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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ACM
AMINAL
Art.
AtG
CCR
CFA
CSC
CTRC
EDF
FFSA
FGTI
GAREAT
GEMA
GenTG

Autoriteit Consument en Markt (Netherlands
Competition
Authority)
Administration for Environment, Nature, Land
and Water
Management (Flemish Region in
Belgium)
Article
Atomgesetz (Germany) (Nuclear Energy Act)
Caisse Centrale de Réassurance (France) (Central
Reinsurance Fund)
Commissie Financiële Afwikkeling Vuurwerkramp
(Commission for the Financial Compensation of
Victims of the Fireworks Disaster)
Convention on Supplementary Compensation for
Nuclear Damage
Commissie Tegemoetkoming bij Rampen en
Calamiteiten (Commission for Compensation in
cases of catastrophes and incidents)
Electricité de France (electricity company in
France)
Fédération Française de l’Assurance (French
Federation of Insurance Corporations)
Fonds de garantie des victimes des actes de
terrorisme et d’autres infractions (Compensation
Funds for Victims of Terrorism and Other Crimes)
Gestion de l’Assurance et de la Réassurance des
Risques Attentats et Actes de Terrorisme
(Reinsurance Pool for Terrorism Risks)
Groupement
des
Entreprises
Mutuelles
d’Assurances (French Grouping of the Mutual
Insurance Companies)
Gentechnikgesetz (Germany) (Law on Genetically
Modified Organisms)
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GNP
IAEA
IPCC
LuftVG
NBC
NEA
NHT

Gross National Product
International Atomic Energy Agency
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
Luftverkehrsgesetz (Germany) (Law on Air Traffic)
Nuclear, Biological or Chemical
Nuclear Energy Agency
Nederlandse Herverzekeringsmaatschappij voor
Terrorismeschade
(Netherlands
reinsurance
company for terrorism risk)
NRF
Stichting Nationaal Rampenfonds (National
Compensation Funds for Disasters)
OECD
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development
SDRs
Special Drawing Rights
StVG
Strassenverkehrsgesetz (Germany) (Traffic Code)
TRIP
Terrorism Reinsurance and Insurance Pool
(Belgium)
UmweltHG Umwelthaftungsgesetz (Germany) (Environmental
Liability Act)
USD
United States Dollar
WRR
Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid
(Netherlands Scientific Council for Government
Policy)
WTS
Wet Tegemoetkoming Schade bij Rampen en
Zware Ongevallen (Law for the Compensation of
Damage in the Event of Catastrophes and Large
Accidents)

I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent decade a lot of attention has been paid to the
way in which victims of a variety of disasters would be
financially compensated. Many legislators have been active by
creating specific compensation mechanisms – although, in some
countries, the compensation is not based on a structural statutory
framework, but will rather be provided ad hoc if politicians
consider the particular disaster to deserve ex post compensation.
Various studies have also shown remarkable differences with
respect to the financial compensation of victims of disasters, even
between European countries. 1 Notwithstanding the existence of a
1
See, e.g., FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES:
A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH (Michael G. Faure & Ton Hartlief eds.,
2006); VÉRONIQUE BRUGGEMAN, COMPENSATING CATASTROPHE VICTIMS: A
COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACH (2010).
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European Solidarity Fund, differences between the European
Member States remain large with respect to victim compensation
mechanisms because of the lack of harmonisation in the area. 2
Various streams of literature stress the importance of
adequate financial compensation to victims of disasters. Some
have pointed at the fact that disasters can have a largely
disruptive effect on societies. Providing adequate financial
compensation to victims is therefore considered an important
condition for restoring societal stability after a disaster. Other
literature, such as literature which adopts the economic approach
to law, points at the relationship between ex post compensation
and ex ante prevention. That literature stresses the fact that
particular ex post compensation mechanisms, more particularly
ad hoc compensation provided by the government, may have
negative effects on the ex ante incentives of victims to invest in
prevention. 3 A careful institutional design of the ex post
compensation mechanisms is therefore not only of importance to
restore social stability after a disaster, but also to bolster disaster
risk reduction. 4
It is against this background that we will comparatively
analyze financial compensation mechanisms in four countries.
From the outset, it should be made clear that disasters can lead to
pecuniary losses (like income loss, property loss etc.) and nonpecuniary losses. Additionally, remedies may either be of a
financial nature (e.g. financial compensation) or of a nonmonetary nature (e.g. restoration in-kind, excuses, or other types
of relief). For reasons of simplicity in this study we do not
distinguish between different heads of damages, and we merely
focus on financial compensation for victims of catastrophes. 5
The Netherlands is used as a point of reference because
various studies have shown that the country’s financial
2

A Green Paper on the Insurance of Natural and Man-Made Disasters
was published by the European Union in 2013, asking the question whether or
not action at EU level could be appropriate or warranted to improve the
market for disaster insurance in the European Union. See Green Paper on the
Insurance of Natural and Man-made Disasters, COM (2013) 0213 final (Apr.
16, 2013). A consultation on the Green Paper was launched in the Spring of
2013.
3
E.g., Richard A. Epstein, Catastrophic Responses to Catastrophic Risks,
12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 287 (1996); Louis Kaplow, Incentives and
Government Relief for Risk, 4 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 167 (1991).
4
See Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Michael G. Faure, The Economics of
Disaster Relief, 37 LAW & POL’Y 180 (2015).
5
See Faure & Hartlief, supra note 1. Where this was equally the case and
on which this study builds further.
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compensation mechanism reveals a shortage with respect to
adequate compensation for disaster victims in comparison to the
neighbouring countries: Belgium, France, and Germany. 6 This
Article focuses on Belgium, France, and Germany because of
each country’s proximity to the Netherlands and differences
between each country’s legislative initiatives to address financial
compensation of disaster victims. With respect to legislative
changes, Belgium and France have moved towards a system with
a structural focus on financial compensation of disaster victims.
Despite debate in Germany, legislative changes have not resulted
in a move towards a system with more structural financial
compensation.
This Article first provides an overview of the financial
compensation regimes in Belgium, France, and Germany and a
discussion of the situation in the Netherlands, which is intended
to indicate where the compensation in the Netherlands shows a
particular gap. This Article will identify whether there is a
particular statutory structural solution, thereby distinguishing
between insurance-based solutions and others. The discussion of
the systems in Belgium, France, and Germany is also used to
indicate where the Netherlands could learn from examples
abroad, but also to show that in some countries, such as
Germany, similar problems as in the Netherlands may arise.
As far as the scope of this study is concerned, this Article
will focus on four types of disasters. The first type of disasters are
natural disasters (e.g. flooding, hurricanes, earthquakes).
Technological or man-made disasters constitute the second type
of disasters. For example, an explosion in a chemical factory
which causes large-scale damages would be rendered a
technological or man-made disaster. The distinction between the
two types of disasters is important from a liability standpoint. In
contrast to certain natural disasters, a liable injurer can be
identified in a technological or man-made disaster which may
result in the application of liability rules and liability insurance.
However, some literature points at the fact that the boundaries
between natural and man-made disasters have become
increasingly blurred. After all, some natural events turn into
disasters as a result of the intervention of man. From a legal
perspective, escalation in the severity of a natural event resulting
6

See, e.g., Véronique Bruggeman, Michael G. Faure & Tobias Heldt,
Insurance Against Catastrophe: Government Stimulation of Insurance
Markets for Catastrophic Events, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 185 (2011);
Ton Hartlief & Michael G. Faure, Vergoeding van schade bij rampen in België
en Nederland, 52 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR PRIVAATRECHT [TPR] 991 (2015) (Belg.).
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from an intervention by man does not necessarily enable the
application of liability rules to natural disasters. In fact, the only
party who could be subject to liability rules in the case of natural
disasters would be the government, and many legal systems still
have higher thresholds or immunities for public authority
liability. In addition to a general discussion of natural and
technological disasters, this Article will briefly focus on two more
specific types of disasters: nuclear accidents and terrorism. The
focus on the nuclear disasters will be relatively brief as all four
countries are signatories to the Convention on third party liability
in the field of nuclear energy of 29 July 1960 and related
international treaties. 7 However, the way in which these
Conventions have been implemented in the four countries and
the amounts of compensation differ. After the occurrence of
terrorist attacks on 9/11, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and
Germany created specific arrangements for the insurance of
terrorism-related damage in their respective countries. A brief
discussion of those mechanisms is equally interesting as these
show that relatively high amounts of compensation can be
provided through a so-called public-private partnership whereby
the government intervenes as reinsurer of last resort via a pool
construction.
Of course, in addition to those four specific types of
disasters, it is easy to imagine other types of catastrophes with the
potential of creating societal disruption, such as large food
poisoning outbreaks or cyber security-related risks. However,
disasters of the aforementioned type are outside the scope of this
Article. This is due to the fact that cyber risks are very peculiar
and unique. The main difference between cyber attacks and the
man-made disasters discussed in this Article is that cyber attacks
lack catastrophic losses with respect to the amount of personal
injury stemming from such attack. Moreover, the way in which
one could deal with financial losses due to cyber security would
also require a separate treatment. Cyber attacks are on the one
hand man-made; and on the other hand (and in that sense they
resemble terrorism) the detection rate is very low as a result of
which the mechanisms proposed here to address man-made
disasters cannot automatically be transposed to the case of cyber
security. In that sense the losses resulting from cyber attacks are
7

The Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear
Energy, July 29, 1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 251 [hereinafter Paris Convention]
constitutes a framework for the financial compensation for victims of nuclear
accidents. The Paris Convention was amended by the Additional Protocol of
28 January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16 November 1982.
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to some extent more comparable to losses resulting from natural
catastrophes. However, the possibilities for potential victims to
take preventive measures with respect to cyber attacks are much
more pronounced than with losses resulting from natural
disasters. Moreover, the primary demand in cases of cyber
attacks is often increased cyber security. A cyber attack does not
always necessarily lead to a demand for compensation of specific
financial losses. There have been steps towards the application of
some of the instruments discussed in this Article, such as cyber
insurance and risk-sharing agreements, to the case of cyber
security as well. 8 Due to the idiosyncrasies of particularities of
cyber security, an examination into cyber attacks deserves
separate treatment. As a result, the concluding chapter (VII) of
this Article indicates the possible expansion of this study to the
case of cyber security as one possible avenue for future research.
As far as the method for this Article is concerned, this
analysis builds on comparative research 9 from 2006 in which the
financial compensation for victims of catastrophes was sketched
from a comparative legal perspective. That study equally
discussed the four countries central to this study. However, that
study is more than ten years old, and several evolutions have
taken place in the countries under discussion that need to be
taken into account. The four countries under review in this
Article have also been analyzed in the earlier (2006) study. To
some extent, and in order to provide a consistent picture of the
situation in the particular legal system, a summary will be
provided of the results of the 2006 study. However, to the extent
that important changes took place, an update will be provided.
The update will not only concern new evolutions in legislation or
policy, but also the application of specific policy tools to new
disasters. This Article is also based on other research executed in
this domain. The research will also build further on the doctoral
dissertation by Véronique Bruggeman from 2010. 10 Bruggeman
equally addresses France and Belgium, and that can undoubtedly
be a useful starting point. More recently, Faure and Hartlief have
compared the financial compensation for victims of catastrophes
in Belgium and the Netherlands, and Faure has analyzed the
liability and compensation mechanisms as tools to reduce disaster
risks. 11 All those studies will be a point of reference and starting
8

See Michael G. Faure & Bernold Nieuwesteeg, Law and Economics of
Cyber Security Risk Pooling, 14(3) N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 923-963 (2018).
9
Faure & Hartlief, supra note 1.
10
BRUGGEMAN, supra note 1.
11
See Hartlief & Faure, supra note 6; see also M.G. Faure, In the
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point for the current study.
Two approaches will be leading as methods for this
Article. On the one hand, the economic approach to law will be
employed. In literature utilizing the economic approach to law,
emphasis has been placed on compensation for victims of
catastrophes and the effects of various ex post compensation
mechanisms on ex ante incentives for disaster risk reduction. 12
Literature utilizing law and economics provides the advantage of
viewing the subject with an effectiveness analysis. The method
can be employed to analyze the extent to which a particular goal,
such as adequate 13 financial compensation of victims and/or ex
ante disaster risk reduction, can be achieved through a specific
institutional design. Without repeating the findings of this law
and economics literature, the main results can be summarized as
follows: 1) the ex post compensation mechanism should be shaped
in such a manner that effective 14 ex ante incentives for prevention
are provided as ex post recovery that will affect ex ante
prevention; 15 2) ex post ad hoc government compensation will not
provide effective ex ante incentives for prevention and may dilute
incentives to purchase insurance; 16 3) insurance is better able to
provide ex ante incentives for prevention via effective risk
differentiation; 17 4) given systemic underestimation of the
catastrophic
risk
by
potential
victims, 18
mandatory
comprehensive cover can improve both ex ante prevention and ex
post compensation; 19 5) the supply of catastrophe cover can be
stimulated through the government by acting as reinsurer of last
Aftermath of the Disaster: Liability and Compensation Mechanisms as Tools
to Reduce Disaster Risks, STAN.J.INT’L J. 52, 95-178 (2016).
12
See, e.g., Michael G. Faure, Financial Compensation for Victims of
Catastrophes: A Law and Economics Perspective, 29 LAW & POL’Y 339 (2007).
13
‘Adequate’ suggests that the financial compensation is large enough to
reimburse the victims’ losses.
14
‘Effective’ means “adequate to accomplish a purpose; producing the
intended or expected result”. It should be noted that this study does not deal
with efficiency considerations. In other words, we are not explicitly looking at
whether the financial compensation mechanisms perform in the best possible
manner with the least waste of time and effort.
15
Dari-Mattiacci & Faure, supra note 4.
16
Epstein, supra note 3; Kaplow, supra note 3.
17
George L. Priest, The Government, the Market and the Problem of
Catastrophic Loss, 12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 219 (1996).
18
Paul Slovic, Howard Kunreuther & Gilbert F. White, Decision
Processes, Rationality and Adjustments to National Hazards, in THE
PERCEPTION OF RISK 1 (Paul Slovic ed., 2000).
19
Howard Kunreuther, The Case for Comprehensive Disaster Insurance,
11 J.L. & ECON. 133 (1968).
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resort; 20 and 6) especially in developing countries, affordability of
the insurance premium should be stimulated through a voucher
system that still reflects risk and incentivizes potential victims to
adopt risk-reducing measures. 21
On the other hand, the functional comparative method
will be employed to analyze the extent to which the two main
goals of an adequate financial compensation system can be
reached, more particularly: 1) adequate financial compensation to
victims ex post, and 2) providing ex ante incentives for disaster
risk reduction. In alphabetical order, the study sketches the
financial compensation system in Belgium (II), France (III), and
Germany (IV) in order to finally discuss the Netherlands (V). In
this respect, not only is the current system outlined, but also the
historical evolution as well as the reasons for recent legislative
changes. Of course, not all of the legal details of the system are
described; only those that are crucial from the perspective of this
study (law and economics methodology). 22 Thus this Article
focuses mainly on the financing of the system (whether it is
private or public), the financial compensation provided, the
involvement of the government, and the matter of whether the
system offers incentives for prevention (via risk differentiation in
the financing of the compensation or otherwise). However, the
general question of whether and to what extent private insurance
results in better compensation than public catastrophe funds does
not form part of this Article. 23 This is an issue that has been
extensively dealt with in law and economics literature. The goal
of this Article is to take the aforementioned literature as one of
the starting points of the study and to engage in an institutional
comparative analysis. The critical comparison will specifically
examine to what extent the situation in the Netherlands shows
particular gaps in comparison with the other countries (VI).

20

Bruggeman, Faure & Heldt, supra note 6.
Howard Kunreuther, Catastrophe Insurance: Challenges for the US
and Asia, in ASIAN CATASTROPHE INSURANCE 3 (Charles Scawthorn & Kiyoshi
Kobayashi eds., 2008).
22
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007).
23
See generally Alfred Endres, Cornelia Ohl & Bianca Rundshagen, Land
unter! Ein institutionenökonomischer Zwischenruf, 29 LIST FORUM FÜR
WIRTSCHAFTS- UND FINANZPOLITIK 284 (2003)(Ger.); Christian Gollier, Some
Aspects of the Economics of Catastrophe Risk Insurance, in CATASTROPHIC
RISKS AND INSURANCE, 13 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development ed., 2005).
21
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II. BELGIUM
A. Natural Disasters
1. Introduction
The types of natural catastrophes to which Belgium is
exposed are relatively limited. The most extensive damage is
normally caused by storms, heavy rainfall, and flooding (as
Belgium has many surface waters). An exceptional earthquake –
there have been instances in the province of Limburg – is also a
possibility. Moreover, various studies on the potential
consequences of climate change, as listed in IPCC 24 (2007), make
clear that Belgium is potentially exposed to increasingly severe
natural catastrophes.
While Belgium is exposed to a number of natural hazards,
there have been few significant catastrophic losses in the past few
years. Nevertheless, as regards the flooding risk in Flanders, the
Administration for Environment, Nature, Land and Water
Management (AMINAL) of the Ministry of the Flemish Region
calculated that 72,000 hectares, or five percent of the territory of
the Flemish Region, could be demarcated as flood-prone. With
respect to the flood-prone territory, 6,166 hectares are situated in
residential zones. Therefore, based on an average surface of 784
square meters per property, between 60,000 and 80,000 residences
are represented. 25
Until 2003 Belgium only had a patchwork of regulations
directly or indirectly applicable to victims of natural catastrophes
searching for full financial compensation. Indeed, tort law,
24
IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report (Contribution of
Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), Geneva, 104 pp.
25
Wetsontwerp tot wijziging, wat de verzekering tegen natuurrampen
betreft, van de wet van 25 juni 1992 op de landverzekeringsovereenkomst en
de wet van 12 juli 1976 betreffende het herstel van zekere schade veroorzaakt
aan private goederen door natuurrampen [Proposal of an Act amending, as far
as the insurance against natural disasters is concerned, the Act of 25 June 1992
on the land insurance contract and the Act of 12 July 1976 on the restoration of
certain damage caused to private property by natural disasters], <Explanatory
Memorandum, Parliamentary Proceedings of the Chamber of Representatives
2004-2005, no. 1732/001, p. 7 (Belg.). These figures have been largely
confirmed in the Milieurapport Vlaanderen, see Vlaamse Milieu Maatschappij
[FLEMISH ENVIRONMENT AGENCY], OVERSTROMINGSRISICO (Nov. 2015),
https://www.milieurapport.be/milieuthemas/waterkwantiteit/afvoer-vanneerslag-overstromingen/overstromingsrisico.
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insurance law, various branches of social security law, and
general solidarity needed to be cumulated to achieve financial
compensation. 26 Theoretically, victims could call on liability law
to seek full compensation. However, tort law can apply only
when a liable tortfeasor can be found, which will rarely be the
case after a natural catastrophe. Hence, the victim will have to
rely on other sources of financial compensation. Yet, most of the
existing legislation from the other branches of law granted only
partial compensation, and the satisfaction of conditional elements
and the duration of procedures pose significant challenges to
obtaining financial compensation. This situation changed
drastically in 2005 when new legislation on financial
compensation of victims of natural catastrophes was approved.
2. Evolution of Insurance Coverage
a. Creation of the Disaster Fund
After a whirlwind caused considerable damage in January
1976 to some parts of Belgium, the Council of Ministers decided
to implement basic legislation allowing for the reparation of
damage to private property due to natural disasters. The Act of
12 July 1976 on the Repair of Certain Damage Caused to Private
Goods by Natural Disasters 27 installed a so-called Disaster Fund
as a part of the National Cash Registry for Disaster Damage. 28
Pursuant to Art. 37 of the Act of 12 July 1976, the Disaster Fund
is financed in the aftermath of a natural catastrophe by advances
from the Treasury, loans and, where necessary, allocations drawn
from the State budget, gifts, legacies, and profits from the
National Lottery. The Federal Disaster Fund used to
compensate, in instalments, for direct material damage caused by
such a natural disaster, up to the amount of EUR 64,800, while a
deductible of EUR 250 was applied – on the condition that the
total direct damage to private goods amounted to at least EUR
1,250,000 and the average damage amounted to at least EUR
26

Kristiaan Bernauw, De verzekering van natuurrampen, TIJDSCHRIFT
VERZEKERINGEN = BULLETIN DES ASSURANCES (ED. BILINGUE) 153
(Belg.) (2006).
27
Wet van 12 juli 1976 betreffende het herstel van zekere schade
veroorzaakt aan private goederen door natuurrampen [Act of 12 July 1976 on
the Repair of Certain Damage Caused to Private Goods by Natural Disasters]
of July 12, 1976, Belgisch Staatblad [B.S.] 13-08-1976 (Belgium).
28
Following the regionalization of the Federal Disaster Fund in the sixth
State reform, the regions have competence in this matter for disasters that
occurred after 1 July 2014.
VOOR
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5,000 per family. The Act of 12 July 1976 permits full financial
compensation only if the granted money is used for restoration or
construction works within the following three years.
The Disaster Fund cannot be considered a great success
since citizens must wait a considerable amount of time before
receiving financial compensation for damage, the government
must recognize the event as a natural disaster, 29 and the
application procedure is very complex. 30 Moreover, financial
compensation is granted only up to a certain amount and
determined in accordance with statutory criteria that lack a
consideration of real damage. 31 Furthermore, the area of
application of the Act of 1976 is specified narrowly and the
damage arising from risks that under normal circumstances
would be covered by insurance policies, such as fire, lightning,
explosions, hail or storm, is excluded a priori from financial
compensation. Finally, the legislature opted for a system whereby
the financing mechanism only becomes operative from the
moment a catastrophe occurs.
b. Insurance Solution for Fire
Since the Disaster Fund is financed by general taxpayers
in accordance with the notion of solidarity, the Government of
Belgium searched for other ways to provide financial
compensation for natural catastrophes, such as calling on the
insurance industry. The promulgation of the Royal Decree of 24
December 1992 on the Insurance against Fire and other Dangers
as concerns the Simple Risks was a first, albeit small, step
forward. This Royal Decree is applicable to those insurance
29

Recognition of an event as a disaster is a political decision, in which
other more than purely technical motives also play a role. Nevertheless, to be
declared a natural disaster, the phenomenon needs to have an exceptional
character and have caused considerable damage. The criteria are as follows:
total damage must amount to at least EUR 1,239,467.60; average damage must
amount to at least EUR 5,577.60 per family; and the phenomenon must have a
retain period of a maximum of once every twenty years. See: Ministeriële
omzendbrief van 30 november 2001 betreffende de toepassing van de wet van
12 juli 1976 betreffende het herstel van zekere schade veroorzaakt aan private
goederen door natuurrampen [Ministerial Circular of 30 November 2001 on
the Application of the Act of 12 July 1976 on the Repair of Certain Damage
Caused to Private Goods by Natural Disasters – new norms on the recognition
as natural disaster].
30
Isabelle C. Durant, Belgium, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR
VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH, supra note 1,
at 37, 72-73.
31
Bernauw, supra note 26, at 155-157.
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agreements in which simple risks32 are insured against damage
due to: 1) fire and related dangers (such as a lightning strike,
explosion, implosion, and contact with an aircraft, vehicle or
animal); 2) electricity; 3) attacks and labour conflicts; 4) storm,
hail, ice and snow pressure; 5) natural disasters; 6) water; 7)
broken windows; 8) theft; 9) indirect losses; and 10) industrial
damage for which daily compensation is guaranteed.
c. Insurance Solution for Storm Coverage 33
Although damage caused by storms in principle could be
(partially) covered by most fire insurance policies, the Disaster
Fund did pay out EUR 15,284,632 of compensation after
windstorm Daria hit the country in 1990. Consequently, the Fund
was not able to build up a financial reserve, and the former
Minister of Economic Affairs, Willy Claes, proposed in 1990 and
in 1992 to transfer the task of the Disaster Fund to the private
insurance sector. 34 This is one of the reasons why the Royal
32
Fire insurance coverage for simple risks relates to: 1) every good or
entity of goods of which the insured value does not add up to more than EUR
743,680.57; and 2) each of the following goods for which the insured value is
below EUR 23.921.725,24: a. offices and houses, including apartments or office
buildings as far as the surface used for commercial purposes does not amount
to more than twenty percent of the total surface of all the floors; b.
agricultural, garden and viniculture companies, fruit and cattle-breeding
companies; c. places used for the exercise of professions, with the exception of
pharmacies; d. places used for religious events, such as for masses, abbeys and
cloisters; e. places used for cultural, social and philosophical activities; f.
buildings used for education, with the exception of higher education; g. music
conservatories, museums and libraries; h. installations that are exclusively
used for sport activities; and i. institutes for medical treatment, sanatoria,
hospitals, clinics and rest homes. The mentioned amounts are coupled to the
ABEX (Association Belge des Experts)-index, with a basic index of 375.
Koninklijk besluit van 24 december 1992 betreffende de verzekering tegen
brand en andere gevaren wat de eenvoudige risico’s betreft [Royal Decree of
24 December 1992 concerning the insurance against fire and other hazards
with regard to the simple risks] of Dec. 24, 1992, BELGISCH STAATSBLAD
[B.S.], 31-12-1992, Art. 5 (Belg.).
33
Koninklijk besluit van 16 januari 1995 tot wijziging van het koninklijk
besluit van 24 december 1992 betreffende de verzekering tegen brand en
andere gevaren wat de eenvoudige risico’s betreft [Royal Decree of 16 January
1995 amending the Royal Decree of 24 December 1992 on insurance against
fire and other hazards with regard to the simple risks] of January 16, 1995,
BELGISCH STAATSBLAD [B.S.], 11-04-1995 (Belg.).
34
Luc Nijs, Wateroverlast en de rol van de verzekeringswereld, in Ruimte
voor water, de beste verzekering tegen wateroverlast, Brussels, AMINAL &
KBC, 15 May 2001.
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Decree of 16 January 1995 established that ‘storm coverage’ –
which legally comprises hail, ice and snow pressure – would be
an obligatory extension of every fire insurance policy that
concerns simple risks.35 The legal rule is now based on the
principle that property will be mandatorily insured against
storms that have a wind speed of no less than 100 kilometres per
hour. Furthermore, the Royal Decree foresees a minimum level of
coverage and authorises the exclusion of those goods that are
highly vulnerable to the storm risk (such as light or easily
movable constructions, open buildings and bell towers).
d. Mandatory Extension for Flood Risks
The Act of 21 May 2003, modifying the Act of 25 June
1992 on the Land Insurance Agreement, and the Act of 12 July
1976 on the Repair of Certain Damage Caused to Private Goods
by Natural Disasters, in turn introduced flood coverage as a
mandatory extension to the fire insurance policies concerning
simple risks (in the same way as storm coverage had been
introduced in 1995). 36 This mandatory extension only applies,
however, to property situated in flood-prone areas (an optimal
extension is available for property outside this risk area), which
had to be demarcated by the country’s three Regions. As a result,
the Disaster Fund no longer needs to intervene since flood risk is
insured or at least insurable. The Act of 1976, though, continues
to exist for those events and property not included in the Act of
2003, namely for those goods that are not insured because of the
low financial capabilities of the victim, and for agricultural
damage. In addition, the Act of 2003 foresees the creation of an
Office of Tariffication, providing insurance to those who do not
have any coverage because either no agent is willing to cover the
risk or the requested premium is too high.

35

Explanatory Memorandum, Parliamentary Proceedings of the Chamber
of Representatives 2004-2005, no. 1732/001.
36
Kurt Termote, Naar een verplichte dekking van natuurrampen?, 375
BALANS 6 (1998) (Belg.); Kurt Termote, Natuurrampen: nieuwe poging tot
regeling,
423
BALANS
4
(2000);
Kurt
Termote,
Verplichte
overstroningsverzekering: niet voor iedereen, 473 BALANS 5 (2003); Caroline
Van Schoubroeck, The quest for private insurance for damage caused by
natural disasters: a Belgian case, 6 J. BUS. L. 558 (2003); Chris Celis & Miek de
Graeve, De overstromingsverzekering: een slag in het water?, 2006
TIJDSCHRIFT VERKOOP VASTGOED [TVV] 529 (Belg.).
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e. Mandatory add on to fire insurance 37
The Act of 21 May 2003 did not enter into force, however,
mainly due to difficulties with the demarcation of the flood-prone
areas. 38 In addition, the Ministerial Council decided on 23
January 2004 to consolidate the loan that it had granted to the
Disaster Fund. 39 The Belgian State then argued that it would be
better off if a new act transferred coverage of natural disasters to
the insurance sector. Therefore, the Act of 2003 was amended by
the Act of 17 September 2005, building on the former legal
provisions. 40
The Belgian legislature created general solidarity between
all citizens who buy fire insurance for the so-called simple risks –
comprising 90-95 percent of the Belgian population – by
introducing a mandatory extension to natural disaster coverage.
The latter consists of four perils: flooding (referring to water that
comes from below); earthquakes; the flowing over or the
impoundment of public sewers; and a landslide or subsidence.
Fire insurance for simple risks and coverage for natural
catastrophes are bound up inextricably, meaning that if the fire
insurer refuses to offer coverage for natural disasters, he cannot
offer any longer fire insurance itself. 41 The extra insurance
37
Wet van 17 september 2005 tot wijziging wat de verzekering tegen
natuurrampen betreft, van de wet van 25 juni 1992 op de
landverzekeringsovereenkomst en de wet van 12 juli 1976 betreffende het
herstel van zekere schade veroorzaakt aan private goederen door
natuurrampen [Act of 17 September 2005 amending as regards insurance
against natural disasters, the Act of 25 June 1992 on the land insurance
contract and the Act of 12 July 1976 on the restoration of certain damage
caused to private property by natural disasters] of September 17, 2005,
BELGISCH STAATSBLAD [B.S.], 11-10-2005 (Belg.).
38
Philippe Colle, De wet van 17 september 2005 betreffende de
verzekering van natuurrampen, 69 RECHTSKUNDIG WEEKBLAD [RW], nr. 23,
2005-2006, at 881 (Belg.).
39
Chamber of Representatives, 25 April 2005, Bill on the Amendment, as
concerns the Insurance Against Natural Disasters, of the Act of 25 June 1992
on the Land Insurance Agreement and the Act of 12 July 1976 on the Repair of
Certain Damage Caused to Private Goods by Natural Disasters, DOC 51
1732/001, 2004-5, p. 14.
40
See Act of 17 September 2005: Assuralia, De natuurrampendekking,
ASSURINFO, Oct. 19, 2005 (Belg.); Colle, supra note 38; Bernauw, supra note
26; Marc de Graeve, De natuurrampenverzekering; de kogel is eindelijk door
de kerk, VOL TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR WETGEVING [T.V.W.] 81 (Belg.); Kurt
Termote, Natuurrampenverzekering: sinds 1 maart in voege, 538 BALANS 5
(2006).
41
The fire insurer is entitled nevertheless to refuse insurance of flooding
in the event that (part of) the building was constructed more than eighteen
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premium will be adjusted to every individual case accordingly
and one can expect it to be between EUR 3-4 per EUR 25,000
insured. The maximum indexed deductible for disaster coverage
amounts to EUR 610 per claim.
This way, at least all direct damage to the insured
property caused by a natural catastrophe or by an insured peril
that results directly from it (notably fire, explosion, or implosion)
is compensated. Additionally, damage to the insured property due
to measures taken by a legally constituted authority to safeguard
and protect goods and persons as well as the clearance and
demolition expenses associated with reconstruction of the
property is compensated. Potential accommodation costs
occurred during the three months following the catastrophe (if the
dwelling became inhabitable) can also be reimbursed. Nongathered crops, soil, objects located outside of the building (unless
if they are permanently attached), easily movable constructions,
garden houses and vehicles, among other things, are excluded
from retribution, unless otherwise stipulated.
Furthermore, each insurer has been given some limits
regarding the monetary burden he should bear, since disaster
coverage concerns catastrophic risks that can reach extraordinary
proportions – the ratio legis being to avoid the financial downfall
of the insurance companies. Indeed, a limit per insurance
company (instead of a global limit for the insurance market) has
the advantage that the insurer can calculate precisely the
maximum risks he is taking, and thus find reinsurance more
easily (Art. 68-8 paragraph 2, Act of 25 June 1992 on the Land
Insurance Agreement). When this limit is attained, the National
Cash Registry for Disaster Damage intervenes with a general
upper limit of EUR 280 million (EUR 700 million for
earthquakes) per event (Art. 34-2, 1° and 34-3 of the Act of 12
July 1976). If these amounts are not sufficient to compensate the
victims fully, the intervention of the Cash Registry will be
reduced in proportion.
These limits seem adequate to compensate for most losses,
especially considering the fact that granted compensations for the
three most destructive natural catastrophes that have hit Belgium
since 1976 until 2005 42 amounted to EUR 74.7 million, EUR 42
months after the publication in the Belgian Gazette of the Royal Decree that
classifies the building as being in a flood-prone area. The ratio legis of this
exception lies in the empowerment of, on the one hand, the local
administrations not to grant building licences, and, on the other hand, the
owners who know that they reside in a risk area.
42
In particular the storms of 25-26 January 1990, the earthquake of 8
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million, and EUR 38.125 million, respectively. 43
In addition, the 2005 Act has set up an Office of
Tariffication. The insurance sector has calculated that between
three and four percent of the insured risks for fire damage are in
fact uninsurable for flooding and that approximately eight
percent of those insured against fire, coverage will see a doubling
of the premium. It is for these uninsurable flooding risks that the
Office of Tariffication will specify the premium conditions.
To conclude, the Act of 17 September 2005 allows victims
of natural catastrophes to direct themselves to their fire insurer
(as long as their damage relates to the simple risks in the sense of
the fire insurance) without recourse to the Disaster Fund, which
is advantageous for both the victims and the Belgian State. 44 As
far as the victim is concerned, the long and often complicated
administrative procedure associated with the Disaster Fund is
avoided. The damaging natural peril no longer needs to be
declared a natural catastrophe by the Ministerial Council. As for
the Belgian State, the main burden of compensating the victims
of natural catastrophes is now borne by the insurers. The Disaster
Fund only intervenes if the limit of the individual insurance
company has been reached and if the damaged property is not
insured due to the financial position of the victim.

November 1983 at Liège/Luik, and the abundant rains of 13-15 September
1998.
43
Explanatory Memorandum, Chamber of Representatives 2004-5, no.
1732/001, p. 15. The actual losses and needs for compensation can be much
higher than the tens of millions of euros mentioned in the Belgian parliament.
First, the numbers that are given are not corrected for inflation and current
risks may be higher due to ongoing population growth and accumulation of
capital. Second, historic losses over the short period of existence of the Belgian
Fund (approximately 25 years) are likely to be lower than the probable
maximum losses that can be estimated using loss models. Hence, flooding in
Belgium can inflict more damage than the amounts mentioned in the Belgian
parliament. For an overview of all disasters hitting the Belgian continent
between 1993 and 2012, see SERVICE PUBLIC FÉDÉRAL INTÉRIEUR,
DIRECTION DES CALAMITES, ÉTUDE STATISTIQUE DES CALAMITÉS DEPUIS
1993
(2013),
https://ibz.be/sites/default/files/media/docs/etude_statistique_des_calamitsdepu
is_1993_version_2013septembre.pdf. The top 10 natural disasters in Belgium
is available at http://emdat.be/.
44
Colle, supra note 38, at 885.
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f. New Legislation 45
The Act of 4 April 2014 repeals most of the provisions of
the 1992 Insurance Act. However, all relevant articles related to
the insurance against natural disasters as concerns the simple
risks have been literally taken over in the new Act of 2014.
g. Separate Solution in the Flemish Region 46
Following the sixth State reform (via the Special Act of 6
January 2014), the three Regions in Belgium have been attributed
the competence of legislating and implementing the financial
compensation in response to damage caused by disasters, and this
from 1 July 2014 onwards. Consequently, Flanders promulgated
the Decree of 3 June 2016 regarding the Compensation for
Damage caused by General Disasters in the Flemish Region. This
decree unites the principles of compensation, reimbursement
procedures and financing methods for damage suffered by
general disasters on the territory of the Flemish Region. It builds
on the basics of the Act of 12 July 1976 – which it repeals, while it
also strives for administrative simplification and an update of the
reimbursement process. 47 The Decree of 3 June 2016 has been
further implemented by the Decision of the Flemish Government
of 23 December 2016. 48
45

Wet van 4 april 2014 betreffende de verzekeringen [Act of 4 April 2014
on insurance] of April 4, 2014, B.S. 30-04-2014 (Belg.)
46
Decreet van 3 juni 2016 betreffende de tegemoetkoming voor schade,
aangericht door algemene rampen in het Vlaamse Gewest [Decree of 3 June
2016 concerning the compensation for damage caused by general disasters in
the Flemish Region] of June 3, 2016, B.S. 23-06-2016 (Belg.). Similar legislative
measures have been promulgated in the Walloon Region, see
Programmadecreet houdende verschillende maatregelen betreffende de
begroting inzake natuurrampen, verkeersveiligheid, openbare werken, energie,
huisvesting, leefmilieu, ruimtelijke ordening, dierenwelzijn, landbouw en
fiscaliteit [Program Decree of 12 December 2014, which establishes the Fonds
Wallon des Calamités naturelles] of Dec. 12, 2014, B.S. 29-12-2014 (Belg.).
47
Ontwerp van decreet betreffende de tegemoetkoming voor schade,
aangericht door algemene rampen in het Vlaamse Gewest, Explanatory
Memorandum, 695 (2015-2016) – Nr. 1, page 3, available at
https://docs.vlaamsparlement.be/docs/stukken/2015-2016/g695-1.pdf.
48
Besluit van 23 december 2016 van de Vlaamse Regering tot uitvoering
van het decreet van 3 juni 2016 betreffende de tegemoetkoming voor schade,
aangericht door algemene rampen in het Vlaamse Gewest [Decree of 23
December 2016 of the Flemish Government implementing the Decree of 3 June
2016 regarding the compensation for damage caused by general disasters in the
Flemish Region] of December 23, 2016, B.S. 13-02-2017 (Belg.)
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In Flanders, exceptional natural phenomena that meet a
particular financial criterion (i.e. damage to private and public
goods exceeding EUR 30 million) can be recognized as a “general
disaster”. As a result victims can turn to the Flemish Disaster
Fund.49 The same is the case if the aforementioned financial
criterion is not met, but if other specific scientific criteria are
fulfilled. The specific criteria, laid down in the Decision of 23
December 2016, are based on the return period of a disaster or on
a determined scientific scale.
In order to determine the geographical extent of the
general disaster, the municipalities receive up to 60 days after the
exceptional natural phenomenon to request that their territory is
included in the geographical demarcation area of the general
disaster. This period for applying for recognition to the Flemish
Government is being restricted in comparison with the 1976 Act
and fits in with the overall goal to accelerate the procedure.
Contrary to the 1976 Act, this decree considers the fire
insurance coverage for simple risks: the physical goods which can
be insured under this insurance coverage are excluded from the
scope of the 2016 Decree. It can be reiterated here that this fire
insurance coverage for simple risks provides coverage against
damage caused by lightning, explosion, storm (including the gusts
of wind with a local character), hail, ice and snow pressure,
flooding, overflowing or pushing up public sewers, landslides or
subsidence and earthquakes.
The request for financial compensation needs to be
submitted within three months following the publication of the
recognition decision in the Official Journal. The principle laid
down in the 2016 Decree is that the financial compensation
should be used to repair the damage. The compensatory amount
is calculated by applying coefficients to the total net amount of
the damage, while a deductible of EUR 500 is applied.
Finally, like the 1976 Act, the Flemish Government acts as
a Guarantee Fund for insurers in case they are confronted with
some harsh financial conditions. The intervention of the Flemish
Government covers the part of the financial compensation the
insurer cannot pay to his insureds.

49

Agricultural disasters are legislated in a separate Decree.
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B. Technological disasters
1. Strict Liability
Belgian law has created quite a few strict liabilities for
technological disasters. 50 The Civil Code includes a strict liability
for the guardian of a defective object (Article 1384, al. 1 of the
Civil Code). Strict liability is also reserved for employers and
other superiors if a tort is committed by their agents (Article 1384,
al. 3 of the Civil Code). The owner of an animal is strictly liable if
damage is caused by the animal (Article 1385 of the Civil Code)
and the owner of a building is strictly liable with respect to
damage caused by the partial or complete collapse of a building if
that was caused by a construction defect or a lack of maintenance
(Article 1386 of the Civil Code). 51
Specific statutes equally introduce strict liabilities inter
alia with respect to damage caused by mines, the transport of gas,
damage caused by toxic waste, fire or explosions in public
buildings and nuclear accidents. 52 However, that does not imply
that the Belgian rules with respect to strict liability have been
developed in a systematic manner. The reality is rather that
specific statutes introduced strict liability ad hoc, usually at the
occasion of a scandal or large accident. 53 For example, it is
unclear why strict liability is introduced for fires or explosions in
public buildings but not for operators of a petrochemical plant. 54
2. Solvency Guarantees
Belgian law has a large amount of mandatory solvency
guarantees such as compulsory liability insurance. 55 An important
50
See, e.g., HUBERT BOCKEN & INGRID
BUITENCONTRACTUEEL
AANSPRAKELIJKHEIDSRECHT
SCHADEVERGOEDINGSMECHANISMEN 123-171 (2010) for an

BOONE,
EN

HET
ANDERE

overview.
Burgerlijk Wetboek [Civil Code], Book III, B.S. 03-09-1807 (Belg.).
52
See, e.g., Hubert Bocken, Van fout naar risico: Een overzicht van de
objectieve aansprakelijkheidsregelingen naar Belgisch recht, 21 TIJDSCHRIFT
VOOR PRIVAATRECHT [TPR] 329, 329-415 (1984) for an overview. The
regulation concerning nuclear accidents will be discussed in the next section.
53
MICHAEL G. FAURE & ROGER VAN DEN BERGH, OBJECTIEVE
AANSPRAKELIJKHEID,
VERPLICHTE
VERZEKERING
EN
VEILIGHEIDSREGULERING 201-202 (1989).
54
Hartlief & Faure, supra note 6, at 1008-09.
55
See, e.g., Jean Rogge, De verplichte verzekering: een ongedefinieerde
notie, in LIBER AMICORUM HUBERT BOCKEN 239, 242 (Ingrid Boone, Ignace
Claeys & Luc Lavrysen eds., 2009), and Véronique Bruggeman, Michael G.
Faure & Ton Hartlief, Verplichte verzekering in België, 2007 TIJDSCHRIFT
51
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example of such a mandatory solvency guarantee relates to the
strict liability for personal injury and material damage caused to
third parties as a result of fire or explosion in a public building –
without prejudice to the ordinary recourse to the persons
responsible for the damage. 56 The Act not only creates strict
liability, but also a mandatory solvency guarantee: a place cannot
be opened to the public if the strict liability to which it is exposed
has not been adequately covered through liability insurance. The
amount to be covered is regulated in a Royal Decree 57 for damage
related to personal injury; the limit is EUR 14,873,611.49 58 and
for material damage the limit is EUR 743,680.57. 59 These
amounts are increased based on inflation. According to this
system, when an explosion in a public place takes place, strict
liability and mandatory liability insurance up to the mentioned
limits would be applicable.
As a result of strict liability and mandatory liability
insurance, victims of a technological disaster in a public building
in Belgium have a reasonable likelihood of being compensated.
The reasonable likelihood of compensation is bolstered by the
fact that such victims have a so-called direct action against the
liability insurer, which entitles the victims to priority over other
creditors. By receiving priority over other creditors, victims avoid
the risk that the insured amounts would no longer be available as
compensation in the event of bankruptcy. 60 Of course questions
VOOR VERZEKERINGEN 387,

for details.
Based on the Wet betreffende de preventie van brand en ontploffing en
betreffende de verplichte verzekering van de burgerrechtelijke
aansprakelijkheid in dergelijke gevallen [Act on the prevention of fire and
explosion and on the compulsory insurance of civil liability in such cases] of
Jul. 30, 1979, B.S., Sept. 20, 1979. See Alo s Van Oevelen & Armand
Vandeplas, Preventie van brand en ontploffing, objectieve aansprakelijkheid
en verplichte burgerlijke aansprakelijkheidsverzekering, 44 RECHTSKUNDIG
WEEKBLAD [RW], no. 4, 1980-1981, at 217 for details.
57
Koninklijk besluit van 5 augustus 1991 tot uitvoering van de artikelen
8, 8bis en 9 van de wet van 30 juli 1979 betreffende de preventie van brand en
ontploffing en betreffende de verplichte verzekering van de burgerrechtelijke
aansprakelijkheid in dergelijke gevallen [Royal Decree of 5 August 1991 on the
articles 8, 8bis and 9 of the Act of 30 July 1979 on the prevention of fire and
explosion and on the compulsory insurance of civil liability in similar cases] of
August 5, 1991, B.S. 30-08-1991 (Belg.), as amended.
58
The Royal Decree mentions an amount of 600 million Belgian francs,
now of course transposed to euros.
59
The amount mentioned in the Royal Decree is 30 million Belgian
francs.
60
See Geert Jocqué, De rechtsbescherming van de verzekerde en de
benadeelde in de aansprakelijkheidsverzekering (2015) (unpublished
56
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can still arise with respect to the adequacy of the financial
compensation mechanism.
With respect to cases involving non-public buildings,
specific strict liability may not be applied to the personal injury
despite the occurrence of activities which could be deemed
dangerous, such as the operation of a petrochemical plant. 61 In
cases of such a technological disaster the strict liability of the
guardian of a defective object might be applicable. 62 For risky
activities, mandatory liability insurance often applies, even
though this may not only be imposed via a statutory duty. Often,
insurance coverage is required as a condition in the
environmental permit of the specific installation. Another
problem is that there may be cases in which there is no
mandatory solvency guarantee despite strict liability. Generally,
strict liabilities, mandatory solvency guarantees (like mandatory
liability insurance), or both, have been created for most high-risk
activities (which could create technological disasters) in
Belgium. 63
3. Rapid Claims Settlement
A new Belgian Act was promulgated on 13 November
2011 concerning financial compensation for victims of
technological accidents, which came into force on 1 November
2012. 64 Its emergence was related to the disaster of an exploding
gas pipeline operated by Fluxys, a Belgian company, that
happened on 30 July 2004 in Ghislenghien. As a result of the
dissertation, Ghent University (on file at UGent) for a more detailed discussion
(http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-8512153).
61
If environmental damage would be caused as a result of that
hypothetical accident, as a consequence of the implementation of the
Environmental Liability Directive, strict liability would apply to the
environmental damage, but not to the personal injury resulting from the
accident.
62
This is based on Art. 1384 al. 1 of the Belgian Civil Code.
63
Hartlief & Faure, supra note 6, at 1010.
64
Wet van 13 november 2011 betreffende de vergoeding van de
lichamelijke en morele schade ingevolge een technologisch ongeval [Act of 13
November 2011 concerning the financial compensation for victims of
technological accidents] of Nov. 13, 2011, B.S., Feb. 24, 2012, 12678. See, e.g.,
C. Coune, Wet van 13 november 2011 betreffende de vergoeding van de
lichamelijke en morele schade ingevolge een technologisch ongeval, 5
TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR BELGISCH HANDELSRECHT [R.D.C.-T.B.H.], no. 5, 2012, at
5; C. De Mulder, Nieuwe wettelijke regeling voor de vergoeding van
slachtoffers van grote technologische rampen, 76 RECHTSKUNDIG WEEKBLAD
[RW], no. 27, 2013, at 1076.
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accident in Ghislenghein, 24 people died and over 150 people
were injured. Because of the link between civil procedure and
criminal procedure in Belgium, most of the victims of the
Ghislenghein accident did not receive compensation until seven
years after the incident. Accidents, such as the exploding gas
pipeline in Ghislenghein, illustrate the need for a new Act that
specifically aims to accelerate victim compensation. 65
The Act applies to so-called technological disasters of
great extent, which are defined as technological incidents
involving bodily injury to at least five persons through death or
hospitalization. The Act will apply when a specific committee 66
declares the incident to be an exceptional disaster, and victims
shall claim financial compensation within six months from the
publication of the committee’s decision. Subsequently,
compensation matters are taken care of by the Belgian motor
insurance Guarantee Fund. A Special Unit in charge of the
victim’s support is appointed by the public prosecutor. This
Special Unit establishes a list of victims and communicates this
list to the Fund. Victims can ask for financial compensation by
addressing a registered letter to either the Fund or the Special
Unit. The Fund in principle only compensates bodily injury
which is not compensated by the general social security
framework or by other insurance mechanisms. Victims are free to
pursue compensation by filing a claim under the Act or under
Belgian Civil Liability Law.
The Act does not specify the conditions under which the
Fund will compensate. Art. 10 of the Act only specifies that the
Fund will compensate the victim or their descendants according
to the rules of common law, considering the exceptional character
of the damage.
Within three months after the Fund has received the list of
the victims, the administration of the Fund will formulate an
informed advice explaining whether the damage is of such a
nature that it should be compensated on the basis of the statute.
If the advice regarding financial compensation is affirmative and
65

See generally Stefaan Voet, Belgium, in CONSUMER ADR IN EUROPE:
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 25 (Christopher Hodges, Iris Benöhr & Naomi
Creutzfeldt-Banda eds., 2012); Stefaan Voet, Public Enforcement and A(O)DR
as Mechanisms for Resolving Mass Problems: a Belgian Perspective, in
RESOLVING MASS DISPUTE: ADR AND SETTLEMENT OF MASS CLAIMS 270
(Christopher Hodges & Astrid Stadler eds., 2013) for an overview and critical
discussion of (consumer) ADR in Belgium.
66
This specific committee is often referred to as the “committee of wise
men”.
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if the damage can be quantified, the Fund will provide an offer of
compensation. This offer is final. According to Art. 14 of the Act,
the acceptance of the Fund’s final offer by a victim or their
descendants is deemed a final settlement of the case. If the victim
does not agree with the decision of the Fund according to Art. 10,
he can sue the Fund before the civil court.
The financing is based on pre-payment by insurance
companies. Pursuant to Art. 16, when the committee’s decision to
declare the incident a technological disaster has been published,
the Fund will make an estimate of the damage and ask private
insurers to pay to the Fund based on their market share. Insurers
active in the area of civil liability insurance (with the exception of
insurances covering liability in the field of motor vehicles) are
forced to contribute to the Fund on the basis of Art. 16,
paragraph 2. The total maximum amount insurers will have to
contribute is EUR 50 million per year. 67
The Fund is, moreover, subrogated in the rights of the
victim against the liable tortfeasor and his insurer. 68 Art. 17 sets
out that the Fund recovers the damages paid, including the
interest as well as the fees and costs for managing the Fund, from
the liable tortfeasor and its insurer. When no liable tortfeasor can
be identified or when it is not possible to recover the amounts
from the liable tortfeasor (because of his insolvency), the Fund
requests repayment from the National Disaster Fund. The
amounts that can hence be recollected by the Fund from either
the tortfeasor, the tortfeasor’s liability insurer, or from the
National Disaster Fund will then, according to the market share,
be paid back to the insurance companies that initially
contributed.
Art. 20, however, stipulates that if after a procedure it
appears that there is no liable tortfeasor, the entire costs of the
compensation will be paid by the National Disaster Fund. On the
other hand, if there is a liable tortfeasor from whom it is
impossible to obtain financial compensation due to insolvency,
the National Disaster Fund takes care of 50% of the costs that
could not be recovered. The remaining 50% will in that case
presumably remain with the insurers who contributed.
Regarding the Ghislenghien incident in which the Fund
intervened, all 140 files have been closed, leading to a total

67
Act concerning the financial compensation for victims of technological
accidents, supra note 64, Art. 16, paragraph 5.
68
Id. at Art. 9, paragraph 4.
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compensation of EUR 6,599,919. 69

C. Nuclear Accidents
1. General Framework
Because all four countries under discussion are members
of the relevant Conventions, the general framework regarding the
financial compensation of victims of nuclear accidents is
applicable to all countries. As a result, this Article will focus on
the methods in which implementation in the particular countries
differs.
Two separate international compensation regimes were
established in the 1960s, and both were substantially revised after
the Chernobyl accident of 1986. The Paris Convention on Third
Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 29 July 1960
(“Paris Convention”)70 and the Supplementary Convention to the
Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear
Energy of 31 January 1963 (“Brussels Supplementary
Convention”)71 were developed under the auspices of the OECD
Nuclear Energy Agency (“NEA”). The aim of the 1963 Brussels
Supplementary Conventions is to supplement the compensation
system provided in the Paris Convention “with a view to
increasing the amount of compensation for damage which might
result from the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes”. 72
The second regime was developed under the aegis of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) and relates to the
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of 21
May 1963 (“Vienna Convention”).73 These two regimes are
69

Fonds Commun de Garantie Automobile, Rapport Annuel Exercice
2012,
12,
http://www.fcgb-bgwf.be/documents/RapVer/RAPPORT_2012_FCGA.pdf.
70
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy,
July 29, 1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 251 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. This
Convention was amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964 and
by the Protocol of 16 November 1982. For more information, see:
https://www.oecd-nea.org/law/multilateral-agreements/brussels-suppconvention-third-party-liability.html.
71
Convention Supplementary to the Convention on Third Party Liability
in the Field of Nuclear Energy, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1963, 1041
U.N.T.S. 358 (entered into force Dec. 4, 1974) [hereinafter Brussels
Supplementary Convention].
72
Id. considerations.
73
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, opened for
signature May 21, 1963, 1063 U.N.T.S. 265 (entered into force Nov. 12, 1977)
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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usually referred to as the first generation of nuclear liability
Conventions.74
The 1986 Chernobyl accident triggered an intensive
discussion about the limitations of both conventions and resulted
in an eventual revision process of the existing regimes. The socalled second generation of nuclear liability Conventions was
established thereafter. The Conventions comprising the second
generation include the Joint Protocol of 1988 Relating to the
Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention
(“Joint Protocol”), 75 the Protocol to Amend the 1963 Vienna
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (“Protocol to
the Vienna Convention”), 76 the Convention on Supplementary
Compensation for Nuclear Damage (“CSC”), 77 the 2004 Protocol
to Amend the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of
Nuclear Energy (“Protocol to Amend the Paris Convention”),78
and the Protocol to Amend the Convention of 31 January 1963
Supplementary to the Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party
Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (“Protocol to the Brussels
Supplementary Convention”). 79
Several fundamental principles underly the International
Nuclear Liability Conventions, in particular strict liability,
limited liability, and financial security.
74
See Michael G. Faure & Tom Vanden Borre, Compensating Nuclear
Damage: A Comparative Economic Analysis of the US and International
Liability Schemes, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 220 (2008).
75

Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention
and the Paris Convention, opened for signature Sept. 21, 1988, 1672 U.N.T.S.
293 (entered into force April 27, 1992).
76
The Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention was adopted by a
Diplomatic Conference, 8-12 September 1997, and was opened for signature at
Vienna on 29 September 1997 at the 41st General Conference of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, see INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY,
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc566.pdf.
77
Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage,
Sept. 12, 1997, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc567.pdf>,
otherwise International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/567, available at:
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc567.pdf.
78
Protocol to Amend the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field
of Nuclear Energy of 29 July 1960, as amended by the additional Protocol of
28 January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16 November 1982, Feb. 12, 2004,
available at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/paris_convention_protocol.pdf.
This 2004 Protocol has not yet entered into force.
79
Protocol to Amend the Convention of 31 January 1963 Supplementary
to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field of
Nuclear Energy, 12 February 2004, available at: https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wpcontent/uploads/formidable/18/2004-Protocol-to-Amend-the-BrusselsSupplementary-Convention-on-Nuclear-Third-Party-Liability-2.pdf.
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The Paris Convention establishes a system of absolute
liability. 80 According to this system, the operator 81 is liable for
damage caused by a nuclear incident in a nuclear installation or
involving nuclear substances coming from such installations. 82
Similar stipulations regarding absolute liability and exonerations
can also be found under the Vienna Convention.83 The
Conventions of the second generation have not changed the
principle that strict liability applies to the operator of a nuclear
power plant. However, an important change took place as far as
the operator’s available defences are concerned: natural disasters
are no longer an applicable defence. 84
Under the Paris Convention and the Vienna Convention,
the operator’s liability is limited both in amount and in time. The
Paris Convention sets the maximum liability of the operator at 15
million Special Drawing Rights (“SDRs”) (around EUR 18.4
million or USD 21 million) but allows the Contracting Party to
establish a greater or lesser amount by legislation considering the
capacity of insurance and financial security. The Contracting
Party can also require a lower amount of liability according to the
nature of the installation. The lower amount should be no less
than 5 million SDRs (around EUR 6.1 or USD 7 million). 85 By
contrast, the Vienna Convention sets the cap of liability at no less
than USD 5 million. 86
The liability limitation has, however, been changed under
the second generation nuclear Conventions. The Protocol to the
Paris Convention increases the limit for nuclear operators to no
less than EUR 700 million. The Contracting Party can reduce the
liability to no less than EUR 80 million for the carriage of nuclear
substances according to the reduced risks.87 The Convention even
allows for the adoption of unlimited liability by the Contracting
Parties, as long as the financial security required is no less than

80

Paris Convention, supra note 70, Exposé des Motifs, point 14. See
PHILIPPE SANDS & JACQUELINE PEEL, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 738-745 (3rd ed. 2012).
81
Paris Convention, supra note 70, Art. 1(a)(vi), defining ‘operator’ as ‘the
person designated or recognised by the competent public authority as the
operator of that installation’.
82
Id. at Art. 3.
83
Vienna Convention, supra note 73, at Arts. I(1)(k), IV(1) & IV(3).
84
See Protocol to the Paris Convention, Art. 9; Protocol to the Vienna
Convention, Art. 4(3).
85
Paris Convention, supra note 70, at Art. 7(b).
86
Vienna Convention, supra note 73, at Art. V(1).
87
Protocol to the Paris Convention, Art. 7(a) and (b).
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the amount mentioned above. 88
Further, seeking financial security coverage for the
operator’s liability is important for the international regimes on
nuclear liability. Both Conventions require the operator to have
and maintain insurance or other financial security up to its
liability cap.89
In addition, it should be mentioned that the Brussels
Supplementary Convention added two additional layers of
financial compensation via public funds on top of the first tier of
private funds (operator’s liability) provided for by the Paris
Convention. Indeed, the first tier of the Brussels Supplementary
Convention is the insurance coverage of the nuclear operator as
established under the Paris Convention. On top of that amount,
the Brussels Supplementary Convention provides for two
additional tiers of public funds: one ‘national’ public fund and
one international solidarity fund (‘third tier’). The national public
fund is to be made available by the Installation State in whose
territory the nuclear installation of the liable operator is situated.
The international solidarity fund is to be made available by all
Contracting Parties according to a pre-determined formula. In
particular, according to Article 3 of the Brussels Supplementary
Convention, the Contracting Parties undertake that
compensation in respect of damage caused by a nuclear accident
shall be provided up to the amount of 300 million SDRs per
incident (EUR 368.30 million or USD 418.20 million). Such
financial compensation shall be provided:
- Up to an amount of at least 5 million SDRs, out of
funds provided by insurance or other financial
security, such amount to be established by the
legislation of the Contracting Party in whose
territory the nuclear installation of the liable
operator is situated;
- A second tier consisting of the difference between
SDR 175 million and the amount required under
the first tier (thus maximum 170 million SDRs or
EUR 208.705 million or USD 237 million), out of
public funds to be made available by the
Contracting Party in whose territory the nuclear
installation of the liable operator is situated;
- A third tier of 125 million SDRs (EUR 153.459
88

Id. at Art. 10(b).
Paris Convention, supra note 70, Art. 10; Vienna Convention, supra
note 73, Art. VII.
89
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million or USD 174 million), out of public funds to
be made available by the Contracting Parties
according to a formula for contributors which is
based on the GNP and the thermal capacity of the
reactors.
Under the Brussels Supplementary Convention, each
Contracting Party has certain freedoms. It can establish the
maximum liability of the operator, pursuant to the Paris
Convention, at 300 million SDRs, and provide that such liability
shall be covered by the insurance of the nuclear operator. In that
case the Installation State has met its obligation under the
Convention, and it must not provide for national public funding
in the second layer. However, the Contracting Party can also set
the maximum liability of the operator at an amount at least equal
to the insurance of the nuclear operator and provide that, in
excess of such amount and up to 300 million SDRs, public funds
shall be made available by some means other than as cover for
the liability of the operator. 90
Important changes occurred in the international regime
after the Chernobyl accident. As mentioned above the first tier
liability, the liability of the operator of the nuclear power plant,
shall increase to EUR 700 million. Moreover, according to the
Protocol to the Brussels Supplementary Convention, the
Contracting Parties will undertake that financial compensation in
respect to nuclear damage shall be provided up to an amount of
EUR 1.5 billion per nuclear incident. This will be divided as
follows:
- Up to an amount of at least EUR 700 million: funds
provided by insurance or other financial security or
out of public funds provided pursuant to Art. 10(c)
of the Paris Convention;
- Between this amount and EUR 1,200 million:
public funds to be made available by the
Contracting Party in whose territory the nuclear
installation of the liable operator is situated;
- Between EUR 1.2 billion and EUR 1.5 billion, out
of public funds to be made available by all the
Contracting Parties according to the formula for
contributions.
90
See Tom Vanden Borre, Shifts in Governance in Compensation for
Nuclear Damage: 20 Years After Chernobyl, in SHIFTS IN COMPENSATION

FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 302 (Michael G. Faure & Albert Verheij eds.,
2007), for more details.
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Finally, the Convention on Supplementary Compensation
for Nuclear Damage (CSC), adopted on 12 September 1997, is a
new and independent legal instrument, which means that a State
does not need to be a party to the Vienna or Paris Conventions in
order to become a party to the CSC.
According to Article III.1.A of the CSC, the Installation
State shall ensure the availability of at least 300 million SDRs.
This provision provides for an obligation of the Installation State
to ensure that 300 million SDRs are available: the Installation
State is free to choose how this amount is funded (private
insurance, regional agreement, etc.). A State meets its obligation
under Art. III.1.A of the CSC when it imposes liability on the
operator for the entire amount. Therefore, this Article does not
oblige a State to make public funds available. According to
Article II.1.B of the CSC, however, the Contracting Parties shall
make public funds available beyond the amount required under
the first tier. 91
If one were to summarize the situation, one could hold
that in addition to the individual liability (with financial caps) of
the nuclear operator there are two additional types of funding
mechanisms. First, there is an obligation of an Installation State
to make certain amounts of money available. This can take place
either by providing for public funding, or by making the nuclear
operator liable for the total amount – this is the second tier of the
Brussels Supplementary Convention and the first tier under the
CSC. Second, there is a system that can be called an international
solidarity fund, funded by all Contracting Parties. 92 This
Collective State Fund is an additional and supplementary
compensation mechanism that can hence be applied, if a State is a
member to the CSC, and when the particular State is neither in
the NEA nor in the Vienna Convention regime.
The total amounts available in the nuclear liability regime
can be summarized in the following Table 1:

91

According to the following formula: the amount which shall be the
product of the installed nuclear capacity of that Contracting Party multiplied
by 300 SDRs per unit of installed capacity; and the amount is determined by
applying the ratio between the United Nations rate of assessment for that
Contracting Party as assessed for the year preceding the year in which the
nuclear incident occurs, and the total of such rates for all Contracting Parties
to 10% of the sum of the amounts calculated for all Contracting Parties.
92
Brussels Supplementary Convention, supra note 71, at arts. III(a)-III(b);
JING LIU, COMPENSATING ECOLOGICAL DAMAGE: COMPARATIVE AND
ECONOMIC OBSERVATIONS 214 (2013); SANDS & PEEL, supra note 80, at 740.
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What
Convention?
Paris Convention
Brussels
Supplementary
Convention

Amount i n million EUR
W ho pays?
First
g eneratio
n
Nuclear operator
57
Installation State (or 193.7
nuclear operator)
Collective State
Fund

Total NEA-r egime
Vienna
Convention

Total Vienna
Convention
Convention on
Supplementary
Compensation

Total CSC

289
Second
g eneration
700
500

142.4

300

341.8

1,500

Nuclear operator

4.2

170.9

Collective State
Fund

-

170.9

4.2

341.8

Operator/Installation
State

341.8

Collective State
Fund

341.8
683.7

Table 1: Available amounts of compensation under the international nuclear
liability Conventions. 93

Table 1 demonstrates that under the nuclear
compensation scheme of the second generation, public funding is
either newly created or kept at the same level as in 1963 in
relative terms. 94 In absolute terms, there is considerably more
public funding in the second generation Conventions. In
particular, under the 2004 Brussels Supplementary Convention,
the public intervention has more than doubled, 95 and under the
IAEA regime, no public intervention existed under the
Conventions of the first generation.
93

See Faure & Vanden Borre, supra note 74, at 239 (providing the
amounts of compensation in USD according to the exchange rate in 2008).
94
See Vanden Borre, supra note 90, at 303-04.
95
In the second tier of the Installation State the amount rose from EUR
202 million to EUR 500 million; in the third tier, the Collective State Fund
went from approximately EUR 150 million to EUR 300 million.
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It is important to underline that out of the four new
nuclear liability instruments that resulted from the revision
exercise, only two have entered into force so far. The Protocol to
the Vienna Convention entered into force on 4 October 2003 and
the CSC entered into force on 15 April 2015.
2. Implementation in Belgium
Rules on nuclear third party liability are contained in the
Act of 22 July 1985 on Third Party Liability in the Field of
Nuclear Energy, 96 as modified. 97 This law implements the 1960
Paris Convention and the 1963 Brussels Supplementary
Convention as well as its Protocols. The 1985 Act, as modified,
lays down the principle of strict liability and limited liability in
amount and time, channelled to the operator of a nuclear
installation. 98 In this respect, Article 7 of the law establishes the
maximum amount of the operator’s liability for nuclear damage
at EUR 1.2 billion. A royal decree can increase or reduce this
amount in order to fulfill Belgium’s international obligations as
well as to take into account low risk installations or transport;
however, it may not set a level lower than EUR 80 million for
transportation and EUR 70 million for the nuclear installations.
Pursuant to the terms of the law, the operator is obliged, in
96

Wet van 22 juli 1985 betreffende de wettelijke aansprakelijkheid op het
gebied van de kernenergie [Act of 22 July 1985 on Third Party Liability in the
Field of Nuclear Energy], Jul. 22, 1985, B.S., Aug. 31, 1985, 48087 (Belg.).
97
Several decrees have been adopted to implement the 1985 Law, in
particular:
Royal Decree of 28 April 1986, determining the financial security certificate for
transport of nuclear substances, whose purpose is to ensure that financial
security certificates (given to all carriers of nuclear substances by the operator
liable) comply with the Paris Convention requirements in this respect, as
prescribed
by
the
1985
Law.
Available
at:
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/eli/besluit/1986/04/28/1986011107/justel;
Ministerial Decision of 9 March 1987 on the register concerning nuclear
installations, which aims to implement Section 13 of the 1985 Law regarding
the obligation to make available to the public the register containing the texts
granting recognition to the operators of nuclear installations. This register
contains a certified copy of the royal decrees of recognition and a card of the
installations indicating the limits of each site. It may be consulted at the
Federal Public Service for Economy, SMEs, Self-Employed and Energy. The
local authority for the territory where the installation is located must comply
with
a
similar
obligation.
Available
at:
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/eli/besluit/1987/03/09/1987011069/justel.
98
See on those principles the discussion in the general framework, supra
Section II.C.1.
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conformity with Art. 10 (a) and (d) of the Paris Convention, to
take out insurance or another form of financial security to cover
his liability up to the amount set in the law (Article 8). The
private insurance market, however, does not have sufficient
capacity to complete the totality of such a high liability risk,
which the operators nevertheless need to have insured. The
problems arise in particular for the coverage of liability claims
that might arise more than ten years after the accident, and to a
lesser extent, the coverage of damage to the environment. There
are insurance policies available for this type of risk, but the
coverage amounts offered in the market do not reach the
requirement amount of EUR 1.2 billion or – for low risk
installations or transport – EUR 297 million. That is why the Act
of 29 June 2014 (modifying the Act of 22 July 1985) has
introduced a state guarantee, to be enjoyed by the operators of
nuclear installations against a fee and insofar as the private
insurance market does not offer the coverage (Article 10/1).
Consequently, the Royal Decree of 10 December 2017
establishes a guarantee program for legal liability in the area of
nuclear energy. 99 This Royal Decree was promulgated after the
European Commission allowed the program in the framework of
Articles 107 and 108 on state support. Since state intervention
must be subsidiary to the private market, the premium from the
operator to the State has been established at an amount that is
higher than the market price; the supplement is situated around
15%. This should encourage operators and insurers to develop
insurance solutions instead of appealing on the State. The
operators are free to choose their affiliation to the guarantee
program and the amount compensated by the State will have to
be repaid by the liable operator, as long as this amount does not
exceed the liability ceiling laid down in the Act of 22 July 1985.
Finally, the damage caused by a nuclear accident should be
covered in the first place by the insurance policies of the operator.
Only when the amount of the damage exceeds the insured
amount, the State should intervene, to the extent of the surplus, to
warrant the liable operator in case he fails to compensate.
Article 23 of the law establishes a prescription period of
thirty years for nuclear physical injuries and of ten years for other
nuclear damage from the date of the nuclear incident in respect of
99

Koninklijk besluit van 10 December 2017 tot opstelling van een
waarborgprogramma voor de wettelijke aansprakelijkheid op het gebied van
de kernenergie [Royal Decree of 10 December 2017 establishing a guarantee
program for civil liability in the field of nuclear energy] of Dec. 10, 2017, B.S.,
Dec. 20, 2017, 113492 (Belg.).
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the right to claim financial compensation from the operator. The
State is responsible for the payment of compensation in respect of
claims for nuclear physical damage which are time barred, within
a period between ten and thirty years from the date of the
incident. From 1 January 2019 onwards, the State’s obligation to
compensate will be transferred to the operator. 100
Belgium also ratified the 1971 Convention relating to Civil
Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material
on 15 June 1989.

D. Terrorism
1. Property Damage
Terrorism risk in Belgium is regulated through an Act of 1
April 2007 which entered into force on 1 May 2008. 101 In fact, the
Belgian legislator copied the Dutch model of the Nederlandse
Herverzekeringsmaatschappij voor Terrorismeschade (“NHT”).
This was made clear in the preparatory works of the Belgian
Act. 102 The Belgian legislator praised the Dutch model for
providing a pragmatic solution and held that the insurance
market in Belgium is comparable to the situation in the
Netherlands, and therefore it found inspiration in the Dutch
legislation. 103
The Belgian Act can be called upon when a dedicated
100
Koninklijk besluit van 7 december 2017 betreffende de
inwerkingtreding van artikel 2, b), van de wet van 7 december 2016 tot
wijziging van de wet van 22 juli 1985 betreffende de wettelijke
aansprakelijkheid op het gebied van de kernenergie en tot bepaling van de
datum bedoeld in artikel 23, vierde lid, van de wet van 22 juli 1985 betreffende
de wettelijke aansprakelijkheid op het gebied van de kernenergie [Royal
Decree of 7 December 2017 on the entry into force of article 2, b) of the Act of 7
December 2016 amending the Act of 22 July 1985 on civil liability in the field
of nuclear energy and to determine the date referred to in article 23, fourth
paragraph, of the Act of 22 July 1985 on civil liability in the field of nuclear
energy] of Dec. 7, 2017, B.S., Dec. 21, 2017, 114049, Art. 2 (Belg.).
101
Wet van 1 april 2007 betreffende de verzekering tegen schade
veroorzaakt door terrorisme [Act of 1 April 2007 on the insurance against
damage caused by terrorism] of Apr. 1, 2007, B.S., May 15, 2007, 26350 (Belg.).
102
Bernard Dubuisson, L’indemnisation des dommages causés par des
actes de terrorisme en Belgique: la loi du 1er avril 2007, 365 TIJDSCHRIFT
VOOR VERZEKERINGEN = BULLETIN DES ASSURANCES (ED.
BILINGUE) [BULL.ASS.] 348, 349 (2008).
103
During the Parliamentary Proceeding the Belgian Legislator explicitly
referred to the benefits of the Dutch model. For details see Dubuisson, supra
note 102, 349.
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Committee has judged that the particular event(s) should be
considered a “terrorist act” (Art. 6). 104 In such case, the 2017 Act
provides, like the Dutch model, a combined intervention by the
insurance company, reinsurers and by the Belgian State. A model
has been developed whereby a first layer of financial
compensation is provided by all Belgian insurers up to a limit of
EUR 300 million. If that amount is insufficient to cover the loss, a
second layer will intervene which is provided through the
reinsurance market up to an amount of EUR 400 million. Finally,
if the amounts provided by the first and second layer of financial
compensation would still be insufficient the Belgian State
intervenes up to a limit of EUR 300 million, like in the Dutch
system. 105 The total amount of compensation (not indexed) is
hence constituted as follows:
Insurers
Reinsurers
Belgian State
Total

EUR
EUR
EUR
EUR

300
400
300
1

million
million
million
billion

An insurance pool, called the Terrorism Risk Insurance
Pool (“TRIP”) is created, that will manage the terrorism risk.
Although the scheme is not compulsory it has attracted more than
95% participation from amongst the insurers operating in
Belgium. The Belgian legislator considered that the creation of
the TRIP was a necessity. 106 The Belgian State only intervenes
after the insurers and reinsurers have provided compensation and
only if the amount of compensation provided by such groups (a
104

The Committee declared, in its decision of 19 September 2017, the
events of 17 August 2017 in Barcelona (Spain) a terrorist attack. A similar
decision has been made, on 29 June 2017, regarding the events of 7 April 2017
in Stockholm (Sweden). This was also the case, inter alia, for the events of 14
July 2016 in Nice (France), the events of 6 August 2016 in Charleroi (Belgium),
the events of 20 November 2015 in Hotel Radisson Blu in Bamako (Mali), and
the events of 22 March 2016 in Brussels (see: Comité voor schadeafwikkeling
bij terrorisme, 28 April 2016). These decisions of the Committee have all been
published in the official Belgian Gazette B.S.
105
See Dubuisson, supra note 102, at 353-54 for details.
106
OECD INT’L. PLATFORM ON TERRORISM RISK INS., BELGIUM –
TERRORISM
RISK
INSURANCE
PROGRAMME
(2016),
https://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/insurance/Belgium-Terrorism-RiskInsurance.pdf. It should be noted that most insurance policies obligatorily
cover terrorist damage, including occupational accident insurance, life
insurance, hospitalization insurance, accident insurance, fire insurance and
civil liability car insurance.
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total of EUR 700 million) would not be sufficient to cover the
loss. Moreover, the reinsurance layer provided by the Belgian
State is, like in the Dutch example, not provided for free, but the
Belgian State is compensated for this intervention. It was held
that this was necessary to avoid the prohibition of state aid
contained in European law. 107
Legal doctrine in Belgium holds that this financial
compensation of terrorism related damage via the creation of a
pool has been effective in covering terrorism-related risks. The
public-private partnership between insurers, reinsurers, and the
State is praised for providing relatively large amounts of cover
(EUR 1 billion) in three layers. 108
The 2007 Act mainly aims at compensating damage to
persons (Article 7 paragraph 2), and compensation of damage to
property is hence limited. In particular, damage to industrial
property, including contents located at a single company site, will
be compensated up to EUR 75 million per insured and per year.
Further, there is also a compensation percentage that is applied to
pay-outs. The percentage rates are worked out using three broad
headings which consist of one percentage rate for personal injury,
one percentage rate for material damage, and one percentage rate
for moral damage. The deductible is 10% of the damage cost
where damage from a terrorist act has occurred to industrial
business and a 10% deductible is applied to damages which are
caused through a nuclear bomb for risks other than motor vehicle
third party liability, strict liability for public places, workmen’s
compensation insurance, life insurance, and health insurance.
2. Personal Injury
It cannot be excluded that some victims of terrorism will
not receive any compensation through TRIP because the
conditions in their insurance contract are not fulfilled. In order to
remedy this situation, the Act of 1 August 1985 on Fiscal and
Other Provisions109 has been supplemented by a special
subchapter on governmental help for victims of acts of deliberate
violence. The Fund for Intentional Acts of Violence can pay out
compensation to the uninsured victims who are confronted with
107

See Dubuisson, supra note 102, at 354-355 (doubting whether a
compensation to victims of disasters could effectively be considered as a
prohibited state aid).
108
Id. at 362.
109
Wet houdende fiscale en andere bepalingen [Act on Fiscal and Other
Provisions] of Aug. 1, 1985, B.S., Aug. 6, 1985, 37751.
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personal or physical damages. 110 However, the government has
the ability to increase this sum after a terrorist attack (Art. 37bis).
In order for the government to increase the sum of compensation,
the King must declare the event an act of terrorism (Art.
42bis).111
The Fund is financed by fixed contributions of all persons
sentenced to a criminal or misdemeanour penalty (Art. 29), but, if
necessary, extra contributions can be requested. Generally, extra
contributions are requested from the Treasury, loans, gifts and
legacies, a part of the profits of the National Lottery, and other
sources of revenue determined by the King (Art. 42bis).
3. The Aftermath of the Terrorist Attack on Brussels Airport
On 22 March 2016, several terrorist attacks were
committed in and around Brussels (in particular, in Brussels
Airport and in the Brussels metro) where a total of 35 persons
were killed. The damage resulting from the attacks in Zaventem
and Molenbeek falls under the scope of the Act of 1 April 2007
and is being evaluated for a total of EUR 168 million. The
distribution of this amount is estimated as follows: damage to
persons 80%, material damage 15%, and non-pecuniary loss
5%. 112 The amount remains well below the maximum threshold,
EUR 1 billion, provided for in the Act of 1 April 2007.
Following the attacks, the Act of 30 May 2016 was
adopted, which amended the Act of 1 August 1985 on Fiscal and
Other Provisions with regard to assistance to victims of deliberate
acts of violence. 113 The 2016 Act has introduced the following
110

Of course, these victims will also receive compensation for their
personal injury from social security.
111
See, e.g, Koninklijk besluit tot erkenning van daden als daden van
terrorisme in de zin van artikel 42bis van de wet van 1 augustus 1985 [Royal
decree recognizing acts as acts of terrorism in the sense of article 42bis of the
Act of 1 August 1985] of Mar. 15, 2017, B.S., Mar. 17, 2017, 37771, which
declares a list of events that took place between 2012 and 2017 (amongst which
the attacks on Brussels Airport on 22 March 2016) as an act of terrorism.
112
See BELGIAN CHAMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES, SCHRIFTELIJKE
VRAAG EN ANTWOORD NR: 0887, TUSSENKOMST VERZEKERINGEN BIJ
TERRORISME
(June
8,
2016),
https://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=qrva&language=nl&cfm=qrvaXml.cfm?legislat=54&dossierID=54-b082-861-08872015201610033.xml.
113
Wet tot wijziging van de wet van 1 augustus 1985 houdende fiscale en
andere bepalingen, wat de hulp aan slachtoffers van opzettelijke gewelddaden
betreft [Act amending the Act of 1 August 1985 on fiscal and other provisions,
as regards assistance to victims of deliberate acts of violence], of May 31, 2016,

296

Loyola Consumer Law Review

Vol. 31:2

changes:
a. The ceilings for financial compensation have been
doubled. Compensation will be awarded when the
damage amounts to more than EUR 500 and up to
EUR 125,000.
b. Certain conditions have been relaxed or were even
deleted when compensation is requested for
damage related to terrorist attacks. In this specific
context, it is not necessary to deposit a complaint or
to apply for civil party status first.
c. Belgian victims of acts of terrorism in a country
that does not provide a settlement for these types of
events can also appeal to the Fund for Intentional
Acts of Violence.
A Commission for financial assistance to victims of acts of
deliberate violence and occasional rescuers has been established.
This Commission deliberates on the applications for emergency
aid, 114 financial compensation or additional assistance. 115 A
subsection of the Commission is specialized in dealing with
applications from victims of terrorist attacks.
It should be noticed that the contribution by the State has
a subsidiary character: the victim should not be able to receive
sufficient compensation for his damage in any other way.
Therefore, the Commission takes into account:
- the solvency and the potential instalments of the
aggressor;
- the contribution of the health insurance fund or the
work accident insurance institution;
- a possible compensation in the framework of a
private insurance.
The Commission can grant equitable assistance, but does
not guarantee a full compensation.
Two months after the attacks, victims were officially
notified of the first emergency aid decisions and the first
payments were made. 116 Nevertheless, one year after the terrorist
B.S. June 17, 2016, 36657.
114
Emergency aid can be requested when any delay in the granting of
compensation may cause the applicant a serious disadvantage, have regard to
his financial situation. The emergency aid is granted per intentional act of
violence and per applicant for damage in excess of EUR 500 and is limited to
an amount of EUR 30,000.
115
The Commission can award additional assistance if the disadvantage
has apparently increased after the compensation has been granted.
116
FEDERALE OVERHEIDSDIENST JUSTITIE, EEN UNIEK LOKET VOOR DE
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attacks, many victim organizations have complained about the
slow payment of damages and the administrative burden. 117
Following the Belgian regulation, the financial compensation of
material and non-material damage caused by terrorism is
primarily a task for insurance companies. Because these
insurance companies can take a long time to determine the exact
damage, the Commission can give an advance of up to EUR
30,000 in urgent cases (i.e. the emergency aid). The first figures
show that the insurance companies have put aside EUR 136
million for the payment of the compensation, but have only paid
out EUR 16 million. In March 2017, more than half of the victims
were still waiting for part of their compensation, and a quarter of
the victims had not received anything at all. The Commission
paid out EUR 1.2 million in advances and helped 160 victims,
while 398 applications were received.
In addition, following the Act of 18 July 2017, Belgians
who are victims of a terrorist attack will receive a lifelong
pension.118 They get their own “statute of national solidarity” that
is comparable to the statute of civilian victims from World War
II. As a result, in addition to the right to a benefit/pension, they
also receive a full reimbursement of their medical costs as long as
such costs are neither covered by insurance nor by the Fund for
Intentional Acts of Violence.

E. Summary
In summary, Belgium has gone through an interesting
evolution and many steps have been taken in recent years. As far
as the natural disasters are concerned, Belgium started from a
model of national solidarity via the Disaster Fund. With the
statutes of 2003 and 2005, however, the role of that Disaster Fund
has been seriously reduced. Belgium de facto followed the French
model by mandatorily adding first party cover for a large group
SLAACHTOFFERS VAN DE AANSLAGEN IN BRUSSEL (June 1, 2016),
https://justitie.belgium.be/nl/nieuws/andere_berichten_27.
117
Leen Vervaeke, Belgische terreurslachtoffers naar de rechter om trage
uitbetalingen verzekeraar, DE VOLKSKRANT (Mar. 20, 2017),
https://www.volkskrant.nl/buitenland/belgische-terreurslachtoffers-naar-derechter-om-trage-uitbetalingen-verzekeraar~a4476798/.
118
Wet betreffende de oprichting van het statuut van nationale
solidariteit, de toekenning van een herstelpensioen en de terugbetaling van
medische zorg ingevolge daden van terrorisme [Act on the establishment of the
statute of national solidarity, the granting of a recovery pension and the
reimbursement of medical care due to acts of terrorism], of Jul. 18, 2017, B.S.,
Aug. 4, 2017, 77667.
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of natural disasters to voluntarily purchased fire insurance. As far
as technological disasters are concerned, it is striking that
Belgium has a large amount of mandatory solvency guarantees,
forcing operators to seek financial cover for the consequences of
their liability. Moreover, since 2012, Belgium also has a specific
model for rapid claims settlement in case of technological
disasters.
With regard to the nuclear risk, Belgium implemented the
Nuclear Liability Conventions. The operators’ liability is now
capped at the total amount of EUR 1.2 billion; in addition there is
a substantial state guarantee. The terrorism risk in Belgium is
regulated through the Act of 1 April 2007 which created TRIP,
and provides a total amount of compensation of EUR 1 billion on
the basis of a system of multi-layered compensation. Recently,
TRIP had to be applied after the 22 March 2016 terrorist attack
on the Brussels airport. TRIP mainly intervenes for property
damage. As far as personal injury is concerned, there is another
statute of 1985 that provides compensation to victims after a
terrorist attack. Following the Brussels airport attacks, the
statutory framework has once more been changed with the Act of
18 July 2017, providing inter alia for a life-long pension for
victims of a terrorist attack.
Belgium has a mix whereby on the one hand the French
solidarity model is followed, providing generous compensation
(first via a Disaster Fund for victims of natural disasters,
covering equally personal injury resulting from the terrorism
risk). At the same time it also obliges operators, via a combination
of strict liability and mandatory liability insurance to provide
proof of their solvency, thus equally stressing the importance of
exposing potential injurers to the social costs of their activity.

III. FRANCE
A. Natural Disasters
1. Mandatory Comprehensive Cover
France has an elaborate system of first party insurances
for property damage. Eighty-five percent of all inhabitants of
France own first party insurance, 119 and therewith a right to
financial compensation for property damage within the scope of
119

This can be deduced from the AZF case, where it was noticed that only
15% of the victims were uninsured.
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the insurance policy. A typical example of such a policy is the socalled multi-risques habitation which is commonly requested as a
precondition for renting a premise, and which covers most risks
with respect to real estate and movable property within the
house.
In addition to voluntary first party insurance, which
covers damage against property, the French system typically also
includes, through the Act of 13 July 1982 (“the 1982 Act”), 120 a
mandatory additional cover for the consequences of natural
disasters. This constitutes France’s well-known and
internationally praised example of mandatory comprehensive
disaster insurance. 121 In France, there is, therefore, no generalized
duty to insure catastrophic risks, but the compulsory coverage
extension of voluntarily subscribed property insurance contracts.
Property damage policies in France are widespread and,
consequently, a large group of individuals are forced to pay an
additional amount for the coverage of natural disasters.
The ‘Code des Assurances’ offers a definition of what is
considered a natural disaster. Remarkably, the Code defines a
natural disaster as an accident that causes damage which is
unusual, unavoidable, and normally not insurable. 122 The fact
that this damage would normally not be insurable is precisely the
reason for the mandatory additional coverage. Indeed, the French
Insurance Code defines loss resulting from natural catastrophes
as “non insurable direct material damage whose determining
cause was the abnormal intensity of a natural agent. . .” (Art. L.
125-1 par 3). Lawyers have criticized this definition since it seems
confusing to call uninsurable a risk that the law makes insurable
by compulsory coverage. 123 The paradox, however, disappears if
one realizes that compulsory insurance allows for a sufficient
spreading of risks and functions as a remedy to adverse selection,
120

Loi 82-600 du 13 juillet 1982 relative à l’indemnisation des victimes de
catastrophes naturelles [Law 82-600 of July 13, 1982 concerning compensation
for victims of natural disasters], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE
FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jul. 14, 1982, p. 2242.
121
See Kunreuther, supra note 19 (already arguing in 1968 in favour of
comprehensive disaster insurance and repeating it many times since, e.g. after
Katrina); Howard Kunreuther, Has the Time Come for Comprehensive
Natural Disaster Insurance?, in ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM
HURRICANE KATRINA 175 (Ronald J. Daniels, Donald F. Kettle & Howard
Kunreuther eds., 2006).
122
Michel Cannarsa, Fabien Lafay & Olivier Moréteau, France, in
FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE
LEGAL APPROACH, supra note 1, at 86; BRUGGEMAN, supra note 1, at 304.
123
Cannarsa, Lafay & Moréteau, supra note 122, at 86.
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which may make natural disasters uninsurable. By imposing a
duty to insure, the law transforms an uninsurable risk into an
insurable one. Compulsory insurance may enable the private
insurance market to cover harm caused by natural disasters in
geographically limited areas. Floods and earthquakes are clear
examples, but the French compulsory disaster insurance coverage
also extends to droughts, cyclonic storms, terrorist attacks, and
technological catastrophes.
Insurers are only held liable to compensate damage if the
government declares a certain incident a natural disaster. This is
an administrative act that can also give rise to an administrative
appeal. 124 The declaration of the event as a natural disaster is
published in the Journal Officiel. From the date of that
publication the victim only has ten days to file a claim with his
insurer. This very short time limit aims to pressure the victim to
act carefully and to allow the insurer’s experts to establish the
extent of the damage as soon as possible. The Code des
Assurances further stipulates that the insurer must make an offer
of financial compensation within three months after the victim’s
claim. Moreover, the insurer must also make an advance
payment within a period of two months. 125 Agricultural damage is
excluded.
The supplementary coverage for catastrophic loss is
financed through an additional premium of twelve percent on all
insurance contracts covering property other than motor vehicles,
and an additional premium of six percent for fire and theft
insurance for motorised land vehicles. 126 The mandatory coverage
is applied to all insured individuals, irrespective of whether they
are particularly vulnerable to natural disasters and thus exposed
to the insured risk. The Act of 13 July 1982 further includes
compulsory deductibles together with a prevention plan; these are
Risk Exposure Plans, which today have become Risk Prevention
Plans. The links between financial compensation and prevention
have been strengthened by a sliding scale that adjusts the
deductibles applying to communes that do not have Risk
Prevention Plans, to encourage them to introduce such plans.
Reinsurance is provided through the Caisse centrale de
réassurance, which is fully controlled by the French State. 127
124
125

Id. at 95.
Id. at 96.

126
Art. 2 of the 1982 Act stipulates that the catastrophe guarantee is
financed by an additional premium calculated on the basis of a single rate set
by Decree for each category of insurance policy.
127
See Roger Van den Bergh & Michael G. Faure, Compulsory insurance
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There are particular features of the French system which
are potentially at odds with European competition law. It has
been argued that those anti-competitive effects may, to some
extent, benefit from the efficiency defence: the need to create
sufficiently large risk pools and to cure the problem of adverse
selection may justify the tying clause (the fact that catastrophe
cover is mandatorily provided with housing insurance). Other
features of the compulsory insurance scheme for catastrophic loss
in France, such as the fixed premiums for the disaster coverage
and the reinsurance by the State, may benefit from a solidarity
exception. 128
2. Example: The 2016 Floodings
May and June of 2016 was marked by a major, atypical,
natural catastrophe, i.e. the flooding of the Seine and its
tributaries, and of some tributaries of the Loire. It was declared a
natural catastrophe by Arrêté du 8 juin 2016 portant
reconnaissance de l’état de catastrophe naturelle. About 182,000
claims have been reported, and it cost insurers more than EUR
1.4 billion, being the most expensive flood since 1982. The
resulting cost to the CCR amounts to EUR 623 million which
represents the second largest loss – the largest flood event – ever
recorded since the inception of the natural disaster compensation
scheme in 1982. A major portion of the impact on CCR’s
underwriting results was, however, offset due to a capital
equalization reserves release of EUR 240 million. 129
The floods led to the interruption of several transportation
networks and also put into question the ability of the crisis
management system to respond to an event of a higher
of loss to property caused by natural disasters: competition or solidarity? 29
WORLD COMPETITION, no. 1, 2006, at 25, 30. The European Commission
approved on 26 September 2016 both the principles and the terms of the
natural disaster reinsurance scheme operated in France by the Caisse Centrale
de Réassurance (CCR). In particular, the Commission approved the guarantee
granted to CCR by the State in this capacity on an exclusive basis. The
Commission considers that this guarantee does not constitute a state aid
incompatible with the European internal market rules given that “the French
natural disaster compensation system is proportionate” and that “it enables
each household and business to be insured against these risks”.
128
Van den Bergh & Faure, supra note 127.
129
CAISSE CENTRALE DE REASSURANCE [CCR], 2016 ACTIVITY REPORT
(2016),
https://www.ccr.fr/documents/23509/29244/Activity+report+2016+CCR+EN.p
df/af04f3a2-2ef4-4b8b-ad39-d2b9a3f32b1c.
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magnitude.

B. Technological Disasters
1. Liability
Although the fault regime is still the central rule in French
tort law, several strict liabilities have been developed. The
French Cour de Cassation ruled that Article 1384, paragraph 1 of
the Civil Code which holds the guardian of a defective object
liable for the damage caused by that object, should be considered
as a general stand-alone provision, providing for a presumption
of responsibility where damage is caused by objects. 130 This
article has been interpreted very broadly in French law: strict
liability is imposed on the sole basis of the use, direction and
control by the defendant of the object which caused the damage.
Moreover, there are also separate statutes laying down strict
liability in various areas (e.g. strict liability for car drivers causing
a road traffic accident).
In addition, there is far-reaching tort liability for public
authorities under French administrative law. Public authority
liability has already been accepted in France, for example, at the
occasion of a disastrous flooding at Grand-Bornand on 14 July
1987, which caused the death of 23 persons in addition to
substantial property damage. It led to a joint liability of the State
and the municipality. 131
French law also has an interlocutory proceeding, the socalled référé, which allows the victim to seek a provisional order
from a single judge within a short period of time (also outside of
cases of urgency). This procedure is also applied to obtain
provisional payment when the debt cannot be disputed. It will
therefore allow a victim to obtain in practice 80% of what may be
regarded as fair compensation.132
2. Act of 30 July 2003
There is another particular feature of the way in which
French law deals with compensation for technological disasters.
The creation of this Act is related to an accident that happened in
France on 21 September 2011 (incidentally ten days after 9/11,
but totally unrelated) at the chemical plant called AZF owned by
130
131
132

Cannarsa, Lafay & Moréteau, supra note 122, at 92.
BRUGGEMAN, supra note 1, at 297-98.
Cannarsa, Lafay & Moréteau, supra note 122, at 98-99.
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Total Fina Elf in Toulouse where thirty people died, 5,000
suffered personal injury, and substantial property damage was
caused. 133 Most victims obtained financial compensation through
their first party insurance; others claimed compensation from the
liable operator, Total Fina Elf. Since the property damage
insurance (multi-risques habitation) is not mandatory, however,
some victims were uninsured (in first party insurance) and
therefore had to sue the operator of the plant in tort law. 134 That
was the reason for the French legislator to extend, through the
Act of 30 July 2003, 135 the first party insurance coverage like the
one provided by the multi-risques habitation to damage caused
by industrial catastrophes. In particular, if an official statement is
made that there is a “situation of technical catastrophe” occurring
from an “installation classée”, causing damage to a large number
of buildings, the coverage of the first party motor vehicle and
housing insurance extends to risks linked to these technological
catastrophes (Art. L-128-1 Code des Assurances 136). It is striking
that although this concerns technological (and therefore manmade) disasters, the Act does not apply to third party insurance,
but to property damage caused by technological disasters, except
for terrorist attacks. In this case, the compulsory disaster cover is
(again, like in the case of natural disasters) linked with
voluntarily subscribed first party property insurance contracts.
All insured undergo an increase in their premiums, irrespective of
whether they are exposed to a technological risk. In contrast with
the regime that was created for the compensation of damage
resulting from natural disasters, the legislator did not find it
useful to install a premium percentage. It is as such remarkable
that in a case of a man-made technological disaster, where a
liable wrongdoer can be identified, a mandatory cover for victims
is introduced. Imposing solvency guarantees on the side of the
wrongdoer, such as compulsory liability insurance, could be a
preferable solution. 137
For uninsured victims a compensation fund is created to
133
134
135

Id. at 115; BRUGGEMAN, supra note 1, at 326-28.
Id.

Loi 2003-699 du 30 juillet 2003 relative à la prévention des risques
technologiques et naturels et à la réparation des dommages [Law 2003-699 of
July 30, 2003 concerning the prevention of technological and natural risks and
compensation of damages], J.O., Jul. 31, 2003, p. 13021. This Act introduced a
new chapter in the French Insurance Code, namely arts. L.128-1 to 128-4.
136
Code
des
assurances
[Insurance
Code],
available
at:
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006073984.
137
Van den Bergh & Faure, supra note 127, at 30.
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compensate for the consequences of technological catastrophes. It
was technically done by extending the benefits of the
compensation fund for victims of automobile accidents (fonds de
garantie) through the Act of 30 July 2003 to all uninsured victims
of industrial disasters (Article L.421-16 Code des Assurances) –
regardless of whether insurance was actually available. 138
Compensation will be limited at EUR 100,000 (Article R.421-78
Code des Assurances). This limited compensation will hence give
incentives to still insure against the risk of damages.

C. Nuclear Accidents
French law on third party liability in the field of nuclear
energy is derived from a combination of, on the one hand, the
Paris Convention and the Brussels Supplementary Convention
which under the Constitution are directly integrated into the
domestic legal system on ratification and, on the other hand, Act
No. 68-943 of 30 October 1968, 139 as amended, on third party
liability in the field of nuclear energy.
The legal regime introduced by the Paris Convention and
adopted in the Act of 30 October 1968 introduced into French
law the principle of strict liability on the nuclear operator
regardless of fault. This strict liability regime relieves the victim
of the burden of proving the liability of the operator and makes
the operator strictly liable for damage to or loss of life of any
person, and damage to or loss of any property caused by any
nuclear accident occurring in his installation or during transport
on his behalf. It is relevant to State, however, that the Paris
Convention does allow the operator to have a conventional right
of recourse against another party to a contract if the accident was
caused by an intentional act or omission, but this may not operate
against the victim.
The liability of the operator is limited to:
- EUR 91,469,410 for an accident occurring in an
installation (Art. 4 Act No. 68-943);
- EUR 22,867,353 for transport or a low-risk
installation (Art. 4 Act No. 68-943).
Over and above the amount of the operator’s liability,
victims are compensated under the conditions and within the
limits laid down by the Brussels Supplementary Convention:
138

Cannarsa, Lafay & Moréteau, supra note 122, at 88.
Loi 68-943 du 30 octobre 1968 relative à la responsabilité civile dans le
domaine de l’énergie nucléaire [Law 68-943 of October 30, 1968 on third party
liability in the field of nuclear energy], J.O., Oct. 31, 1968, p. 10195.
139
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up to 175 million SDR (EUR 215 million or USD
244 million) by the State in whose territory the
installation is located;
- up to 300 million SDR (EUR 368.30 million or
USD 418.20 million) by the Contracting Parties to
this Convention, including France, whose own
financial contribution under the method of
calculation used currently stands at approximately
34%.
Article 7 of the Act of 30 October 1968 requires each
operator to have and maintain insurance or other financial
security for an amount corresponding to his liability for an
accident. This financial security must be approved by the
Minister of Economy and Finance. Should the victims of a
nuclear accident be unable to obtain financial compensation for
their damage from the insurer, financial guarantor or operator,
the compensation burden shifts to the State up to the amount of
EUR 91,469,410 without prejudice to any possible additional
amounts.
Protocols amending the Paris and Brussels Conventions
were signed in Paris on 12 February 2004. Although these
Protocols have yet to enter into force, their approval was
authorized in France by Act No. 2006-786 of 5 July 2006.140 They
have already been transposed into national law (Article 55 of Act
No. 2006-686 of 13 June 2006 on nuclear transparency and
safety, 141 whose provisions will be applicable upon entry into
force of the Protocol amending the Paris Convention) in order to
bring French law into line with the new legal regime thus
introduced. Once the Protocol amending the Paris Convention
enters into force, the maximum liability of the operator is set at
EUR 700 million for nuclear damage caused by each nuclear
accident (see Art. L-597-4 Ordonnance no 2012-6 du 5 janvier
2012 modifiant les livres Ier et V du code de l’environnement).

140
Loi 2006-786 du 5 juillet 2006 autorisant l’approbation d’accords
internationaux sur la responsabilité civile dans le domaine de l’énergie
nucléaire [Law 2006-786 of July 5, 2006 authorizing the approval of
international agreements on third party liability in the field of nuclear energy],
J.O., Jul. 6, 2006, p. 10115.
141
Loi 2006-686 du 13 juin 2006 relative à la transparence et à la sécurité
en matière nucléaire [Law 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 on transparency and
nuclear safety], J.O., Jun. 14, 2006, p. 8946.
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D. Terrorism
1. Property Damage
Property coverage against attacks and acts of terrorism
has been compulsory for all property insurance policies since the
Act of 9 September 1986. 142 Under Article L 126-2 of the Code des
Assurances, insurance contracts guaranteeing fire damage to
property as well as damage to motorized land vehicles are
mandatorily extended to cover direct material damage to the
insured property caused by a terrorist attack or act of terrorism
sustained on national territory. The repair of material damage,
including decontamination costs, and the repair of non-material
damage resulting from such damage are covered within the limits
of the deductible and the ceiling set in the fire insurance contract.
Different limits and excesses may be agreed in the case of large
risks 143 (paragraph 2 of Article L 111-6 of the Code des
Assurances).
The terrorist attacks and acts of terrorism referred to in
the Code des Assurances are the offenses defined by Articles 4211 and 421-2 of the French Criminal Code and extends to acts of
terrorism committed using nuclear, biological, chemical, or
radiological (NBCR) weapons. In addition, following the
introduction of the Act of 23 January 2006, 144 coverage also
includes any material damage sustained on national territory that
may result from an attack perpetrated outside its borders, such as
contamination by chemical agents; cyber terrorism is also
covered.
In 2002, the Gestion de l’Assurance et de la Réassurance
des Risques Attentats et Actes de Terrorisme (“GAREAT”)
142
Loi 86-1020 du 9 septembre 1986 relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme
et aux atteintes à la sûreté de l’Etat [Law 86-1020 of September 9, 1968 on
combatting terrorism and attacks on national security], J.O., Sep. 10, 1986, p.
10956.
143
Large risks are “those relating to fire and natural elements, other
damage to property, general civil liability, various pecuniary losses, hulls of
land motor vehicles as well as civil liability, including that of the carrier
pertaining to these vehicles, when the policyholder carries out an activity
whose importance exceeds certain thresholds defined by decree taken after
consultation of the Council of State” (paragraph 2 of Article L 111-6 of the
Code des Assurances)
144
Loi 2006-64 du 23 janvier 2006 relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme et
portant dispositions diverses relatives à la sécurité et aux contrôles frontaliers
[Law 2006-64 of January 23, 2006 on combating terrorism and laying down
various provisions relating to security and border controls], J.O., Jan. 24, 2006,
p. 1129.
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reinsurance pool was created jointly by insurers, reinsurers and
the Caisse Centrale de Réassurance. 145 The GAREAT program is
divided into two sections: the Large Risks section and the Small
Risks section. Large risks are defined as risks for which the sums
insured amount to EUR 20 million or more. The GAREAT
program is further divided into layers:
a. the first layer consists of co-reinsurance between
the members of the pool (EUR 500 million in
annual aggregate);
b. the next layers (of each EUR 500 million in annual
aggregate) consist of reinsurance by international
professional reinsurers up to the level at which the
French State intervenes;
c. the top layer (in excess of EUR 2,520 billion)
consists, for the Large Risks section, of unlimited
reinsurance granted by the CCR with a guarantee
from the French State. 146
A market agreement requires insurers affiliated with the
two French professional insurance bodies, FFSA and GEMA, to
cede their terrorism risks systematically to GAREAT’s Large
Risks section. All other French or foreign insurers authorized to
cover such risks may likewise join GAREAT’s Large Risks
section on an individual basis. CCR supplements GAREAT’s
Large Risks program by providing unlimited state-guaranteed
coverage beyond the above limit. CCR receives a premium for
providing unlimited state cover with a state guarantee (i.e. 10%
of the annual premiums collected by insurers).
GAREAT reinsurance rates depend upon the sum insured
of each risk ceded (with the exception of the premium on nuclear
risks, which is 24% regardless of the sums insured). GAREAT
rates apply to the property premium of the risks ceded
individually to GAREAT:
- insured value between EUR 20 million and < EUR
50 million: 12% rate;
- insured value ≥ EUR 50 million: 18% rate.
The 2015 premium estimated income of GAREAT Large
risks section is EUR 200 million. 147 This figure has remained
145
In 2015 GAREAT federates 197 members, including ten insurance
captive companies of large corporations (which have direct membership) and
60 Lloyd’s Syndicates with which GAREAT deals through their
representation office in Paris.
146
The unlimited coverage is granted under a global Stop Loss
reinsurance treaty reinsured 100% by Caisse Centrale de Réassurance (CCR).
147
OECD INT’L. PLATFORM ON TERRORISM RISK INS., FRANCE –
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stable for several years and reflects an average 15% rate on
property policies. Private and public reinsurance accounts for
around 30% of the premium, which is a significant decrease since
the scheme’s inception due to the fact that the reinsurance market
has become more competitive in this field. 148 At the close of the
underwriting year, GAREAT – being a non-funded pool – gives
back to the members the residual premiums, after deduction of
the cost of reinsurance, the cost of the CCR Unlimited Treaty, the
claims, and the management fees.
2. Personal Injury
The Guarantee Fund for victims of terrorism and other
criminal acts, the Fonds de garantie des victimes des actes de
terrorisme et d’autres infractions (“FGTI”), was created in 1986
to compensate for bodily harm resulting from acts of terrorism,
and to provide assistance to victims of offences under ordinary
law. 149 The Fund is financed by a contribution levied on property
insurance policies. 150 Articles L. 422-1 to 6 2 and R. 422-1 to 10 3
of the Insurance Code deal with the organization and financing of
the FGTI.
Since its creation, French or foreign victims of terrorist
acts occurring in France on or after 1 January 1985 and French
victims of acts of terrorism occurring abroad can request
compensation from the FGTI following a special procedure.
When the authorities pass on information regarding the
circumstances surrounding the terrorist act and the identity of the
TERRORISM
RISK
INSURANCE
PROGRAMME
(2016),
6,
https://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/insurance/France-Terrorism-Risk-Insurance.pdf.
148
INT’L FORUM FOR TERRORISM RISK (RE)INS. POOLS, WORLD
TERRORISM
INSURANCE
POOLS
AND
SCHEMES,
June 2017, 27,
http://iftrip.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/IFTRIP-brochure-final.pdf.
149
See Loi 86-1020 du 9 septembre 1986 relative à la lutte contre le
terrorisme et aux atteintes à la sûreté de l’Etat, as amended by the loi 90-589
du 6 juillet 1990 modifiant le code de procédure pénale et le code des
assurances et relative aux victimes d’infractions [Law 90-589 of July 6, 1990
amending the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Insurance Code and
concerning victims of crimes], J.O., Jul. 11, 1990, p. 8175.
150
The Guarantee Fund is 75% funded by a lump sum contribution of
EUR 4.30 (in 2016) from each property insurance contract taken out with a
company operating in France. The resources of the FGTI are, if necessary,
supplemented by the reimbursement of the indemnities that the Fund obtains
from the perpetrators of the offenses that caused the compensated damage
(20%) and by financial investments (5%). In January 2017, the amount of the
tax on insurance contracts is increased to EUR 5.90 per contract corresponding
to EUR 140 million of additional revenue for the FGTI.
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victims to the FGTI, the Fund’s dedicated terrorist victim
compensation team contacts victims directly. It helps the
identified victims to put together their application and strives to
make funds available quickly in order to cover any initial costs.
The Fund sets out a compensation proposal to victims within
three months of a definitive assessment of the damage having
been determined. Victims will be fully compensated for bodily
harm, usually after an assessment by a doctor designated by the
Guarantee Fund. If directly related to the act of terrorism,
clothing expenses are also reimbursed up to a certain limit by the
Guarantee Fund on presentation of supporting documents.
Payments received from other sources for the same losses (e.g.
national insurance or a mutual insurance scheme) will be
deducted from the financial compensation paid by the Guarantee
Fund.
In 2015, the FGTI made payments totalling EUR 328.8
million to victims of terrorism and other offences. It should be
noted that, contrary to Belgium, the French government pays for
all damages and later claims them back from the insurers.
3. Example I: The Terrorist Attacks in Paris
Six terrorist attacks took place on 13 November 2015 in
Paris. During the attacks, 129 people were killed and more than
350 wounded. President Hollande called on all Member States of
the European Union to offer assistance to France. He referred to
Article 42 (7) of the EU Treaty, which states that if a Member
State is attacked on its own territory, the other countries have the
duty to “provide help and assistance by all means available to
them”. This was the first time in the history of the European
Union that a Member State relied on the article. On 17
November, all 28 EU Member States unanimously agreed with
the request for help. The Member States were allowed to decide
for themselves how they implemented the aid.
It is to be noted that the Guarantee Fund’s articles state
that anyone who, at the time of the attack, was within a
government-determined perimeter of a terrorist attack, may call
himself a victim, even without being physically injured. The
Fund’s clause seems to have unintentionally created a new
market – more and more people know how to find their way to
the Fund and claim to be victims of a terrorist attack. Indeed,
among the 2,579 people who have received compensation from
the state-run Fund, “1,218 claimed compensation for
psychological injuries sustained in the attacks, 576 claimed
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compensation for physical injuries sustained in the attacks and
758 are family members of people who were killed in the
attacks”. 151 Victims of the attack on 13 November received, in
respect of the provisions paid by the FGTI, EUR 64 million. In
November 2017, 947 victims out of 2,579 have been the subject of
a final offer of compensation.
There is also controversy over the amounts allocated, and
critics argue that the operation of the FGTI is “too old and
bureaucratic”. The FGTI is now engaged in improving its
services and, on 26 September 2017, its Board of Directors
decided to recognize “anguish” as a form of suffering. Anguish is
compensated with a minimum lump sum of EUR 10,000. 152
It is expected that the November attacks in Paris will lead
to claims worth EUR 350 million in the coming years. Several
newspaper articles claim that the Guarantee Fund has been
depleted.
4. Example II: The Terrorist Attacks in Nice
On the evening of 14 July 2016, a nineteen ton cargo truck
was deliberately driven into crowds of people celebrating Bastille
Day on the Promenade des Anglais in Nice, France. The attack
resulted in the death of 86 people and the injury of 458 others.
Following the attack, the FGTI received 2,966 requests,
and 1,609 victims received a compensatory response by July 2017.
Nearly 98% of victims have been compensated. The first
compensation provisions were paid within ten days. 153 Family
members of victims who died in Nice can count on a
compensation of EUR 40,000. Those who were injured are
reimbursed according to the severity of their injuries. At the end
of July 2017, the French government had already paid around
151

Romina McGuinness, France pays 64 million euros to victims of Paris
terror
attacks,
EXPRESS
(Nov.
7,
2017),
https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/876648/paris-bataclan-terror-attackvictims-france-pay-millions-euros. The article quotes a spokesperson for the
Guarantee Fund for Victims of Terrorist and Other Criminal acts.
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Aurélie Abadie, Terrorisme: 64 M€ déjà versés aux victimes de
l’attentat du Bataclan, L’ARGUS DE L’ASSURANCE (Nov. 6, 2017),
http://www.argusdelassurance.com/institutions/organisations-professionnelleset-regulateurs/terrorisme-64-m-deja-verses-aux-victimes-de-l-attentat-dubataclan.123745.
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Flore Thomasset, À Nice, de Nouvelles demandes d’indemnisation de
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EUR 300,000 to the victims of Nice. However, there’s also anger
over the slow pace of victim compensation on the part of the
State. 154 Only 25 of the promised EUR 300 million have been paid
out to 1,610 victims. 155 After filing an application, victims are
given an advance payment of between EUR 2,500 and EUR
5,000.

E. Summary
Like most nations in the world, French society refuses to
reconcile itself to the notion of fatality. Instead, the country likes
to characterize itself as requiring ever-growing safety and
security. This requirement generates the conviction that all risks
must be covered, that the repair of all damage must be quick and
complete and that society must provide, to this effect, not only
compensation for the damage it has provoked, but also for both
unforeseeable damage and unpreventable damage. The general
tendency is therefore to extend the risks covered and to enable
damage compensation at any point in time. Once the demand for
reparation becomes necessary, hybrid mechanisms (mixing to
various degrees insurance, liability, and solidarity) for damage
compensation are used. This overall tendency can be summarized
by the expression “risk socialization”. 156 It is, however, not really
the risk that is socialized, but its harmful consequences and their
compensation.
It can be noted that, if insurance is already a form of
solidarity – since it leans on mutualisation – risk socialization
calls upon a widened solidarity beyond the circle of the coinsured, hereby including national solidarity.
This attitude of France towards compensation is also clear
from the way in which the financial compensation for victims of
154
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disasters is arranged in France. With its Act of 1982 which
provides a comprehensive mandatory insurance for natural
disasters, France is in a way even a frontrunner at international
level. The mandatory insurance guarantees that all those who
have housing insurance, which is more than 90% of the
population, will also be automatically insured against natural
disasters. The model also provides for state guaranteed
reinsurance via the CCR, and is regularly applied inter alia at the
occasion of the 2016 flooding. With respect to technological
disasters France created a mandatory first party insurance in
2003 which resulted in a mandatory add-on for technological
risks. With regard to nuclear damage, the compensation
provided, at least via the operators’ liability is, as will be shown
later, low in an international comparison. For terrorism, an
insurance pool jointly created by insurers, reinsurers and the
CCR (GAREAT) provides cover for property damage via a
multi-layered approach with even unlimited reinsurance via the
CCR with a state guarantee. Personal injury will be covered
through a fund. The Guarantee Fund was applied inter alia to
cover for the November 2015 terrorist attacks.

IV. GERMANY
A. Natural Disasters
1. Ad hoc ex post Compensation
Germany’s approach to financial compensation for
victims of natural disasters is remarkably different than the
regimes implemented in Belgium and France. The most
significant difference stems from Germany’s exclusion of
damages related to natural disasters from the mandatory
insurance scheme. 157 Therefore, no single instrument deals
exclusively with financial compensation of victims of natural
catastrophes. 158 As a result, potential victims of natural
catastrophes in Germany must rely on private insurance. In
exceptional cases, such as widespread damage resulting from a
catastrophe, the German government, or specific Länder, will
intervene with ad hoc legislation to provide financial
157

Reimund Schwarze & Gert G. Wagner, In the aftermath of Dresden:
New directions in German flood insurance, 29 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND
INS. [GPRI] 154, 159 (2004).
158
Ulrich Magnus, Germany, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS
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compensation to victims of catastrophes. 159 The ad hoc
compensation based on specific statutes in Germany is qualified
as “rather insecure, often inadequate, but sometimes
‘overgenerous’”. 160 Because disaster insurance is not mandatory
in Germany, insurance coverage is generally low. 161
The German system of ad hoc ex post compensation was
heavily criticised in various studies, mainly for creating the socalled charity hazard. Charity hazard refers to the concept that
individuals reject insurance cover against natural hazards
because they anticipate governmental and private aid. 162
Empirical research comparing the mandatory public monopoly
insurance in Switzerland with systems of risk transfer found in
Austria and Germany also indicated that charity hazard in
Germany caused a substantial market failure in terms of
insufficient insurance demand. 163 As a result, numerous reforms
to the German system were formulated, the most important one
related to the introduction of mandatory comprehensive disaster
insurance based on the French system. 164 Despite political debates
in 2004, discussions regarding mandatory disaster insurance did
not result in action at Germany’s legislative level. Schwarze and
Wagner show that political considerations played an important
role in the decision-making process. 165 This is related to the fact
159
See Raschki, P., Schwarze, R., Schwindt, M. & Weck-Hannemann, H.,
Alternative financing and insurance solutions for natural hazards. A
comparison of different risk transfer systems in three countries – Germany,
Austria and Switzerland – Affected by the August 2005 floods, Innsbruck,
KGV Prevention Foundation, 2009, 13-15; REIMUND SCHWARZE, MANIJEH
SCHWINDT, GERT WAGNER & HANNELORE WECK-HANNEMANN,
ÖKONOMISCHE
STRATEGIEN
DES
NATURGEFAHRENMANAGEMENTS:
KONZEPTE, ERFAHRUNGEN UND HERAUSFORDERUNGEN 25-26 (2012).
160
Schwarze & Wagner, supra note 157, at 154.
161
At the occasion of the “flood of the century” (Jahrhundert Flut) of the
Elbe in 2002, estimates were provided of available flooding insurance. The
number of policies with additional (flooding) cover was estimated not to exceed
9%. See: Id., at 160. Also later studies inter alia with respect to a flooding in
2005 showed low amounts of insurance cover. See: SCHWARZE, SCHWINDT,
WAGNER & WECK-HANNEMANN, supra note 159, at 25-26.
162
See Paul Raschki & Hannelore Weck-Hannemann, Charity hazard: a
real hazard to natural disaster insurance?, 7 ENVTL. HAZARDS, no. 4, 2007, at
321.
163
See, e.g., Raschki, Schwarze, Schwindt & Weck-Hannemann, supra
note 159, at 20.
164
See, e.g., Schwarze & Wagner, supra note 157, at 162-63; Endres, Ohl
& Rundshagen, supra note 23.
165
“Ad hoc aid gives the decision-makers greater discretion in their
response to natural disasters than regularised benefits”. See Reimund
Schwarze & Gert G. Wagner, The Political Economy of Natural Disaster
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that ad hoc responses to disasters provide large political
advantages, more particularly to the politicians already in office.
It is a point that has been powerfully made by Depoorter who
showed that there will often be underinvestment in ex ante
prevention and overinvestment in ex post recovery for the simple
reason that politicians can obtain larger political rewards from ex
post recovery payments than from investments in ex ante
prevention, which only pay off after their term of office. 166 The
case of the Elbe flood in 2006 illustrates that point: “Chancellor
Schröder’s energetic and sympathetic efforts to help Saxony
during the floods led to the governing parties renewed popularity,
helping the social democrats to win the 2006 election”. 167 Another
argument against the introduction of the mandatory disaster
insurance was that it would lead, in a time of economic crisis, to
an estimated withdrawal of EUR 2.85 billion (USD 3.24 billion)
of purchasing power from the German economy, which was
needed to stimulate economic growth. 168 The refusal to introduce
mandatory disaster insurance in Germany once more underscores
the difficulty of introducing mandatory insurance, given the
political rewards that can be gained through (largely inefficient)
ex post ad hoc compensation.
2. Example I: The 2002 Elbe Flooding
After

the

2002

flood,

a

specific

Act,

Flutopferhilfesolidaritätsgesetz, was created to establish a Fund
in order to support the victims of the catastrophe. 169 The purpose
of the Fund was to give first and limited financial assistance on a
primary level (Soforthilfe) and, subsequently, to finance measures
for reconstruction (Aufbauhilfe) and the removal of damage
caused by the flood. 170
Various studies on the Elbe flood of 2002 also provide
information on the amount of losses and the financing of such
losses. 171 The official estimate in 2002 was that total losses
Insurance: Lessons from the Failure of a Proposed Compulsory Insurance
Scheme in Germany, 17 EUR. ENV’T. 403, 413 (2007).
166
Ben Depoorter, Horizontal Political Externalities: The Supply and
Demand of Disaster Management, 56 DUKE L. J. 101 (2006).
167
Schwarze & Wagner, supra note 165, at 413.
168
Id.
169
Magnus, supra note 158, at 121.
170
Id. at 123.
171
Mechler, R. & Weichselgartner, J. (2003). Disaster Loss Financing in
Germany – The Case of the Elbe River Floods 2002. IIASA Interim Report.
IIASA,
Laxenburg,
Austria:
IR-03-021,
available
at:
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resulting from the Elbe flooding would amount to approximately
EUR 9.2 billion (USD 10.4 billion). According to Magnus the
2002 Flood Fund disposed of a total amount of EUR 8.1 billion
(USD 9.2 billion) that was distributed through the administration
of the local communities. 172
The following amounts were compensated by the
government after the Elbe flooding
Table 2: Financing Programs in the Elbe Flood
Private

Residential

Households

Property

Business

Agricultur

Emergency

EUR

EUR

EUR 15,000

EUR

Relief

500/person

5,000/building

(50% of loss)

50,000

Financing

(USD 568),

(USD 5,680)

(USD 17,000)

(USD

Max. EUR

and EUR

57,000)

2,000/household

500/employee

e and
Forestry

(USD 2,270)
Municipal

Residential

Infrastructure

Property

Business

Agricultur
e and
Forestry

Reconstructio

90% of

Max. 80% of

35-75% of

Max. 30%

n Financing

reconstruction

reconstruction

reconstruction

of crop

Assistance

costs

costs

costs

losses, Max.
EUR 1
million

Source: Mechler & Weichselgartner (2003), 31.

3. Example II: 2013 Floodings
Following heavy early summer flooding across much of
Germany in 2013, federal and State leaders agreed on an EUR 8
billion package of assistance to help those hit hardest by the
natural disaster. The federal government agreed to finance all the
so-called “reconstruction aid” upfront. The Länder then needed to
pay back EUR 3.25 billion through debt retirement and interest
payments over twenty years. The Fund picked up the tab for up
to 80 percent of the cost of repairing the flood damage.

http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/7060/
172
Magnus, supra note 158, at 133.
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4. Example III: 2017 Summer Floodings
In the summer of 2017, the Elbe rose from a normal
summer level of about two metres to 9.16 metres, well surpassing
the 8.77 metre record of 1845. The particular storm, Paul, raged
mainly in the northern half of Germany, especially in Hamburg,
Berlin, Lower Saxony, and North Rhine-Westphalia. In the last
two days of June 2017, Storm Rasmund’s heavy rain fell on large
parts of Berlin and Brandenburg. In part, over 200 liters of rain
fell over a square meter within 24 hours. By comparison,
Germany has an average of just under 800 liters per square meter
for a whole year. The heavy rain alone caused damage of around
EUR 60 million, mainly in Berlin and Brandenburg. For the
heavy storm series between the end of June and the beginning of
July 2017, the compensation for insured persons amounted to
around EUR 600 million. About half of the compensation related
to damaged houses, household effects, commercial and industrial
enterprises while the other half of compensation related to fully
insured cars.173
Following the 2017 summer floodings, the German
government announced hundreds of millions of euros in
emergency relief to flood victims; further, the German
government offered a package of tax breaks to ease the clean-up.
The Länder also set up various compensation programs. The
State of Lower Saxony, for example, put in place an aid program
for private households, in order to support tenants and owners in
the repair of residential buildings and the renovation of
household items. If the damage surpasses EUR 500, victims can
receive compensation of up to 80 percent, but victims should
primarily use insurance benefits. The financial compensation is
tied to the condition that those affected insure themselves against
natural hazards in the future. 174 In June 2017, the conference of
the Heads of the Federal States agreed to negotiate a piece of
federal legislation that regulates pay-outs of governmental
disaster relief aid.

173
GESAMTVERBAND DER DEUTSCHEN VERSUCHERUNGSWIRTSCHAFT,
UNWETTER “PAUL” UND “RASMUND” VERURSACHEN SCHÄDEN VON ÜBER
MILLIARDE
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(July
12,
2017),
EINER
HALBEN
http://www.gdv.de/2017/07/unwetter-paul-und-rasmund-verursachenschaeden-von-ueber-einer-halben-milliarde-euro/.
174
NIEDERSACHSEN,
HILFSPROGRAMME
DES
LANDES
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B. Technological Disasters
Germany does not have specific regulations for
technological disasters. There are, however, strict liabilities
introduced via liability statutes for example: the Road Traffic
Act, Straßenverkehrsgesetz (“StVG”); the Air Traffic Act,
Luftverkehrsgesetz (“LuftVG”); the Environmental Liability Act,
Umwelthaftungsgesetz (“UmweltHG”); and the Genetechnic Act,
Gentechnikgesetz (“GenTG”). 175 Catastrophic events resulting
from a dangerous activity are in principle covered by strict
liability statutes. Examples such as a derailed train or a train
burning in a tunnel would be subject to a strict liability of the
operator or keeper. 176
However, literature which adopts the economic approach
to law holds that strict liability statutes fail to provide
satisfactory protection in the case of catastrophic damage for a
variety of reasons. First, there may be catastrophic damage
resulting from a technological disaster where no specific strict
liability statute is applicable. For example, the storage of
explosives in an inhabited flat in a densely-populated
neighbourhood. Second, there is a large possibility for the
operator to call on force majeure, thus excluding the liability. A
third criticism relates to the fact that the special statutes
introducing strict liability often contain limited amounts of
compensation. As a result of such financial caps, the full damage
resulting from the technological disaster may not be
compensated. 177

C. Nuclear Accidents
Liability for nuclear installations is laid down in the
Nuclear Energy Act, Atomgesetz (“AtG”), 178 which executes the
international conventions mentioned above. 179 The Atomic
Energy Act aims both at promoting the use of nuclear energy and
preventing damages. While initially passed in 1959, the Atomic
Energy Act was recast in 1985 and modified in 2002, 2011, and
175
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Gesetz über die friedliche Verwendung der Kernenergie und den
Schutz gegen ihre Gefahren [AtG] [Atomic Energy Act], July 15, 1985, BGBL. I
at 1565, as amended by Gesetz zur Modernisierung der Rechts der
Umweltverträglichkeit [Act on the modernization of the law of environmental
compatibility], July 20, 2017, BGBL. I at 2808, paragraph 2 section 2 (Ger.).
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2017. In addition, Germany is a party to the Paris Convention,
the Brussels Supplementary Convention, and the Joint
Protocol. 180 According to the Atomic Energy Act, “the Paris
Convention shall apply as national law in the Federal Republic of
Germany, unless its provisions depend on reciprocity as effected
by the entry into force of the Convention” (paragraph 25 (1) AtG).
The provisions of the Paris Convention provide the basis of
nuclear liability in Germany. They are complemented by Sections
25 – 40 of the Atomic Energy Act.
The Atomic Energy Act sets forth characteristics of
nuclear liability in Germany. 181 As in the international regime,
liability is channelled to the operators of a nuclear power plant
and the operators are strictly liable for the damage caused by a
nuclear incident (paragraph 25 (1) AtG). Liability is stricter in
Germany because defenses under the international regimes, such
as defenses for armed conflict, hostilities, civil war, insurrection,
or grave natural disasters of an exceptional character, are no
longer available (paragraph 25 (3) AtG). If the damage occurs
abroad, however, financial compensation is only due if that
country provides reciprocal benefits (paragraph 25 (3) AtG). The
territorial restrictions under Article 2 of the Paris Convention do
not apply such that the operator is liable irrespective of the place
of the damage (paragaph 25 (4) AtG). Germany’s system of
unlimited liability constitutes a significant deviation from the
international system. The liability is limited to the maximum
amount of the government indemnification only if damage is
caused by an armed conflict, hostilities, civil war, insurrection, or
a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character (paragraph 31
(1) AtG).
To provide coverage for the potential liability, the
operators are required to seek financial security (paragraph 13 (1)
AtG). The administrative authority shall determine the type,
180

OECD-NEA, Nuclear Legislation in OECD and NEA Countries.
Regulatory and Institutional Framework for Nuclear Activities. Germany,
2011, available at: https://www.oecd-nea.org/law/legislation/germany.pdf.
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Änderung haftungsrechtlicher Vorschriften des Atomgesetzes und zur
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terms and amount of the financial security; however, in 2002, a
limitation of EUR 2.5 billion was imposed on the amount of
financial security (paragraph 13 (2) AtG).182 Since the maximum
coverage amount of EUR 2.5 billion is not available at the
insurance market, the operators of nuclear power plants started
to find alternatives. In 2001, the four parent companies of
Germany’s nineteen nuclear power plants negotiated and
concluded a “Solidarity Agreement” (Solidarvereinbarung). 183 The
Agreement consists of six sections and four annexes. Under this
Agreement, up to EUR 255.6 million nuclear liability is covered
by third party liability insurance taken out by each operator. 184
Between this amount and EUR 2.5 billion, coverage is provided
under the framework of a a contract to which all nuclear power
plant operators and their respective parent companies are jointly
subscribed. Each party has an obligation to contribute a
percentage of the total amount in case a damage is attributed to
one of the parties. The percentage for each nuclear power station
is calculated according to the square root of the thermal reactor
output. The percentage of power plants is then attributed to the
parent companies on the basis of their participation (Clause 1 (3)
Solidarity Agreement).
This allocation of liability is different from that in the US,
where each operator bears the same quota. In Germany, the
allocation of contribution is based on the generating capacity. As
in the US, the obligation to make the contribution only comes due
after a damage in excess of the insurance capacity happens.
182
In the beginning of the 1970s, a pooling system in Germany emerged.
At that time, an increase of the financial security up to 1 billion DEM (≈ EUR
500 million) was on the legislative agenda. The first DEM 500 million should
be covered by private means while the government should indemnify the
remaining half. The insurers and nuclear operators negotiated to cover liability
up to DEM 500 million fully by insurance. The first DEM 200 million was
covered by insurers while for the remaining DEM 300 million, the insurer only
fronted contract. The remaining DEM 300 million was reinsured by the
operators of nuclear power plants as a whole. This arrangement remained
valid until 2002. In 2002, the amendment to the Atomic Energy Act increased
the amount of financial security up to EUR 2.5 billion and allowed financial
security in other forms rather than through liability insurance. See Norbert
Pelzer, International Pooling of Operators’ Funds: An Option to Increase the
Amount of Financial Security to Cover Nuclear Liabilities, 79 NUCLEAR L.
BULL. 37, 43 (2007); Simon Carrol, Perspective on the Pros and Cons of a
Pooling-type Approach to Nuclear Third Party Liability, 81 NUCLEAR L.
BULL. 75, 91 (2008).
183
Pelzer, supra note 182, at 44 n. 24.
184
Insurers argued they could only provide full coverage up to EUR 256
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However, the risk that the operators have to contribute is even
smaller in Germany where the partners only have to pay if
neither the operator nor the parent company are in a position to
pay up to EUR 2.5 billion (Clause 1 (5) Solidarity Agreement).
The Solidarity Agreement is hence only a guarantee for the
payment by the liable parties.
If the liability is not covered by or cannot be satisfied by
financial security, the German State shall indemnify the operator
(paragraph 34 (1) AtG). The maximum amount of
indemnification – to the extent that the damages are not covered
by private financial security or that claims cannot be paid out of
such security – is set at EUR 2.5 billion. The obligation of
payment is the maximum amount minus the amount that is
covered by financial security. Such indemnification is borne for
up to the amount of EUR 500 million, 75% by the federal
authorities and 25% by the region (in German referred to as
Land) where the installation is situated. The federal State covers
the amount between EUR 500 million and 2.5 billion alone. After
the payment of the indemnification, recourse is possible if the
operator disobeys specific obligations, or the operator caused the
damage wilfully or by gross negligence, or if the operator did not
seek financial security to the required extent (paragraph 37 AtG).
But the liability for third parties prevails over the claims for
recourse (Clause 1(8) Solidarity Agreement). In addition to
mutually guaranteeing the coverage of liability, the partners must
also provide help in handling claims; for example, they may
provide legal and commercial staff capacity and infrastructure.
For this kind of support, the partners cannot ask for repayment.
The partners also provide help for the use of independent
contractors, up to the amount of EUR 122,218 million (Clause 2
Solidarity Agreement). To ensure the availability of assets in case
of damage, the partners must submit an auditor’s certification
each year (Clause 3 Solidarity Agreement).
German law therefore differs importantly from the
international Conventions by providing a much higher amount of
compensation via a retrospective pooling scheme. The amount of
financial security to be provided through the pool moreover does
not eliminate the principal liability of the operator. In other
words, under the German approach nuclear operators are still
liable if the capacity of the pool is depleted.
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D. Terrorism
1. Material Damage
In response to 9/11, the German reinsurance market made
the decision to exclude losses due to an act of terrorism. The
primary market followed suit in view of the missing reinsurance
capacity. This led to the creation of a so-called terrorism pool – as
was the case in many countries. Extremus Versicherungs-AG
(“Extremus”), a pool consisting of seventeen insurers and
reinsurers, was created and approved by the German State
authority in September 2002. 185 Extremus acts as primary insurer,
issuing the policies on its own paper. The company buys
reinsurance from its shareholders, from other companies active in
the German market and from international reinsurers. The
scheme is not mandatory, nor is it mandatory for insurers to offer
terrorism coverage for larger risks. Primary insurers might
recommend their clients to Extremus if the clients wish to
purchase terrorism insurance. 186
Extremus intervenes to cover damage to property and
losses due to the interruption of business operations. Nuclear,
biological, or chemical (“NBC”) contamination is excluded, as
well as cyber terrorism. The scheme also does not include
aviation, marine, life or personal accidents. Financial
compensation for victims of terrorist attacks is thus not covered
by Extremus. All property has to be located within Germany and
losses have to occur in German territory.
Due to the scope of risk for which Extremus is eligible, the
primary market is able to provide coverage for smaller risks that
result as a consequence of a terrorist attack. Extremus covers
losses higher than EUR 25 million, but coverage is subject to an
overall limitation of EUR 2.5 billion. 187 All policies provide for a
standard deductible of EUR 50,000. The maximum damage
which a policyholder can insure with Extremus for a single year
is limited to EUR 1.5 billion. 188 Above the limit of EUR 2.5
billion (in the annual aggregate co-insured by members of the
pool), the German State provides additional coverage up to an
amount of EUR 10 billion for excess losses. 189 For its guarantee,
the State receives a payment of 12.5% of the premiums collected
185
186
187
188
189

Magnus, supra note 158, at 130.
INT’L FORUM FOR TERRORISM RISK (RE)INS. POOLS, supra note 148.
Magnus, supra note 158, at 130.
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by Extremus. Extremus is in other words a multi-layered
insurance pool consisting of insurers and reinsurers providing a
total capacity of EUR 10 billion. Thus far, no indemnifications
have been paid out by Extremus. The severe terrorism attack on
19 December 2016 in Berlin affected one insured (the other
victims having sustained only physical injuries), but the loss
remained within the deductible. 190
Since 1 January 2017, Extremus has been offering socalled “threat insurance”, which covers certain incidental costs if,
for example, a shopping center is closed by authorities because it
is presumed to be the scene of a terrorist attack.
2. Personal Injury
Victims of violent crime in Germany have a right to ask
financial compensation under the Victims Compensation Law.191
The Law is based on the concept that victims of a violent attack
have a claim for compensation against the State which has been
unable to protect them in spite of all its efforts. Physical or mental
harm as a result of a violent attack is a prerequisite for a claim for
compensation. Victims of crimes of violence receive all health
treatment measures necessary to restore or improve their health;
this includes, for example, health or occupational rehabilitation
measures, care services, psychotherapeutic treatment, etc. This
Act also provides payments to cover living expenses and longterm pension payments to compensate for the physical injuries
and economic losses. The level of the graduated pension
payments is governed by the extent of the respective injury to
health and the losses of income caused by the injury. At the
lowest level, the current monthly payment is EUR 118. The only
payments that will be deducted are those which the victim
actually receives in respect of the same injury and which are also
intended for the same purpose.
Compensation can be claimed by German nationals and
by foreigners who are lawful residents in Germany.

190

Charlie Thomas, Extremus Considering First Claim Following Berlin
THE
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(Jan.
18,
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http://www.insuranceinsider.com/extremus-considering-first-claim-followingberlin-attack.
191
Gesetz über die Entschädigung für Opfer von Gewalttaten [OEG]
[Victims Compensation Law], May 11, 1976, BGBL. I at 1181 (Ger.).
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3. Example: The 2016 Berlin Terrorist Attack
On 19 December 2016, a truck was deliberately driven
into the Christmas market next to the Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial
Church at Breitscheidplatz in Berlin, leaving twelve people dead
and 56 others injured.
There was some initial confusion over the financial
compensation for the victims’ families. Since the attacker used a
truck, it was initially classified as a road incident rather than a
terrorist attack. Therefore, the victims had to apply to the
Verkehrsopferhilfe, an assistance Fund set up to aid victims of
road accidents. As a result, the victims of the Berlin attack have
been compensated partly from a Fund primarily set up to deal
with motor vehicle accidents and not under the aegis of the
Victims Compensation Law. The German Justice Minister said
that the government would rewrite German law to rule out such
absurdities in future. By December 2017, Germany paid out EUR
2.3 million in compensation and support. The government’s
hardship rules set individual sums of EUR 10,000 for immediate
family members and EUR 5,000 for siblings. 192 Those left
wounded have received sums based on the severity of their
injuries.
The initial response to the tragic events in Berlin has been
broadly criticized, and the poor handling of Germany’s response
has been widely admitted, so much so that a final report on the
underlying problems has been presented by the German Justice
Minister in December 2017. 193 In particular, victims and relatives
complained about the lack of state recognition, the lack of timely
information, and the inadequate government financial support.
The report proposes the establishment of information centers for
victims and relatives at the site of terrorist attacks, as well as a
point of contact in the government. It also wants to streamline
procedures for notifying family members of people who have
been seriously injured or killed. Further, the government should
take the lead in advising victims and relatives on how to get
support and compensation payments. Interestingly, the
192
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(Dec.
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recommendations in the report have been based on general
practice in Israel, a country with an extensive history of dealing
with terrorist attacks.

E. Summary
Germany regards the prevention of catastrophic damage
as a matter of great importance. 194 Prevention as far as possible is
the overriding aim of any protection against catastrophes. This is
particularly affected by requiring extended preventive measures
and precautions as far as private or public operators of publically
accessible places or events (installations, plants, trains, planes,
sporting events, etc.) are concerned. These operators are required
to provide reasonable preventive safety measures even against
natural disasters. Moreover, the German Federation and the
Länder have established specific institutes, agencies and
measures with the goal of protecting the population against
catastrophic risks.
However, as far as ex post financial compensation for
victims is concerned, Germany lacks a structural solution similar
to the mandatory comprehensive first party insurance systems
implemented in Belgium and France. Attempts to introduce such
a model failed. As a result, victims of natural disasters in
Germany have to rely on ad hoc ex post compensation. The
flooding that occurred in 2013 and 2017 showed that the German
government (often the federal level, but often equally in
combination with the Länder) generously intervenes.
Germany especially has a strikingly interesting model for
the compensation of damage caused by nuclear accidents. The
total amount of indemnification is high, also in international
comparison (EUR 2.5 billion), but it is especially striking that the
largest part of this compensation is paid via a risk-sharing
agreement between the nuclear power plant operators. Germany
has, like the Netherlands and Belgium, also created a special
insurance pool to deal with terrorism-related property damage
(Extremus). Personal injury is compensated on the basis of a
special act dealing with financial compensation for specific
victims. Notwithstanding particular problems, the German
government paid out EUR 2.3 million in compensating the
victims of the 2016 Berlin terrorist attack.

194

Magnus, supra note 158, at 120.

2019

Compensation for Victims of Disasters

325

V. THE NETHERLANDS
A. Natural Disasters
1. Introduction
The Netherlands has suffered various types of natural
catastrophes, including an earthquake in Southern-Limburg
(1992), severe storms (1997, 2002, 2007 and 2013), and heavy rain
and flooding in the South-East (1993-1995). With respect to each
natural catastrophe, the legal instruments available to provide
financial compensation came into question. Victims frequently
approached the government for compensation and, as a result,
the government of the Netherlands intervened on various
occasions by using the public budget to provide ad hoc
compensation to the victims. As is shown below, a specific Act –

Wet Tegemoetkoming Schade bij Rampen en Zware Ongevallen
(“WTS”) – was created in 1998 with the aim of providing
financial compensation to the victims of catastrophes and severe
accidents. in practice, however, it appears that WTS often has
not been applied to cases where many people suffered harm as a
result of a disaster. Therefore, in addition to the statutory
arrangement in the WTS, the government of the Netherlands
along with other organisations created ad hoc solutions for
specific victims. The main problems with respect to the
insurability of disasters and the solutions via these collective
arrangements are addressed below.
2. Evolution of Insurance Coverage
In the 1950s Dutch insurers issued so-called binding
decisions, applying to all their members, prohibiting them from
insuring flood and earthquake risks; the latter being relatively
small in the Netherlands with the exception of the area around
southern Limburg.195 The argument of the insurers was that these
risks were technically not insurable and that therefore all of their
members should refrain from covering them. 196 The insurers
feared adverse selection because of concerns regarding the
occurrence of a natural disaster that resulted in billions of euros
195

Ton Hartlief, Vergoeding van watersnoodschade, in RECHT IN HET
DE JURIDISCHE ASPECTEN VAN WATERSNOOD 131, 142-143 (Michael
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196
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worth of damage and an insufficient amount of statistical
material for the calculation of premiums. It was argued that only
those who would be largely exposed to the risk would have a
demand for insurance; others would have no need for coverage,
leading to a situation of adverse selection. Consequently, those
who faced the risk of being affected by a natural disaster could
not receive coverage simply because insurers had agreed not to
cover those risks.
As a result of an earthquake close to Roermond in 1992
and the flooding of the River Meuse in 1993, the binding decision
concerning earthquakes was quickly withdrawn, and insurers
came under increased pressure to abrogate the binding decision
on flooding. In part, this was the result of political pressure on
insurers, as can be seen, for instance, by the questions that were
put to the government during the parliamentary proceedings. 197
But it was due also to the concerns of the European competition
authorities since the binding decision clearly violated the
conditions of Regulation 3932/92 of 21 December 1992 on the
application of Article 85(3) of the “Treaty to certain categories of
agreements, decisions and concerted practices in the insurance
sector”. 198 Levie and Cousy (1994) have commented on this
exemption regulation, which states that standard policy
conditions in particular may not contain any systematic exclusion
of specific types of risk without providing for the express
possibility of including that cover by agreement (see
Consideration 8 preceding the exemption of the Regulation, as
well as Article 7(1)(a) of the exemption, reflecting that noncompetitive practices are apparently not an exception in Dutch
insurance practice). The binding decision was subsequently
withdrawn in 1998. 199
Negotiations took place between the government and the
insurers on a new system of coverage for natural disasters, with
the French model being used as an important example. These
debates finally led to the introduction of the WTS 1998,
197

Overstromingen in Nederland, December 1993, Documents of the
Second Chamber of Representatives 1993-1994, 23 564, no. 3.
198
Commission Regulation 3932/92, 1992 O.J. (L 398) 7. Note that this
group exemption for the insurance sector has meanwhile been abrogated.
199
Report to the European Parliament concerning the operation of the
exemption Regulation 3932/92 COM (1999) 92 final (May 12, 1999). Where the
European Commission explicitly discussed these binding decisions, stating
that, as a result of the questions asked by the Commission, the Dutch
Association of Insurers had decided to bring its binding decisions into line with
the regulation by simply converting the binding decision into a non-binding
recommendation, leaving each insurer free to extend cover to flood risks.
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providing for public compensation in the event that the damage
is uninsurable. In addition, by the end of the 1990s, Dutch
insurers acquiesced to political pressure and announced that they
were prepared to cover damage caused by heavy rain, as can be
seen in a letter of the Secretary of State of Internal Affairs Gijs de
Vries. 200 The fact that the public funding mechanism offered
under the WTS 1998 was not applicable to cases where risks in
principle would be insurable played an important role in this
respect. As a result, damage due to heavy rainfall became
insurable.
In 1999, the Dutch Association of Insurers advised that
insurance against heavy rainfall would be included in the existing
building, fire and theft, and contents covers. 201 Damage due to
rainfall, including the overflow risk of dikes and quays, should be
covered for both private individuals and companies. Damage
resulting from the flooding of rivers not originating in the
Netherlands and saltwater flooding remains uninsurable. That
shows that the scope of insurance cover for flooding in the
Netherlands remains extremely limited. The WTS 1998 gives
citizens and companies the right of financial compensation when
insurance possibilities are exhausted.
As a side note, it is of interest to mention that the Dutch
Association of Insurers agreed in 2002 to offer agricultural water
damage insurance through a pool, covering damage up to an
amount of EUR 50 million, backed by a guarantee of the central
government for an amount between EUR 50 and 100 million
with a deductible of 25% if the damage is higher. 202 This example
makes clear that the Netherlands has been moving forward with
regard to the insurability of water damage. The insurance is
meant to cover, in particular, crop damage due to heavy rain.
The agricultural sector also agreed that, in such a case, it would
not call for financial compensation from the government on an ad
200

Wateroverlast in Nederland; Brief staatssecretaris inzake mogelijke
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Dutch.
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Matthijs Kok, Hessel F. Dooper & Ingrid B.M. Lammers, Verzekeren
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hoc basis. However, the WTS 1998 would still remain applicable,
for instance in the event of damage caused by flooding. Yet, since
the guarantee of the central government principally constitutes
state aid, the European State Aid procedure had to be followed,
as reflected by the letter of the Minister of Agriculture, Cornelis
Pieter Veerman of 11 April 2003. 203 On 15 October 2003, the
European Commission approved the subsidy provided by the
central government in the form of a guarantee. 204 Thereon, it
became possible for the market to start developing these crop
damage insurances. Two pools, Agriver and OWM AquaPol 205
(formerly LTO AquaPol), were instituted. Both apply for the
subsidy in the form of a guarantee by the central government.
Since 19 March 2004, Agriver has offered insurance for crop
damage against the consequences of heavy rain, subsidized by a
guarantee of the central government. 206 In 2007, crop insurance
was expanded to include compensation of damage to crops in the
fruit-farming sector caused by frost. The European Commission
approved the extension of such regulation on 19 June 2007. 207 The
Dutch State hereby provides a subsidy in the form of a guarantee
as a stimulus for insurance companies, ranging from EUR
6,677,400 (USD 7,586,962) to a maximum of EUR 20,927,400
(USD 23,778,025) per year for frost damage, with a total insured
value of EUR 762.6 million (USD 866.5 million). Furthermore,
the decision of the European Commission altered the state aid
rules regarding the first branch of crop insurance. In both cases, a
deductible of 25% per crop applies. It is noteworthy that
governmental intervention thereby facilitated the insurability of
the risk caused by a catastrophe, especially crop damage caused
203
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by heavy rainfall and extreme frost.
This course of events makes clear that although there are
undoubtedly great benefits to cooperation between insurers, the
case of the Dutch binding decisions indicates that this
cooperation may effectively also limit or even exclude coverage.
Even when the binding decisions were abrogated, the
negotiations between the government of the Netherlands and the
Dutch Association of Insurers determined the conditions for
covering damage caused by natural disasters. According to legal
doctrine, this shows that an effective competition policy is in
great need in order to generate a wide and differentiated supply
of insurance policies. 208
3. WTS 1998
In the 1990s the debate on financial compensation for
victims of catastrophes, more particularly of flooding, continued.
The government of the Netherlands originally argued against the
French solution due to fears that free consumer choice would be
limited, and that a compulsory system would increase costs for
citizens. 209 Ultimately, the government chose to introduce a draft
of legislation similar to the French framework. The draft
installed a Fund which would be financed through a tax on
housing insurance. All those insured (bad or good risks) would
have to pay the tax. However, the Dutch Council of State
criticized this draft because they claimed that the preferable
course of action would be letting the government finance this risk
and that insuring the flooding risk was possible. 210 Hence, the
government decided to withdraw the draft.
Following the withdrawal of a draft similar to the French
framework, the government of the Netherlands used the Belgian
Disaster Fund of 1976 as a model for the WTS, an Act on
compensation of damage in the event of catastrophes and large
accidents. 211 The WTS sought to provide a structural solution for
208
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financial compensation of victims of catastrophes rather than
impose a system of ad hoc responses. 212 De Vries (1998), 213 de
Groot (2004), 214 and Bruggeman (2010) 215 completed separate
analyzes to determine the situations under which the WTS would
provide a right to financial compensation for damage. The result
of such analyzes indicates that compensation is applicable in the
case of events classified as a catastrophe, such as fresh water
flooding or earthquakes, or large accidents of at least an equal
amount of damage. Large accidents only fall within the WTS’s
scope of application if such accident was declared to constitute a
large accident by a Royal Decree (Art. 3). To qualify as a large
accident, parliamentary proceedings indicate that governmental
organizations and services of various disciplines must have
intervened in a coordinated response effort. Further, the accident
must have endangered the health of many individuals and caused
substantial damage. 216
The WTS clearly has a subsidiary character, as is made
clear in the Act itself. Article 4, for instance, provides that victims
will receive financial compensation for particular types of
damage, including damage to a dwelling, commercial loss and
property damage. 217 Article 4(3) of the WTS stipulates that
victims are not entitled to financial compensation when the
aardbevingen of andere rampen en zware ongevallen [Wet tegemoetkoming
schade bij rampen en zware ongevallen] [Act on compensation for damages in
case of disasters and major accidents], Stb. 1998, 325 (Neth.).
212
The WTS foresees, according to its explanatory memorandum, in a
“structural arrangement on the basis of which the State gives compensation to
those who made costs in preventing or limiting damage and to those who
suffered damage which is the immediate and directive consequence of a
freshwater flood, an earthquake of another catastrophe of at least equal order”.
213
de Vries, F.J., ‘Vergoeding van rampschade’, Nederlands Juristenblad
[NJB], 1998, 1908-13.
214
de Groot, J.F., ‘Na de ramp. Een beschouwing over de toepassing van
de WTS’, Overheid en Aansprakelijkheid, 2004, 141-52.
215
BRUGGEMAN, V., COMPENSATING CATASTROPHE VICTIMS. A
COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACH, Alphen aan den Rijn,
Kluwer Law International, 2010.
216
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Memorie van Toelichting, 12-12-1996, Kamerstuk 25 159, nr. 3 [Documents of
the Second Chamber of Representatives 1996-1997, 25 159, no. 3], 4-5, in
Dutch.
217
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damage was reasonably insurable or when the victim was able to
obtain compensation from another source. The parliamentary
proceedings made clear that damage is considered as reasonably
insurable when it is not generally excluded from coverage and
when it is generally insurable without limiting conditions or
excessively high costs, which calls into question whether damage
resulting from natural disasters can be considered insurable. In
response, the WTS explicitly notes that certain types of damage,
such as damage to motor vehicles, will not be compensated under
the Act because the type of damage is insurable and covered
under commercial insurance. 218 If, however, insurance were
theoretically possible, but victims did not take up the possibility
because the premium charged would not be proportional to the
coverage provided, the WTS may be applicable again. 219
The WTS works with a layered system of compensation.
The general basis for compensation is set forth in Article 6 of the
Act, but the Implementing Regulation WTS 220 contains more
specific rules regarding the calculation of the magnitude of
certain heads of damage and costs. In case the WTS is directly
applicable, or declared applicable to a specific disaster by Royal
Decree, a Ministerial Regulation will have to be elaborated. This
Ministerial Regulation then sets forth more detailed rules
regarding the compensatory amount and the calculation methods.
Since the general basis for compensation cannot remain
uncapped, the victim will only receive a contribution in the total
amount of his or her damage and costs, and thus not full financial
compensation. In practice, the available amount per disaster or
large accident is limited to EUR 500 million. 221
The WTS mainly applies to damage caused by heavy
222
rain. De Groot (2004, 152) claims that the WTS has been
218
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Stcrt. 2003, 9.
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applied only four times. 223 The first and second applications of
the WTS stemmed from cases of heavy rain. In both instances,
the WTS needed to be declared applicable by Royal Decree
because the heavy rain did not pertain to a formal flood in the
sense of Article 1 of the WTS. It is remarkable that this statutory
arrangement, which was specifically created by the legislator to
compensate victims of catastrophes, has been applied merely in
the case of damage due to heavy rainfall (which is in principle
insurable). The legislator has not succeeded in its (at least
implicit) attempt to create with the WTS an exclusive
arrangement for government contributions in the event of both
natural catastrophes. Hence, it is not surprising that the WTS has
been the subject of criticism in various literature.
4. Recent Evolutions
The absence of an adequate flooding insurance in the
Netherlands was criticized by the Netherlands Scientific Council
for Government Policy (WRR), 224 which resulted in Dutch
insurers developing a proposal for flooding insurance based on
the French model. This time, however, they encountered
difficulties with the Netherlands Competition Authority,
Autoriteit Consument en Markt, (“ACM”). The ACM criticized
the fact that consumers would no longer have a choice and
doubted whether there was a societal need for disaster
insurance. 225 The ACM argues, inter alia, that consumer interest
groups would not support flooding insurance. 226 As a result, the
insurers withdrew their initiative in 2013 and determined that a
political solution was required. The insurers stated in their press
memo:
As a result of the position of the ACM, the Netherlands
will still be without an affordable flooding insurance
with an adequate cover. At the occasion of a next
flooding (which will inevitably take place), victims will
2000 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR MILIEUAANSPRAKELIJKHEID 13.
223
The amount of times the WTS has been applied is the same thirteen
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this claim.
224
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in POLITIEK PRIVAATRECHT 247, 262 (Willem H. van Boom & Siewert D.
Lindenbergh eds., 2013).
225
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226
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voor overstromingsdekkingen, 2013, 10-11.
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again be uncompensated. They will then have to await
whether they can still call on the WTS. And they will
rightly ask why no arrangements have been made. 227
It is striking that despite long negotiations and attempts to
implement flooding insurance, flooding insurance remains
unavailable in the Netherlands. 228 The reluctance to seek
insurance solutions was also apparent in the reaction of the
Netherlands to the Green Paper on the insurance of natural and
man-made disasters. 229 In the Dutch reaction, the government
claims to be against European regulations that increase the
insurability of natural disasters. The government resists a larger
involvement of the government (arguing that that would lead to
moral hazard), mandatory disaster insurance (as it would lead to
negative redistribution), and the French model of a mandatory
add-on in addition to voluntarily purchased insurances. 230
This overview of the development of disaster insurance in
the Netherlands reveals that efforts to develop flooding insurance
have failed despite numerous attempts. 231 Although the binding
decisions from the 1950s have formally been abrogated, the failed
efforts to develop flooding insurance indicate that the spirit of
those binding decisions has not left the Netherlands. 232 For
victims of natural disasters this effectively means that they are
227
In Dutch: “Door de ACM-zienswijze blijft Nederland voorlopig
verstoken van een betaalbare overstromingsverzekering met een goede
dekking. Bij een volgende overstroming – die vroeg of laat komt – staan
gedupeerden opnieuw in de kou. Zij moeten dan maar afwachten of ze dan
nog een beroep kunnen doen op de WTS. En vragen zich dan terecht af
waarom er niets is geregeld”. See Buis (2013), Verbond: betaalbare
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biedt
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230
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subjected to a declaration of applicability of the WTS.
Alternatively, victims of natural disasters need to await ad hoc
government compensation. Notwithstanding the many reports
and recommendations, including from the WRR, 233 60 years after
the dramatic flooding that took place in the province of Zeeland
in 1953, flooding insurance in the Netherlands is still not
available. 234

B. Technological Disasters
1. Introduction
In addition to the negligence rule set forth in Article 6:162
BW, the Netherlands Civil Code235 includes a large amount of
strict liabilities. For example, Article 6:175 BW includes strict
liabilities for damage caused as a result of dangerous substances
and waste sites. Those strict liabilities are not linked to any
compulsory liability insurance, but, if the liable injurer would
have purchased liability insurance, the victim has a direct right of
action against this liability insurer. 236
The liabilities incorporated in Section 6:3 BW can in
theory be applied in case of a technological disaster. However, in
practice, the question of whether the injurer can effectively
provide compensation arises more frequently than the issue of
satisfying the legal conditions for liability. Insured amounts are
often insufficient to compensate victims of technological
disaster. 237
2. Solvency Guarantees
Dutch legislation does not provide a large amount of
mandatory solvency guarantees. The Belgian example of
compulsory insurance in combination with strict liability for
explosions and fires in public buildings has also been discussed in
the Netherlands. 238 A Belgian scholar, Van Schoubroeck, even
theorized that if a disaster like Volendam would have taken place
233

The critical report of the WRR of 2012 will be discussed in the next
section related to technological disasters.
234
Hartlief & Faure, supra note 6, at 1036.
235
Burgerlijk Wetboek [BW] [Civil Code] (Neth.).
236
Art. 7:954 Burgerlijk Wetboek [BW] [Civil Code] (Neth.).
237
Hartlief & Faure, supra note 6, at 1014.
238
See, e.g., Dineke Postma & Tom Bertens, Crisis, rampen en recht:
Verslag Jaarvergadering NJV 2014, 2015 NEDERLANDS JURISTENBLAD [NJB]
18.
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in Belgium, the damage would have been largely covered under
the mandatory insurance cover. 239
3. WTS
When drafting the WTS, legislators in the Netherlands
sought to create an arrangement that would provide exclusive
compensation in the case of large disasters, i.e. both natural and
man-made catastrophes. For man-made catastrophes, the WTS
must be declared applicable by Royal Decree.
However, Article 4(3) of the WTS imposes a condition that
compensation for damages must not be recoverable from another
source. The historical application of the WTS has shown that, as
a result, the WTS may not be applicable in cases of man-made
disasters where damage can be claimed from a liable injurer.
Thus, the subsidiarity of the WTS manifests itself in one of two
circumstances. First, the WTS is applicable, but if certain types
of damage are recoverable from another source they are not
covered under the WTS. Second, the WTS is not applicable at all,
given the claim possibilities in tort law.
In order to provide a good picture of the problems with
which victims of technological disasters are confronted, two
major technological catastrophes that occurred at the beginning
of this century will be described. They are a good illustration for
the problems of providing financial compensation to victims of
technological disasters in the Netherlands. Precisely in cases of
serious man-made disasters with large personal injury, like in the
cases of Volendam and Enschede, the WTS was not applied. The
formal reason provided was that the damage in both cases
concerned “insurable damage” such that the WTS was
inapplicable. 240
4. “Enschede”
The first example is the explosion of a fireworks factory in
Enschede on 13 May 2000. 241 The fire in the fireworks factory
239

Caroline Van Schoubroeck, Objectieve aansprakelijkheid en
verzekeringsplicht bij schade door rampen: Een Belgische case-studie, in
AANSPRAKELIJKHEID EN SCHADEVERHAAL BIJ RAMPEN, 145 (Arno J.
Akkermans & Edward Brans eds., 2002); Herman Cousy, Rampenschade in
België: nieuwe ontwikkelingen, in KRING VAN AANSPRAKELIJKEN BIJ
MASSASCHADE 105, 116 (VERMANDE ED. 2002).
240
Hartlief & Faure, supra note 6, at 1021.
241
See Jos J. Van der Helm, Tegemoetkomingregelingen na de
vuurwerkramp, 40 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR PRIVAATRECHT [TPR] 40, for the legal
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and the subsequent explosions resulted in numerous deaths,
injuries, and the destruction of nearly an entire neighbourhood.
The damage amounted to several hundred million euros. The
compensation for damages resulting from the explosions arose as
a question in the wake of the catastrophe. While a claim was
filed against the liable company under tort law, it became
immediately clear that the corporation could not compensate the
entirety of the damage resulting from the explosion. A tort claim
would therefore never lead to financial compensation of the
victims. As a result, the question of whether other mechanisms
could be used to compensate the victims arose again.
The explosion in Enschede clearly displays the limited
ability of the WTS 1998 to provide financial compensation to
victims of catastrophes. This Act was not declared applicable to
the catastrophe in Enschede because the government argued that
the catastrophe concerned largely insurable damage. As far as
victims are concerned, one can of course think of various first
party insurances that have or could have covered the losses of the
victims. With respect to corporate damage, one can again think
about various corporate insurances that would have covered the
losses. However, although the WTS 1998 was not declared
applicable, the government argued that a national catastrophes
fund Stichting Nationaal Rampenfonds (“NRF”) could provide
some financial compensation to victims for damage which was
not insured. 242 The latter is an interesting construction: it is in
principle a private initiative and thus a privately-run fund to
which the government donates funds.
In addition to providing first aid after the explosion, the
community of Enschede paid funeral and other related costs. The
community received a contribution from the NRF for victims
who were not sufficiently insured.243 After the disaster, the
community of Enschede created a commission for the financial
settlement of the fireworks disaster, the Commissie Financiële
Afwikkeling Vuurwerkramp (“CFA”). The Commission was
composed of representatives from the community and province,
consequences and compensation arrangements after this catastrophe;
BRUGGEMAN, supra note 1, at 382-85.
242
See Vuurwerkramp Enschede; Brief minister, 24-05-200,
Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 27 157, no. 1, 4-5, available at:
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-27157-1.
243
See Vuurwerkramp Enschede; Brief minister met informatie over
maatregelen die op rijksniveau zijn en worden genomen, 06-06-2000,
Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 27 157, no. 2, 17-19, available
at:https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-27157-2.
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the insurers, and the NRF. The central government only acted as
observer. The task of this CFA was to make an inventory of the
damage and to determine to what extent some victims were
underinsured.244 The CFA formulated proposals for additional
financial compensation to the community of Enschede. This CFA
proposed various arrangements for non-insured damage, which
were also largely implemented. Compensation for damages of
individual citizens included compensation for lost furniture,
compensation for damaged cars (that were not insured) and
compensation for specific costs caused by the unusual
circumstances. 245 All these heads of damage were compensated
through the aforementioned NRF. The central government made
a lump sum payment of 6.2 million guilders to the Fund (around
EUR 2.8 million or USD 3.2 million). 246
For corporations, a specific Fund was created to make
advance payments and provide loans. 247 Thus, the
aforementioned NRF provided compensations for citizens, but
companies could not seek financial assistance from the NRF. In
particular, in November 2001 an arrangement for companies was
negotiated specifically for damage caused by the fireworks
catastrophe, consisting inter alia, of: 248
- a compensation for non-insured and underinsured
material damage (60% of the value with a 10%
deductible);
- a compensation for non-insured and underinsured
commercial losses (70% of the lost profits compared
to 1999 with a deductible of 30%) under the
condition that the assets of the corporation are

244
Vuurwerkramp Enschede; Brief met het voortgangsbericht over de
ramp, 29-06-2000, Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 27 157, no. 5, 9-10, available
at: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-27157-5.
245
See Vuurwerkramp Enschede; Brief minister met het maandelijkse
voortgangsbericht met betrekking tot de afwikkeling van de vuurwerkramp
van 13 mei 2000 te Enschede, 23-10-2000, Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 27 157,
no. 10, 5-7, available at: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-27157-10.
246
See Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 27 157, no. 10, 5.
247
See Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 27 157, no. 5, 7-8.
248
See Vuurwerkramp Enschede; Brief staatssecretaris over een
continuïteitsregeling voor door de vuurwerkramp in Enschede gedupeerde
ondernemers, 22-11-2000, Kamerstukken II 2000-2001, 27 157, no. 12, 1-2,
available at: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-27157-12. and
Vuurwerkramp Enschede; Brief minister over de afwikkeling van de
vuurwerkramp in Enschede, 30-11-2000, Kamerstukken II 2000-2001, 27 157,
no. 13, 4-5, available at: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-27157-13.
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lower than EUR 225,000; 249
- a compensation in case of the shutdown of a
company with a maximum of three times the
annual profit in 1999 under the condition that the
companies’ own assets were lower than EUR
225,000;
- a compensation of maximum EUR 2,500 for legal,
fiscal and accountancy assistance.
This consisted in total of an amount of approximately
90,000,000 guilders (around EUR 40.8 million or USD 46.4
million) which was paid by the Ministry of Economic Affairs to a
foundation called Financial Aid Fireworks Catastrophe
(Financiële Hulpverlening Vuurwerkramp).250 The government
estimated that more than 90% of the companies in the disaster
area could continue their enterprise in an acceptable manner with
aid provided by the foundation. 251
5. “Volendam”
Shortly after the events in Enschede, the Netherlands was
confronted with another major catastrophe. On New Year’s Eve
of 2000, a large fire took place in café De Hemel in Volendam.
This fire resulted in many deaths and serious injuries. Again, the
question of adequate financial compensation and the role of the
government arose. In contrast to the fireworks explosion in
Enschede, Volendam concerned primarily personal injury
damage. The possibilities of using tort law were examined, in
addition to social security payments to the victims. Although the
owner of the café may be the primary individual responsible,
victims looked at other potential defendants due to insolvency
concerns. The owner of the café only had insurance coverage for
a limited amount of the damage and, thus, victims sought
recovery from other sources. Barendrecht showed that the
Volendam case is typically one where multiple tortfeasors have
acted together and have all contributed to the risk. Therefore,
Barendrecht suggested that a division of liability should occur
based on the contribution of each tortfeasor and victim to the
249
This limit was introduced in order to indicate that companies that can
carry the damage themselves should indeed take the financial consequences
themselves as well. However, in reality the large majority of the corporations
was apparently below the limit. See Kamerstukken II 2000-2001, 27 157, no.
15, 10.
250
See Kamerstukken II 2000-2001, 27 157, no. 12, 2.
251
See Kamerstukken II 2000-2001, 27 157, no. 13, 5.
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entire risk. 252
Formal law suits against public authorities did not take
place, and, ultimately, a group of victims reached an agreement
with the owner of the café. With the help of the community of
Volendam a settlement was reached whereby the owner of the
café decided to sell his café which was purchased by the
community. The sum Volendam received for the real estate was
then made available for victim relief via a Fund.
Other forms of support were discussed following the
Volendam disaster. Again, the WTS 1998 was declared not
applicable because the disaster concerned insurable damage. 253
However, the government donated an amount of 3.5 million
guilders (around EUR 1.6 million or USD 1.8 million) shortly
after the disaster to two foundations that took care of victims
with serious burns. 254 The Dutch government explicitly stated
that this payment was made as a gesture of national solidarity
with the victims and not as a recognition of some kind of
government liability. In addition, substantial amounts were paid
by the central government. These amounts were used to
reimburse the compensation costs made by the community
Edam-Volendam, the compensation of costs for a specific
research committee that examined the sources of the disaster, and
for the compensation of various other costs.
A Committee instituted by the government formulated
several advice papers concerning the financial compensation that
the central government should provide for the Volendam victims.
Those guidelines were also followed in practice. In those papers,
many comparisons were made with the arrangement for the
252

See Maurits Barendrecht, Verdeling van verantwoordelijkheid als het
fout gaat: Volendam en Aandelenlease als voorbeelden, 79 NEDERLANDS
JURISTENBLAD [NJB] 2180 (2004).
253
See Café-brand Volendam; Lijst van vragen en antwoorden over o.a.
het kabinetsstandput Nieuwjaarsbrand Volendam, 01-10-2001, Kamerstukken
II
2001-2002,
27
575,
no.
6,
50,
available
at:https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-27575-6.
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These two foundations are the Nederlandse Brandwondenstichting
(Netherlands Burns Foundation) and the Stichting Slachtoffers
Nieuwjaarsbrand (Foundation Victims New Year’s Eve Fire). See Café-brand
Volendam; Brief minister en staatssecretaris met een overzicht van de
gebeurtenissen in de twee weken na de ramp, 17-01-2001, Kamerstukken II
2000-2001,
27
575,
no.
2,
8,
available
at:
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Volendam; Kabinetsstandpunt Nieuwjaarsbrand Volendam, 18-07-2001,
Kamerstukken II 2000-2001, 27 575, no. 5, 42, available at:
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-27575-5.

Loyola Consumer Law Review

340

Vol. 31:2

victims of the fireworks factory explosion in Enschede. A
suggestion was made to provide an amount of EUR 150,000
(USD 170,000) to the Volendam victims, whereas the amount
provided to the Enschede victims was only EUR 120,000 (USD
136,000). The specific Committee argued that, specifically in the
case of Volendam, many young victims were involved and
therefore the incident damaged their future perspectives. The
Committee also took into account that serious burns would lead
to a very long and slow recovery process. 255 On the basis of these
proposals, the central government made a total amount of EUR
30.1 million (USD 34.2 million) available for the victims. 256 This
is remarkable since the initial intent of the central government
was to merely provide compensation for direct costs. Ultimately,
large amounts of ad hoc compensation were provided as well.
6. Lessons from Enschede and Volendam
A common feature of the Enschede and Volendam
catastrophes was that no mandatory solvency guarantees were
available. The operator of the fireworks factory in Enschede had
only a voluntary liability insurance with a cover of several
millions of guilders and the same applied for the owner of the
café in Volendam. Consequently, the Dutch government has
provided generous financial compensation both after the
Enschede and the Volendam catastrophes. As mentioned, in the
case of Enschede, 90 million guilders (around EUR 40.8 million
or USD 46.4 million) was paid by the State; in the case of
Volendam the Dutch State (the taxpayers) paid approximately 50
million guilders (around EUR 22.7 million or USD 25.8
million).257
7. Criticism to the WTS
It is remarkable that the statutory arrangement set forth in
the WTS, which was specifically created by the legislator to
compensate victims of catastrophes, has been applied merely in
the case of damage due to heavy rainfall. The WTS was not of
use in the case of serious man-made disasters resulting in major
255

See Café-brand Volendam; Brief staatssecretaris over het
kabinetsbesluit naar aanleiding van het advies van de Commissie Financiële
Afwikkeling II, 26-07-2002, Kamerstukken II 2001-2002, 27 575, no. 18, 1-3)
available at: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-27575-18.
256
See Kamerstukken II 2002-2003, 27 157 and 27 575, no. 51, 9.
257
Hartlief & Faure, supra note 6, at 1016-17.
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personal injuries, such as the aforementioned fireworks accident
in Enschede in 2000 or the Volendam fire in 2000-2001. 258 Thus,
the legislator has not succeeded in its attempt to create with the
WTS an exclusive arrangement for government contributions in
the event of both natural and man-made catastrophes. Hence, it
is not surprising that the WTS has been the subject of criticism in
various literature.
The first criticism relates to the fact that the government
intervenes with specific funding for victims of catastrophes on an
ad hoc basis. This preference for victims of catastrophes has been
criticized from the angle of the equality principle. 259 Second, legal
doctrine also holds that, if specific financial compensation needs
to be provided to victims of catastrophes, it is more desirable to
have a structural solution instead of the current ad hoc
arrangements. In this respect, the WTS 1998, which apparently
does not serve this goal, should be revised. Third, it has been
stressed that there might be reasons to increase duties of
potential tortfeasors to guarantee their solvency. Fourth, it seems
logical to increase the possibilities of first party insurance.
To some extent those four general criticisms of the WTS
are strongly related. The first criticism of the ad hoc
compensation is of course related to the second criticism that a
structural solution which specifies clearly ex ante the rules of the
game would be better. The third criticism relates specifically to
technological (man-made) disasters, to the extent that a tortfeasor
can be identified (like the operator of a specific plant), imposing
solvency guarantees would have a double benefit. The imposition
of solvency guarantee leads to more adequate compensation to
victims and at the same time guarantees better prevention, given
that moral hazard is controlled. Whereas the third criticism
relates to technological disasters, the fourth criticism on the lack
of first party coverage relates to natural disasters. In cases where
tort law can be applied (like with technological disasters), it is
logical first to apply liability rules and compulsory financial
security in order to correctly allocate the social costs of disasters.
To the extent that (for a variety of reasons) such a cost allocation
to tortfeasors is not possible (like with natural disasters) it would
258
Michael G. Faure & Ton Hartlief, The Netherlands, in FINANCIAL
COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL
APPROACH, supra note 1, at 195, 218-21.
259
AUKE R. BLOEMBERGEN, Een schadefonds geweldsmisdrijven?, in
BLOEMBERGENS WERK 167 (1992); Jim M. Polak, Schade en schadevergoeding
bij incidentele calamiteiten: Een vervolg, [22] NEDERLANDS JURISTENBLAD

[NJB] 1093 (1977).
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be logic to work out a comprehensive mandatory first party
insurance scheme (similar to France and Belgium). Such a
structural first party insurance scheme for natural disasters is
then precisely the structural solution (required in the second point
of criticism) and avoids the need for ad hoc compensation
(addressed in the first point of criticism). The same applies to the
third point of criticism : to the extent that adequate strict liability
rules are put in place, combined with mandatory solvency
guarantees, financial compensation for victims of technological
disasters will equally be available. That can equally avoid ad hoc
compensation, the first point of criticism, and provides the
desired structural solution, the second point of criticism.
Now that the prohibited cartel agreements that do not to
cover the consequences of large-scale flooding and earthquakes
have been withdrawn, insurance policies covering those risks
could be brought to the market. These should only come to the
market, however, provided that some kind of solution for large
losses is available through reinsurance and/or the government,
which is so far only the case for damage due to heavy rainfall and
frost. One should note, however, that, for other relevant natural
hazard risks in the Netherlands (storms, lightning and hail),
commercial insurance coverage is available.
8. Reforms
The government of the Netherlands has installed a body
with the specific task of providing an assessment of the WTS
1998: the Commissie Tegemoetkoming bij Rampen en
Calamiteiten, Commission for Compensation in Cases of
Catastrophes and Incidents (“CTRC”). In 2001, the CTRC was
asked to provide the government with advice on optimal
compensation in the event of catastrophes. 260 The CTRC
examined the existing possibilities of compensation and,
subsequently, formulated proposals for desirable additional
compensation. Its final report, Solidariteit met Beleid, Solidarity
with Policy, was presented to the Minister of the Interior on 7
March 2005 and consisted of three parts: a general section, two
research reports on the financial settlement of disasters in the
Netherlands, and the financial compensation schemes for damage
caused by catastrophes in some other countries. The CTRC
260
Vuurwerkramp Enschede; Brief minister met de halfjaarlijkse
voortgangsrapportage Vuurwerkramp, 18-10-2001, Kamerstukken II 27 157,
no. 44, 4, available at: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-27157-44.
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brought to the fore multiple interesting suggestions regarding
financial compensation for victims of catastrophes in the
Netherlands, including the following:
- Tort law needs to be the primary mechanism for
compensating catastrophic damage;
- Judicial liability procedures should be shortened
and simplified by means of a new act on the
collective settlement of mass damage; 261
- Insolvency guarantees for injurers need to be
introduced or increased;
- For catastrophes where no liable injurer can be
identified, the CTRC suggests increased use of first
party insurance. The proposal is designed not to
make the purchase of disaster coverage mandatory
(as in France), but to facilitate the insurability of
risks by letting the State act as reinsurer (if
necessary) and pursuing an active information
policy;
- Change the WTS into a national solidarity fund
that would, on the basis of clear rules and
structures, provide various types of compensation,
including for uninsurable damage.
Most of the Commission’s proposals are in line with what
has been suggested in legal doctrine. As far as the revision of
financial compensation of victims of catastrophes is concerned,
the former Minister of the Interior wrote on 5 June 2006 a letter
to parliament outlining the position of the government on the
reform proposals of the CTRC. 262 In that letter, the former
Minister of the Interior noted the government’s desire to achieve
261
See Wijziging van het Burgerlijk Wetboek en het Wetboek van
Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering teneinde de collectieve afwikkeling van
massaschades te vergemakkelijken [Wet collectieve afwikkeling massaschade]

[Act on the Amendments of the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Legal
Procedure in order to facilitate class action], June 23, 2005, Stcrt. 2005, 340, as
amended by Wet tot wijziging van het Burgerlijk Wetboek, het Wetboek van
Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering en de Faillissementswet teneinde de collectieve
afwikkeling van massavorderingen verder te vergemakkelijken [Wet tot
wijziging van de Wet collectieve afwikkeling massaschade] [Act amending the
Act on collective settlement of mass damage], June 26, 2013, Stb. 2013, 255
(Neth.).
262
Beleidsplan Crisisbeheersing 2004-2007; Brief minister bij aanbieding
kabinetsstandpunt over het eindrapport van de Commissie tegemoetkomingen
bij rampen en calamiteiten (CTRC), 17-07-2006, Kamerstukken II 2006-2007,
29 668, no. 11, available at: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-2966811.
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a few fundamental changes on the following basis 263:
- A provision of guarantees or insurance should be
made compulsory in cases where a liable injurer
can be identified;
- Insurance coverage by potential victims has to be
stimulated in instances where a liable injurer
cannot be identified; and
- The current legislative basis for compensation of
victims of catastrophes has to be changed to
address the current ad hoc solutions.
The government was therefore strongly suggesting the
development of voluntary first party insurance without
prescribing a straightforward duty for potential victims to
purchase insurance coverage, comparable to the model that exists
in France. In the event that insufficient capacity makes the risk
hard to insure, the State could act as reinsurer. The general idea
behind this new policy is that there would be less pressure on the
public budget, but responsibility would be shifted either to the
industry for technological disasters or to potential victims for
natural catastrophes.
Further, in 2012 WRR published a report in which it
argues that it is important to provide incentives to all
stakeholders involved for the prevention of disasters. 264 The
report stresses the need to create structural solutions for when the
damage would occur, but also to create effective incentives to
control risks, prevent incidents, and mitigate damages. 265 The
WRR rightly argues that many corporations are currently not
intrinsically motivated to take responsibility with a view on
preventing incidents. Similar to the proceeding recommendation
from the CTRC, the WRR therefore recommends that solvency
guarantees should be introduced for potential injurers.
Thus, the messages of the CTRC and the WRR are
similar. The amounts provided by the insurance market today are
too low, and insufficient amounts are available without
263

A summary of these proposals can be found in Faure & Hartlief, supra
n. 1, 341-342 and Bruggeman, supra n. 1, 390-393.
264
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See Marjolein van Asselt & Karin Ammerlaan, Schadevoorziening als

perspectief: vernieuwing van het denken over verantwoordelijkheid voor
fysieke veiligheid, [56] OVERHEID & AANSPRAKELIJKHEID [OA] 100 (2012) for
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intervention by the government. For that reason, both reports
point at the important role of the government and insurers in the
provision of adequate compensation.
The cases of Volendam and Enschede painfully illustrated
that the bill for the technological disasters is still paid by the
taxpayer, rather than by liable injurers and their liability
insurers. 266

C. Nuclear Accidents
The Netherlands ratified the 1960 Paris Convention and
the 1963 Brussels Convention on 28 September 1979 through the
Act of 17 March 1979. 267 The 1979 Act came into effect on 28
December 1979, bringing both conventions into force on that date
in the Netherlands. On that same date, the Nuclear Incidents
(Third Party Liability) Act of 1979 which set forth the regulations
governing nuclear third party liability in the Netherlands also
came into force. 268 On 1 August 1991, an Act amending the 1979
Nuclear Incidents (Third Party Liability) Act came into effect,
implementing the Paris and Brussels Protocols. 269 Simultaneously,
another Act amending the 1979 Act on Third Party Liability in
implementation of the Joint Protocol was passed by
Parliament. 270 This Act came into effect on 27 April 1992.
Further, on 30 October 2008 Parliament approved a bill to ratify
the 2004 Protocols to the Paris Convention and to the Brussels
Supplementary Convention. A bill to amend the Nuclear
Incidents (Third Party Liability) Act was also approved.
The limitations on the scope of the Paris Convention do
not apply to the liability of an operator of a nuclear installation
on Dutch territory, for certain kinds of damage. This is
particularly the case for damage (a) suffered on the territory of a
State party to the Convention wherever the incident occurred; (b)
suffered on the territory of a State not party to the Paris
Convention, but party to the Joint Protocol, as a result of an
266

E.g., Hartlief & Faure, supra note 6, at 1026.
Art. 3 Goedkeuringswet Verdrag inzake wettelijke aansprakelijkheid
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on liability for nuclear accidents], Mar. 17, 1979, Stb. 1979, 225.
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267

346

Loyola Consumer Law Review

Vol. 31:2

incident in the territory of a State party to the Joint Protocol; or
(c) wherever suffered, as a result of an accident on Dutch territory
(Art. 15(1)). The operator is also not exonerated from paying
financial compensation for damage caused by an incident due
directly to a grave natural disaster (Art. 3).
The maximum liability of the operator under the Paris
Convention has been raised to EUR 1.2 billion (USD 1.4 billion)
(Art. 5(1)). Under Article 5(3), a lower amount may be set by
ministerial order for low-risk installations. If, in the opinion of
the Minister of Finance, an operator of a nuclear installation
cannot obtain the financial security required by the Paris
Convention, the minister may enter into contracts on behalf of
the State as insurer or provide other state guarantees up to the
operator’s liability limit. This possibility also exists if financial
security is only available at an unreasonable cost. In so far as the
funds available from the operator’s financial security are
insufficient to compensate for the damage, the State shall make
available funds up to the operator’s maximum liability. In such
cases, the minister is entitled to exercize the operator’s rights of
recourse (Art. 10).
If the amount of damage caused by a nuclear incident on
Dutch territory exceeds the limit of the Brussels Convention, the
government will make available supplementary funds up to a
maximum total of EUR 2.27 billion (USD 2.58 billion) (Art.
18(1)). Under Article 18(4), these public funds will also be made
available for damage suffered in the territory of parties to the
Brussels Convention on condition of reciprocity.

D. Terrorism
1. Material Damage
The Dutch government and the Dutch Association of
Insurers agreed to set up a dedicated reinsurance company, the
Dutch Terrorism Risk Reinsurance Company, Nederlandse

Herverzekeringsmaatschappij voor Terrorismeschaden N.V.
(“NHT”), to provide insurance against terrorist acts in all areas of
business. This step represented an intervention measure to
address a market failure to supply terrorism risk coverage.
Since 1 July 2003, 271 more than 185 insurance companies
(95% of all active Dutch insurers), the government, and some
271
The NHT became operational on 1 July 2003. It has been periodically
extended for additional periods and is expected to be further extended as long
as market conditions require.
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reinsurance companies participate in the NHT. Every insurance
company which does business in the Netherlands, and which is
permitted to do business, can become a member of the NHT
(with the exception of insurance companies providing nuclear
cover). The participating insurance companies cede all their
terrorism exposure to the NHT pool, which acts as a reinsurance
company. The pool then assumes 100% of the terrorism liability
for all individual and SME insurance policies. The NHT
provides coverage for non-life insurance (for property located in
the Netherlands), life insurance (where the policyholder has a
regular residence in the Netherlands), healthcare insurance, and
funeral insurance.
The NHT will provide reinsurance coverage for terrorism,
malevolent contamination or precautionary measures or any
conduct in preparation for terrorism. The NHT decides whether
a particular event should be considered as a consequence of the
manifestation of the terrorism risk. Terrorism is defined as:
any violent act and/or conduct – committed outside the
scope of one of the six forms of acts of war as referred to
in Article 3:38 of the Financial Supervision Act (Wet op
het Financieel toezicht) – in the form of an attack or a
series of attacks connected together in time and
intention as a result whereof injury and/or impairment
of health, whether resulting in death or not, and/or loss
of or damage to property arizes or any economic interest
is otherwise impaired, in which case it is likely that said
attack or series – whether or not in any organisational
context – has been planned and/or carried out with a
view to effect certain political and/or religious and/or
ideological purposes.
The overall capacity of the terrorism risk reinsurance pool
is limited to EUR 1 billion (USD 1.1 billion) per calendar year. In
the event of a severe terrorist attack, the limit of EUR 1 billion a
year may not be sufficient. If EUR 1 billion per year is not
sufficient, the compensation to all members will be decreased.
There are four layers of coverage:
- EUR 300 million (USD 341 million) in the
aggregate (pooled cover provided by the primary
insurers);
- EUR 100 million (USD 114 million) in the
aggregate in excess of the EUR 300 million
provided by international reinsurers;
- EUR 550 million (USD 623 million) in the
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aggregate in excess of the EUR 400 million
provided by international reinsurers;
- EUR 50 million (USD 57 million) in annual
aggregate excess of EUR 950 million provided by
the Dutch government. 272
The first layer applies a threshold deductible, which
means that insurers bear the risk to EUR 7.5 million (USD 8.5
million). The deductible does not apply to life insurance or health
insurance.
On an annual basis, the members pay their share of the
reinsurance premium and the operational cost of the NHT. The
individual share is a proportional figure of the market share
(gross premium income the Netherlands) of a member
company. 273 The Dutch government charges a premium at a level
intended to price itself out of the market when terrorism risk
insurability is restored. From the period of 1 July 2003 until 31
December 2003, the government charged a premium of EUR 10
million (i.e. EUR 20 million on a yearly basis or USD 23
million).274 A system of descending premiums is used for
increasing coverage. For example, the first part of coverage is
relatively expensive – coverage of EUR 100 million demands the
same premium as the next increment of EUR 200 million. Thus,
an incentive is incorporated into the system in order to stimulate
the recovery of commercial insurance. Pursuant to the incentive,
individual reinsurers that are capable of covering the risk obtain
the ability to offer coverage for a lower premium. This point of
departure seemed to pay off, since a commercial reinsurer
declared itself willing to cover the first EUR 100 million of
272

The initial agreement was that the Dutch State would fully share its
stake in the NHT decrease. For that reason, it was agreed that the premium of
the State would be slightly higher than that of the reinsurers to make it
attractive for reinsurers at a lower level premium risk of the State. This has
worked to the extent that, in 2005, the share of the State decreased to EUR
100 million and, in 2006, to EUR 50 million. Thereafter, the reinsurers
indicated that they wished to continue the participation of the State, because,
after a major terrorist attack, the insurers and State must anyway carefully
coordinate their activities and communication and because the involvement of
the State would be highly appreciated. At the end of 2006, the Minister of
Finance informed the insurers of its consent to this continuation. To date, state
participation has been continued in this way.
273
INT’L FORUM FOR TERRORISM RISK (RE)INS. POOLS, supra note 148.
274
Terrorismeverzekering; Brief minister over de Nederlandse
Herverzekeringsmaatschappij voor Terrorismeschaden N.V. (NHT), 01-072003, Kamerstukken II 2002-2003, 28 668, no. 2, 23 June 2003, available at:
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-28668-2.
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governmental coverage (namely between EUR 700 and 800
million). Governmental intervention is hence delayed until the
EUR 200 million threshold. 275
In sum, the NHT is, like in the other European countries,
a private enterprise in which a large number of insurance
companies participate and a multi-layered approach is
provided.276 The main advantage of this model is that a total
capacity of the pool up to EUR 1 billion can be provided. A
strong point is equally that a risk premium is charged by the
government which subsequently has stimulated insurers to
develop alternatives themselves. 277 Some have criticized the
NHT, arguing that the State should not intervene to provide
reinsurance. They argue that it would have been better to provide
this structural solution by applying the WTS 1998 to the
terrorism risk as well. 278
Given the recent terrorist attacks in Europe, there are
currently discussions about the aggregate limit of the NHT,
specifically whether the current limit is sufficient. 279
2. Personal Injury
Apart from the NHT, the Compensation Fund for Victims
of Violent Crime, Schadefonds Geweldmisdrijven was
institutionalized as early as 1976, and offers a payment to
everyone who has suffered injuries or serious material and
immaterial loses due to an intentional violent crime committed on
Dutch territory. 280 The Compensation Fund is a supplementary
compensation mechanism. As such, the Compensation Fund only
awards financial compensation when it is clear that the victim
275
Wijziging van de Noodwet financieel verkeer in verband met de
dekking van het terrorismerisico door verzekeraars; Nota n.a.v. het verslag,
14-08-2003, Kamerstukken II 2002-2003, 28 915, no. 5, 3, available at:
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-28915-5.
276
Faure & Hartlief, supra note 258, at 206.
277
See BRUGGEMAN, supra note 1, at 375-81.
278
See, e.g., Karin Ammerlaan & Willem H. van Boom, De Nederlandse

Herverzekeringsmaatschappij voor Terrorismeschaden en de rol van de
overheid bij het vergoeden van terreurschade, [45/46] NEDERLANDS
JURISTENBLAD [NJB] 2330 (2003).
279
INT’L FORUM FOR TERRORISM RISK (RE)INS. POOLS, supra note 148,
at 30.
280
Wet van 26 juni 1975, houdende voorlopige regeling schadefonds
geweldsmisdrijven [Wet schadefonds geweldmisdrijven] [Act on provisional
regulation of the damage fund for violent crimes], June 26, 1975, Stb. 1975, 382
(Neth.).
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cannot be reimbursed in any other way. Therefore, the Fund,
which is financed through the general public budget, acts as a
safety net.

E. Summary
According to the general Dutch perspective, financial
compensation to victims of natural catastrophes and man-made
disasters needs to be provided by the general means. This point of
view is evidenced by Article 21 of the Dutch Constitution, which
enforces a duty towards the government to provide the
habitability of the country. The acceptance of the consequences of
this duty leads to the principle of mutual solidarity between the
Dutch population.
This has to a large extent also been reflected in the
developments in the Netherlands with respect to the financial
compensation for victims of disasters. Of all the countries studied
in this Article, the Netherlands has probably devoted most
resources to discussing victim compensation, to no avail. The
Netherlands does not really know a structural solution to
guarantee financial compensation to victims of natural disasters.
The Act, WTS 1998, that was supposed to serve this goal has not
been able to provide adequate compensation to victims and has
for that reason been subject to criticism and reform proposals
which have not yet led to a legislative change. The inadequacy of
WTS 1998 was especially shown at the occasion of an explosion
in a fireworks factory in Enschede and a fire in a café in
Volendam. In both cases WTS 1998 could not be applied, but
generous compensation was paid by the Dutch State. A major
problem, however, was that in both cases compulsory financial
guarantees did not apply and the (voluntarily concluded) liability
insurance of the operators provided too low amounts of
compensation. It is for that reason not surprising that the reform
proposals have gone in the direction of providing mandatory
financial security by operators. As far as the cover for terrorism is
concerned, the Netherlands has been one of the first countries to
develop (like the other countries discussed so far) a terrorism risk
insurance pool (“NHT”) which provides a total cover of EUR 1
billion via a multi-layered approach with a reduced intervention
by the Dutch State.
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VI. A CRITICAL COMPARISON
A. Starting Points and Methodology
The introduction explicitly stated that this comparative
exercise was undertaken to see where the legislation in Belgium,
France, and Germany with respect to financial compensation for
victims of disasters deviates from the situation in the
Netherlands. In this section we will provide a critical comparison
of the situation in the four countries. In order to undertake this
comparison, we will take the economic starting points that we
formulated in the introduction as a baseline. Six starting points
had, from an economic perspective, to be followed in order 1) to
guarantee an adequate financial compensation to victims ex post
and 2) to provide effective incentives for disaster risk reduction
ex ante. These principles will constitute the background for the
comparison that we will undertake in this section. We will
thereby follow the same order and therefore address the same
types of catastrophes as we did throughout the study. We will
therefore look at the regulation of natural disasters (B),
technological disasters (C), nuclear disasters (D) and terrorism
(E). An important limitation of our study is that we did not
attempt to provide full details on the situation in every country
for all aspects of those disasters. We could for example obtain
information on the activities to which compulsory financial
guarantees apply for some countries, but not for all. That
limitation on the scope of the research inevitably also limits the
scope of the comparison. Still, we believe that it provides a fairly
good opportunity to sketch to what extent the financial
compensation in the particular countries studied is adequate with
respect to the four specific types of disasters taking into account
the need for adequate ex post compensation and providing ex
ante incentives for disaster risk reduction.
Our benchmark for the comparison is the adequacy of the
financial compensation for the victims and the effectiveness of
the incentives for disaster risk reduction. Obviously other
benchmarks could be used as well and to some extent we alluded
to those in this article. For example, some countries, like Belgium,
worked out specific compensation mechanisms not only aimed at
adequate compensation of the victims, but also at speedy
compensation. Speed may be an important criterion to judge the
adequacy of the financial compensation mechanism for the simple
reason that the length of the procedure could increase the
suffering of the victims, and therefore the non-pecuniary losses.
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In addition, a (too) long procedure could lead to secondary losses
and for example to bankruptcies simply because a livelihood and
therefore the source of income of a victim has been destroyed
(think of an example where a café or restaurant has been put out
of business as a result of an oil spill on a nearby beach). The lack
of speedy compensation could in those cases make the losses even
larger. It is for that reason that in some cases (especially when
referring to technological disasters) we addressed mechanisms in
legal systems that strive for the speedy compensation of victims.
We do not, however, have full information on the way in which
this is arranged in the four legal systems examined, and it is for
that reason that we do not use that as a specific proxy in our
comparison. The reader should, however, be aware that the speed
of providing the financial compensation can be an important
element both in judging the adequacy of the compensation to
victims, but also in assessing the effectiveness of the incentives
for disaster risk reduction. It may also be clear that the longer the
procedure takes, the more the ex ante incentives for disaster risk
reduction might be diluted. Speed in the financial compensation
is therefore of importance both in the adequacy of the financial
compensation and the effectiveness of the incentives for disaster
risk reduction.
In the introduction, we equally made clear that we do not
distinguish between the several heads of damages as it would
make our study needlessly complex. We noticed, however,
especially with terrorism, but also with some other catastrophes
that there is a difference in the compensation mechanisms. Some
pertain, for example, with property damage and material losses
while other involve personal injury. There is some kind of a
paradox there: from a policy perspective, personal injury plays
stronger to the imagination and, therefore, compensation
mechanisms will often provide generous compensation for
personal injury at a relatively low threshold. The focus may not
be directly on property damage, although arrangements to cover
property damage have, as the overview showed, in many
countries also been worked out (especially in the case of
terrorism). The paradox is that, although the public attention and
compensation mechanisms may often strongly focus on personal
injury, the largest magnitude of losses is often related to property
damage rather than personal injury. But the specific
consequences of those differences also remain further undiscussed
in this comparison.
In order to go beyond a country comparison for the
specific disasters, we will also try to provide a more general view
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on how the specific countries are doing as far as providing
financial compensation to victims of disasters is concerned in a
more holistic manner. Jordan, Würzel, and Zito developed a
methodology to judge the adequacy of the use of new instruments
for environmental governance in a variety of countries. The
authors qualify particular countries as “leaders, followers and
laggards”.281 Although our field of research is obviously different
from the field of Jordan, Würzel, and Zito, who focuse on new
policy instruments in environmental governance, we believe that
their methodology is interesting to provide an integrated
perspective in order to assess the adequacy of the financial
compensation of victims of disasters in specific countries (F). We
equally examine whether it is possible to find explanations for
some of the differences we observed (G), and we analyze to what
extent the existing frameworks were able to deal with some of the
recent disasters (H). Finally, we speculate on the extent to which
important reforms may be expected in the domains that we
examined (I).

B. Natural Disasters
In the introduction, it was mentioned that ex post ad hoc
government compensation will not provide effective ex ante
incentives for prevention. It was equally mentioned that
insurance is better able to provide those ex ante incentives.
Further, it was also commented that the supply of catastrophe
cover could be stimulated through the government by acting as
reinsurer of last resort. How are these three particular
requirements followed in the four countries under discussion as
far as the financial compensation for victims of natural disasters
is concerned?
Addressing the first aspect, whether the particular country
provides ex post ad hoc compensation which would negatively
affect incentives, the situation in Belgium is complex: there was a
Disaster Fund, but this was structural rather than ad hoc.
Moreover, this Disaster Fund does not provide full compensation
as a result of which the negative effects on ex ante disaster risk
281
NEW INSTRUMENTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE (Andrew
Jordan, Rüdiger K.W. Würzel & Anthony R. Zito eds., 2003); Andrew Jordan,
Rüdiger K.W. Würzel & Anthony R. Zito, The rise of “new” policy instruments
in comparative perspective: has governance eclipsed government?, 53 POL.
STUD. 477 (2005); RÜDIGER K.W. WÜRZEL, ANTHONY R. ZITO & ANDREW
JORDAN, ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE, A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF NEW ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTRUMENTS (2013).
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reduction were probably not that problematic. Since the statutes
of 2003 and 2005, the role of the Disaster Fund has even been
further reduced. Belgium has now moved to a system of
mandatory insurance; the Disaster Fund only intervenes where
the mandatory insurance does not apply and only in cases where
the disaster has been recognized as such by the government.
France does not, in principle, have ad hoc ex post compensation
since coverage is provided via mandatory insurance. Germany
provides generous ex post compensation from the public purse. 282
The WTS 1998 in the Netherlands is meant to provide structural
ex post compensation for victims of disasters, largely in the same
way as the Belgian Disaster Fund. But the WTS does not apply
to natural disasters that can be considered “insurable”. It has
been applied to cases of heavy rain. From this brief overview, the
French system appears to have the best approach because
mandatory insurance in France avoids the public purse.
The second aspect of the comparison concerns whether
there is comprehensive mandatory insurance cover for natural
disasters. Belgium followed the French model by introducing
mandatory additional cover in addition to the voluntary
concluded housing insurance.
Legislative interventions in
Belgium led to mandatory insurance coverage for those natural
disasters that fall within the scope of the statute. Germany tried
to introduce a similar model in 2004, but the model was rejected
for political reasons. There was a similar outcome in the
Netherlands: notwithstanding many attempts and advices by a
variety of commissions, there is as yet no mandatory coverage for
natural disasters. The mere availability of voluntary insurance
for natural disasters, more particularly flooding to which the
Netherlands is heavily exposed, is still problematic. Again,
France comes out best, quickly followed by Belgium which
mirrored the French example.
The third aspect of comparison relates to the government
playing a role as reinsurer of last resort in order to stimulate the
supply of catastrophe insurance. The comparison turns out
largely in the same way as mandatory insurance: the Belgian
(now: Regional) Disaster Fund(s) still intervenes for amounts of
damage which are higher than the upper limit of the mandatory
insurance cover. It looks similar to the French model, where the
Caisse Centrale de Réassurance (“CCR”) provides unlimited
reinsurance, de facto financed by the French State. There is a
difference though between the two models: in Belgium for
282

See supra Section IV. A.
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amounts higher than the insurance limit the (structural) Disaster
Fund intervenes. This intervention does not seem to be incentivebased. In the French CCR-model the intervention of the State for
amounts higher than the compensation provided by insurers is
not directed to victims. Instead, such amounts are directed to the
CCR and indirectly to the insurers. In that sense, it could be
argued that the French model still stimulates the insurability of
natural disasters by facilitating the supply of catastrophe cover.
The intervention of the CCR, however, has also been criticized
for basically providing reinsurance for free and therefore not
being market-based either. Thus, it is doubtful whether there are
major differences between the Belgian and French model of state
intervention for amounts beyond the amounts provided by
insurance cover. As there is no mandatory insurance mechanism
for natural disasters in Germany or the Netherlands, those
countries do not have a particular role for the government as
reinsurer of last resort in this particular domain. Again, France
seems to come out best, followed by Belgium.

C. Technological Disasters
The requirements for an adequate financial compensation
of victims of technological disasters are rather different because
there is a potential injurer who can be held to compensate the
damage; thus, national legislation should try to provide effective
incentives for disaster risk reduction to that particular operator.
There are, however, particular aspects in the design of liability
rules which are of importance in order to allow liability rules to
fulfil their incentive effect. Given the fact that operators usually
have better information than the judge on the optimal
technologies to prevent technological disasters, and given the
difficulties in proving a fault for potential victims, a strict liability
rule would provide better incentives than a fault-based or
negligence regime. Liability rules, however, can only function
effectively if guarantees are provided that the injurer will also
have money at stake to compensate the victims. Since
technological disasters can easily cause damages of which the
magnitude can be substantially higher than the injurer’s wealth,
it is important to introduce guarantees against this insolvency
risk. Finally, access to justice for potential victims may be
problematic especially in cases involving a large number of
victims. Procedural difficulties and long delays in deciding the
tort case can be expected. That is not only problematic from the
perspective of victim compensation (in cases where victims have

356

Loyola Consumer Law Review

Vol. 31:2

to wait many years for damage compensation), but also from the
perspective of incentives (when tortfeasors only are forced to
compensate many years after the incident they may have gone out
of business, thus potentially diluting the incentive effect of
liability rules). Therefore, it may be of importance to have
systems in place allowing a rapid compensation of victims in the
event technological disasters occur.
Regarding strict liability, no substantial differences
between the countries examined are detected. All systems have, to
a lesser or larger extent, introduced strict liabilities for
technological disasters. In some cases, this is based on an
extensive interpretation of old tort law provisions in civil codes;
in other cases special statutes have introduced strict liabilities.
Some of those strict liabilities were the result of the
implementation of international treaties, such as for marine oil
pollution or nuclear accidents or even European Directives such
as in the case of product liability and environmental liability. In
the latter case, there is unsurprisingly a large convergence and
not much difference between the systems. 283 Many legal systems
have, moreover, accompanied the introduction of strict liabilities
with mandatory solvency guarantees. Although the limited scope
of this study did not allow us to examine the full extent of
solvency guarantees, there seem to be a few striking differences.
Belgium and France seem to have a relatively large amount of
activities for which solvency guarantees apply. In the
Netherlands, there seems to be a larger reluctance against the
introduction of mandatory solvency guarantees. The dramatic
cases of Enschede and Volendam 284 are typical in that respect:
there was a serious insolvency problem precisely because the
limited amount of voluntary insurance purchased by the
operators was insufficient to cover the damage. It is therefore not
surprising that the many reform committees that studied the
financial compensation for victims of technological disasters all
recommended to introduce or increase mandatory solvency
guarantees.
Some legal systems equally have specific procedures
allowing rapid compensation to victims of technological disasters.
One of the more recent statutory changes is probably the Belgian
legislation of 2011 which provides possibilities for victims to
283
See UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW: STRICT LIABILITY (Bernhard A. Koch
& Helmut Koziol eds., 2002) for a comparative account of strict liability in a
variety of legal systems.
284
See supra Section V. B. 6.
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obtain low threshold speedy compensation based on a prepayment by insurance companies. 285 France has a rather peculiar
Act of 2003, which introduced mandatory first party insurance
for technological disasters to be financed by victims. From the
perspective of providing effective incentives for prevention to
operators it is remarkable that the French legislator chose for a
mandatory first party construction in the case of technological
disasters, rather than for mandatory solvency guarantees for
operators. France, therefore, does not provide an example in line
with the general starting points mentioned in the introduction.
Germany and the Netherlands have specific procedures allowing
victims to claim a limited amount of damages, but the procedures
are rather general provisions in procedural law and not tailored
towards victims of technological disasters like in the case of
Belgium and France. 286

D. Nuclear
When discussing nuclear accidents in Belgium, the general
framework was discussed in a detailed manner. 287 It was made
clear that most of the international nuclear liability Conventions
are based on a strict liability. In addition, the Conventions are
characterized by a limited liability of the operator, mandatory
financial security and financial compensation in addition to the
liability of the operator, to be financed by the State and by all
Contracting Parties. These features of the international nuclear
liability regime have been critically reviewed in the economic
literature. The strict liability and the mandatory solvency
guarantees are obviously viewed as positive since they may lead
to optimal incentives ex ante for disaster risk reduction.
However, the limitation on liability is problematic since it may
insufficiently expose operators to liability and could result in
victims being undercompensated. Also, the fact that the State
rather than the operator provides a substantial amount of
compensation is problematic to the extent that this de facto leads
to a subsidy for the nuclear industry.
Although all countries have based their system on the
same international Conventions there are important differences
between the countries examined, as is also made clear in
285

See supra Section II. B. 3.
As we mentioned in the introduction to this section, as we lack full
information on specific procedures aiming at rapid compensation for victims,
we are not able to provide a full assessment on this point.
287
See supra II. C. 1.
286
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overviews provided by the Nuclear Energy Agency of the
OECD. 288 These differences could relate to: 1) the total amount of
financial compensation available to victims; 2) the question
whether the operator is sufficiently exposed to liability; and 3)
whether it is the State rather than the operators who provide the
compensation. The differences can be summarized in the
following table:
Table 3: Nuclear Operator’s Third Party Liability Amounts and
Financial Security Limits
Country

Operator’s liability

Funds available

amount
Financial

Public funds

security

International
funds

limit to

(established

cover

under either the

operator’s

BSC or the CSC)

liability
amount
Belgium

EUR 1.2 billion

France

EUR 700 million

EUR 1.2

SDR 125 million

billion
EUR 700
million

289

After

SDR 125 million

depletion of
the operator’s
liability
amount up to
SDR 175
million

Germany
The
Netherlands

Unlimited
EUR 1.2 billion

EUR 2.5

EUR 2.5

billion

billion 290

EUR 1.2

After

billion

depletion of

SDR 125 million
SDR 125 million

the operator’s
liability
amount up to
EUR 2.3
288
See OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, NUCLEAR OPERATORS’
THIRD PARTY LIABILITY AMOUNTS AND FINANCIAL SECURITY LIMITS (Apr.
2018), http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/table-liability-coverage-limits.pdf.
289
This amount will only be applicable when the Protocol to the Paris
Convention will enter into force.
290
The public funds come into play when the damages are not covered by
private financial security or when claims cannot be paid out of such security.
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billion

Looking at Table 3, several of the questions mentioned
above can be answered. First, addressing the question of the total
funds available there appear some similarities and some
differences. German law is the most generous of the countries
examined because it has financial security available up to EUR
2.5 billion (USD 2.8 billion). Belgium and the Netherlands are
similar in that they have a financial security limit for the operator
of EUR 1.2 billion (USD 1.4 billion) and in addition international
funds up to SDR 125 million (EUR 153 million or USD 174
million). Additionally, the Netherlands has public funds available
up to EUR 2.3 billion (USD 2.6 billion); however, such funds are
only available following the depletion of the operator’s liability.
The country which has most nuclear power plants in Europe,
France, is strikingly the least generous by only having a limit for
the operator of EUR 700 million (USD 797 million), public funds
of SDR 175 million (EUR 214 million or USD 244 million) and
international funds of SDR 125 million.
Ultimately, it is clear that even the “best” country does not
have sufficient funds available to cover the costs of an average
nuclear accident. Looking not only at estimates of the costs of
nuclear accidents, but also at the real costs, more particularly of
the Fukushima incident, it is clear that they amount more in the
direction of USD 80 billion and higher. This clearly shows serious
undercompensation of victims.
A related consideration is obviously whether the operator
is fully exposed to liability. Again, the situation is probably the
worst in France where the operator, Electricité de France
(“EDF”), is exposed to the lowest amount of EUR 700 million.
Belgium and the Netherlands already do a lot better with an
operator liability of EUR 1.2 billion and a financial security to be
provided for the same amount. But the “best” is undoubtedly
Germany, which has both the principal position of having
unlimited operator liability and financial security of up to EUR
2.5 billion.
The results are therefore the same when concerning the
question of whether it is the operator or rather the State who
takes financial responsibility. Germany comes out best as at least
EUR 2.5 billion is financed by operators. France comes out worst
as only EUR 700 million is financed by the operator. Belgium
and the Netherlands are in between since EUR 1.2 billion is
financed by the operator. The Netherlands is, however,
problematic as after the depletion of the operator’s liability,
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public funds are made available up to EUR 2.3 billion. Note that
in comparison, Germany makes an amount available of EUR 2.5
billion, but paid by the operators.

E. Terrorism
As far as terrorism is concerned, there are probably less
differences between the countries as they all have installed multilayered systems, including an intervention by the State as
reinsurer. Although all the countries in this study have pool
constructions, however, there are substantial differences between
the countries as far as the total amounts available are concerned
and related to the financing. Belgium and the Netherlands both
have pool constructions for a total of EUR 1 billion. The French
system of GAREAT provides a total of EUR 2.52 billion.
However, France does not have a limit. The highest layer consists
of an “unlimited protection” provided by the CCR and backed up
by a guarantee provided by the French State. Germany provides
an amount of a total of EUR 10 billion. There are also substantial
differences as to where the division between insurers/reinsurers
and the State is concerned. Here, the Netherlands does
remarkably well as only EUR 50 million out of the total EUR 1
billion limit is paid by the State. Germany is at the other extreme
where from the total of EUR 10 billion, EUR 7.5 billion is
compensated by the State. In Belgium of the total of EUR 1
billion, EUR 300 million is paid by the State, and in France the
CCR again provides unlimited reinsurance in excess of the
amount of EUR 2.52 billion.

F. Leaders, Followers, and Laggards
If one would do an attempt to summarize the previous
comparison using the framework of Würzel, Zito and Jordan, this
would provide the following picture:
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Table 4: Leaders, Followers, and Laggards 291
Disaster compensation

Leader

Follower

Laggard

Ad hoc

France

Belgium

Netherlands,

First party

France

Belgium

France

Belgium

Germany

Belgium,

mechanism
Natural

Germany

disasters
insurance
Government or

Germany

market
Nuclear

Amount

Netherlands,
Netherlands,
Germany
France

Netherlands
Operator

Germany

exposed
Government

Belgium,

France

Netherlands
Germany

Belgium

France, Netherlands

Amount

France

Germany

Netherlands, Belgium

Market or state

Netherlands,

Belgium

France

subsidy
Terrorism

Germany

Source: Adapted from Würzel, Zito and Jordan (2013) with updates.

To be clear: when referring here to the leader, we usually
took the country that is doing best as far as the financial
mechanism is concerned in view of the economic principles.
When referring to the laggard, we took the country that does
worst. The followers were always in the middle, but not
necessarily countries that followed examples from others.
As far as the natural disasters are concerned, France
comes out best on all accounts due to its mandatory first party
insurance. There is in principle no ad hoc ex post government
compensation and, therefore, also no government intervention.
Because Belgium has followed the French model, it is also
considered a follower on all accounts. The Netherlands and
Germany are the same in the sense that they do not have
mandatory first party insurance cover, but still largely rely on ex
post ad hoc compensation and, thus, on government intervention.
As far as the nuclear disasters are concerned, Germany
comes out best on all accounts. In Germany, the total amounts of
compensation are very high, and there is an exposure of the
nuclear operators to unlimited liability and a mandatory
291
We have not included technological disasters in this table as we had
insufficient information to make a clear distinction between the countries in
this respect.
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provision of EUR 2.5 billion. The danger of state subsidy in
Germany is therefore relatively reduced. Belgium and the
Netherlands can be considered followers as far as the total
amounts are concerned, which are comparable. However, the
subsidy aspect in the Netherlands is more problematic than in
Belgium as in the Netherlands still up to an amount of EUR 2.3
billion public funds are made available after depletion of the
operator’s liability of EUR 1.2 billion, which is not the case in
Belgium. With respect to the nuclear risk, France does worst on
all accounts. In France, there is only an exposure to liability of
the operator of EUR 700 million (the lowest in all countries
reviewed). Therefore, there is an insufficient exposure of the
operator to liability. In addition, there is also compensation via
public funds, which produces a subsidy effect. The total amount
of financial compensation for the nuclear risk in France is also
low.
With respect to terrorism, France comes out best when
examining total amounts because there is, in principle, an
unlimited provision of funds via the CCR. Germany is next with
a EUR 10 billion amount. The amounts are substantially less in
Belgium and the Netherlands, both with EUR 1 billion. As a
result, both Belgium and the Netherlands qualified as laggards.
However, when addressing whether it is the market or rather the
State that provides the amount, the Netherlands comes out best.
Of the total amount of EUR 1 billion, only EUR 50 million is
provided by the State in the Netherlands; moreover, the Dutch
State is charging a premium for this intervention. The state
intervention in Belgium is relatively limited at an amount of
EUR 300 million out of a total of EUR 1 billion. The state
intervention in France is of course huge as it provides unlimited
cover via the CCR. In Germany, a last layer of compensation in
the amount of EUR 7.5 billion is provided by the State. 12.5% of
the premiums collected by Extremus must be paid to the State for
this guarantee. Therefore, it is positive that this layer provided by
the State does not merely consist of a subsidy.
The interesting aspect of this table is that there is in fact
no country that comes out best on all accounts. France may come
out high as far as the financial compensation for victims of
natural disasters is concerned, and Germany may come out high
for nuclear incidents. But France came out quite bad as far as the
nuclear accidents are concerned, and Belgium usually ends up in
the middle of the countries examined. It is striking, however, that
in many cases the Netherlands ends up as a laggard, except for
the fact that it provides a limited government subsidy for a
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compensation of the terrorism risk for which it equally charges a
premium.

G. Explaining the Differences?
The methodology we just applied allows for some
indication of the leaders, followers, and laggards. Indeed, also the
overview we provided, analysing the financial compensation of
victims of disasters in the four countries showed remarkable
differences. Of course, it would be interesting to go beyond the
mere comparison and to ask the question of whether explanations
can be provided for the different attitudes in the various
countries. It is striking, not only that some countries (like France)
are very rapid to introduce mandatory comprehensive insurance
for natural disasters, whereas others (Germany and the
Netherlands) are more reluctant to follow that path. But it is also
striking that following particular disasters (such as Fukushima)
some countries are very quick in reacting and, for example,
adapting amounts of compensation for victims of nuclear
accidents (like Germany) whereas others are much lower or do
not react at all (France). One can only speculate about the sources
for those differences. To some extent it may be related to the
differences in compensation culture in the various countries we
have examined. We already provided for that reason in the
summary of each country some more general observations on
how victimisation is viewed in the particular country and
whether the country is for example rather relying on individual
autonomy or on solidarity. We do not have the possibility to
examine potential sources for those differences based on those
varying legal cultures. However, some interesting indications in
that respect have been provided in the literature. In an interesting
study, Van Dam has used Hofstede’s framework for analysing
cultural differences 292 to explain the cultural differences between
the tort law systems in Europe. 293 Using Hofstede’s criteria to
explain cultural differences, such as: power distance, uncertainty
avoidance, individualism versus collectivism, and masculinity
versus femininity, Van Dam explains that the cultural differences
between the countries. For example, in the United Kingdom
individualism ranks higher than in France or Germany, where
collectivism is more important. That explains, according to him,
292

GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES (2nd ed., 2001).
Cees van Dam, European Tort Law and the Many Cultures of Europe,
in PRIVATE LAW AND THE MANY CULTURES OF EUROPE 57 (Thomas
Wilhelmsson, Elina Paunio & Annika Pohjolainen eds., 2007).
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particular differences between the features of tort law in the three
countries. 294 It would undoubtedly be interesting to apply such an
analysis based on cultural differences in order to analyze whether
that could explain some of the differences in attitudes we have
observed in this study.
However, in particular cases, the differences observed
might not be directly related to differing preferences or cultural
differences. It is well-known that industrial pressure groups play
an important role in shaping legislation in general, 295 and in
shaping tort law in particular. 296 In other words, powerful interest
groups, mostly those related to industry, may play an important
role in the shaping of the legislation with respect to the financial
compensation of victims of catastrophes. That may explain why
in particular countries (for example, the Netherlands) there is
opposition against a more wide-spread use of obligations for
operators to show financial security. And politicians clearly have
their own preferences as well. Recall that politicians can often
gain from providing ex post compensation to victims of
disasters. 297 This is seen, for example in Germany, where
politicians oppose the introduction of structural solutions like
mandatory compulsory insurance. Structural solutions would
remove their possibility to obtain political gains from awarding
financial compensation ad hoc to specific victims. As the German
case study showed, 298 political resistance explained why a
proposal to introduce mandatory insurance for natural disasters
was not accepted in Germany. Some of the differences observed
between the legal systems are therefore not only related to
different compensation cultures, but also to the various lobbying
efforts by interest groups and to the corresponding reactions by
politicians.

H. Recent Evolutions
We started this article by referring to an earlier study from
2006 that had reviewed compensation systems in the four
294
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ECON. 241 (1990), for an example how nuclear liability legislation in Belgium
has been shaped by private interests.
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countries 299 which we took as a basis for our case studies.
However, we equally indicated that since that period a lot has
happened: not only have further proposals for legislative changes
taken place; the countries examined have also experienced many
disasters. In fact, with the exception of nuclear accidents, all of
the other disasters examined (natural, technological, and
terrorism) have hit one or more of the countries examined. It is
for that reason that we also examined to what extent the
compensation mechanisms put in place were used to compensate
the victims. In that respect, it is striking that the discussion of
those recent disasters showed that in various ways (and in some
countries more criticized than in others) financial compensation
to the victims has been provided. In some cases that took place on
the basis of existing legislation; in others, new legislation was
created or ad hoc interventions took place in order to provide
compensation.
Belgium could apply its Terrorism Act of 1 April 2007 and
the pool solution TRIP to the terrorist attack on the Brussels
airport. France could apply the mandatory insurance for natural
disasters, with reinsurance via the CCR, to cover the losses
related to the 2016 flooding. France could also use the
compensation mechanism for personal injury to compensate the
victims of the terrorist attacks in both Paris and Nice. The same
was true in Germany where government compensation was
provided to deal with the personal injury from the victims of the
2016 Berlin terrorist attack. As Germany has no structural
solution, both the 2013 and the 2017 floodings were compensated
on an ad hoc basis. That could therefore lead to the conclusion
that all countries dealt in some way or another with the financial
losses of the victims, also in those recent disasters. However, that
should obviously not lead to the conclusion that the compensation
in the countries examined would therefore be adequate. In many
cases (especially in Germany) there was criticism on the speed
and adequacy of the compensation. Moreover, as we made clear,
providing adequate compensation to victims is only one criterion
to judge a financial compensation system; the other question is to
what extent the compensation mechanism also provides effective
incentives for disaster risk reduction ex ante, to the extent that
that is possible at all. In that respect, there are still remarkable
differences between the countries, and politicians generally still
seem to show a strong tendency to provide ad hoc compensation
when there is a large public pressure, like in the case of terrorism.
299
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I. Looking into the Future
An interesting question is of course also to what extent this
critical comparison of the countries provides any indication of
how countries would deal with (perhaps also other) disasters in
the future. Of course, observations in this domain are largely
speculative, but based on what has happened in the past, a few
speculations could be made: as far as natural disasters are
concerned, it is unlikely that major changes will take place in
France and Belgium for the simple reason that structural
solutions have been put in place and are generally considered as
satisfactory. Germany attempted to introduce compulsory
disaster insurance, but the attempt failed. It is not very likely that
a similar attempt will be undertaken again in the near future. In
the Netherlands, the financial compensation for victims of
natural disasters has led to many debates between the
stakeholders, policy documents and reports, but not yet to any
concrete legislative proposal for reform. However, it is likely that,
inter alia as a result of climate change, the Netherlands will be
more vulnerable to particular natural disasters, especially those
related to water such as seawater levels rising, heavy rainfall, and
flooding. It is not unlikely that when another of those would
(again) hit the Netherlands in the future, the question of
insurance to cover those risks would rise again. The question of
introducing a similar structural solution as Belgium and France
would also see the light again.
As far as technological disasters are concerned, it is not
likely that large changes will occur in the short run in Belgium
and France. In the Netherlands, it is likely that the debate will be
reopened on the currently large lack of compulsory financial
securities for operators of hazardous activities. There may be
strong political opposition against increased duties in that respect,
but the current externalisation of harm to society by operators
will most likely no longer be felt as acceptable, more particularly
when another large technological disaster would occur.
The area where the influence of the major interest groups,
more particularly licensees of nuclear power plants and generally
electricity producers, has been large is undoubtedly related to the
liability for nuclear accidents. Not only has the nuclear lobby
been able to create very favourable conventions with low limits
on liability; even after Chernobyl it took more than 10 years to
adapt the international Conventions and more than 30 years after
Chernobyl, most of those adapted Conventions and Protocols
have not even entered into force yet. The international arena,
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more particularly the Nuclear Energy Agency from the OECD,
does not even have serious proposals on the table to reform the
international Conventions towards a real internalisation of the
externalities caused by the nuclear risk, even post Fukushima.
Given the apparent complete capturing of the NEA by the
nuclear lobby it is not to be expected that at the international
arena much will change in the near future. That may, however,
be different at the national level. Even before Fukushima,
Germany showed to be quite progressive with higher amounts of
compensation (compared to the nuclear Conventions) and with
the reduction of the state subsidies. Interestingly this led to the
creation of a risk-sharing agreement between the nuclear power
plant operators in Germany. Not surprisingly the country in
Europe that is lagging behind in this respect is exactly the one
where 50% of all Europe’s nuclear plants are located, France. It
shows the lowest liability for the nuclear operator and a large
amount of state intervention. 300 In general one can, however,
expect that Member States at the national level would follow the
German example. Following the German example implies that, as
a result of public pressure and green lobbyism, some countries
may decide to deviate from the international regime which is
largely favourable to the nuclear industry. Deviating countries
may for example decide to increase limits on liability or even,
following the German example, transition to unlimited liability.
Terrorism is one domain that likely will not experience
much change in the near future. The simple reason is that post
9/11 all four legal systems already put in place terrorism pools to
deal with terrorism-related property damage. As far as personal
injury is concerned, most of the countries examined already had
compensation funds in place for victims of violent acts which
could also benefit victims of terrorism. The recent attacks in
France, Germany, and Belgium have moreover shown that the
systems that were put in place were able to provide adequate
compensation to victims. For that reason, it is not very likely that
large changes could be expected in the near future in that
domain.

VII. FINAL THOUGHTS
We started this article by examining whether, from a
Dutch perspective, there are possibilities to improve the current
300
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system for a financial compensation for victims of disasters. Our
examination inquired as to whether higher amounts of
compensation can be provided and whether the system can be
structured in such a manner that also effective incentives for
disaster risk reduction are provided.
An interesting lesson from the critical comparison
provided in the previous section is that countries can benefit from
mutual learning. There are indeed substantial differences.
Differences relate not only to varying approaches between the
countries, but also between the different domains (technological,
natural, nuclear and terrorism). It was also striking to see that
there is no country that is, in the view of the economic starting
points, doing perfect on all accounts. As just mentioned, France
may be doing well as far as the financial compensation for
victims of natural disasters is concerned, but certainly not in the
area of the nuclear risk. However, it was also striking that for
many domains the Netherlands seems to be running behind the
neighbouring countries. That therefore provides an important
scope for improvement and learning for the Netherlands. In fact,
as we have also clearly indicated when discussing the Dutch
case, 301 there have already been many studies that came to a large
extent to the same conclusions as this report with respect to the
necessary reforms of the system in the Netherlands. They can
easily be summarized as follows: as far as the natural disasters
are concerned, there is a strong case to be made in the
Netherlands to follow the French/Belgian example and therefore
to introduce comprehensive mandatory insurance for particular
natural disasters, specifically for flooding. As far as technological
disasters are concerned, the dramatic cases of Volendam and
Enschede clearly showed that the Netherlands should make
much more use of mandatory solvency guarantees. That was
already the recommendation in previous reports, including
reports from the WRR, and is equally the conclusion from this
study.
The reason why efficient solutions are not introduced is
often related to politics and more particularly effective lobbying
by interest groups or lacking political rewards. Depoorter (2006)
showed convincingly that politicians receive too little reward for
investments in ex ante prevention and can largely benefit from ex
post compensation. That is why there will often be systematic
underinvestment in ex ante disaster risk reduction and
overcompensation ex post. That this is not only a theoretical issue
301
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was well demonstrated when reviewing the attempt to introduce
comprehensive mandatory insurance for natural disasters in
Germany: politicians did not want to lose the power to receive
political rewards by providing ex post compensation and did not
want to expose households to the payment of premiums in a time
of financial crisis. 302 Notwithstanding these political difficulties,
which have undoubtedly played an important role in the
Netherlands as well, it still remains important to point at the
dangers and weaknesses of the current system: not only will
insufficient compensation be available when yet another flooding
or Enschede/Volendam-type of technological disaster occurs; it
equally leads to systematic underinvestments in ex ante disaster
risk reduction.
One problem when facing catastrophes is that some may
argue that when a disaster happens, the damage will be so huge
that it is not possible to provide any type of ex ante compensation
mechanism that would reasonably be able to deal with such
catastrophe. Ultimately it will be the government (and therefore
the tax payer) that has to pay. That (wrong) argument is then
often used to justify any lack of action with respect to a structural
solution for the financial compensation of victims of disasters.
The argument is wrong for the obvious reason that disasters
come in varying degrees. Not all disasters are of such a
magnitude that it would be impossible to provide compensation
via market solutions like insurance. Moreover, even when the
real amount of a catastrophe is higher than insurable amounts, a
partially structural solution to compensate for example EUR 1020 billion would still have the benefit of reducing the amount for
which additional financing would have to be sought. The most
important point is that ignoring catastrophes because of this
fatalistic perspective (there is nothing we can do anyway) also
reduces disaster preparedness and effective investments in
disaster risk reduction. It remains therefore important to work
out a structural solution even when one has to realize that that
solution may adequately deal with some but not necessarily with
the most dramatic disasters. The experience with the
French/Belgian model for dealing with natural disasters shows
that it is possible to work out a structural solution (using market
insurance and an intervention by the State as reinsurer of last
resort) that is able to deal with most if not all natural disasters.
Of course, an important limit of our study consists of the
fact that we addressed only four types of disasters (natural,
302
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technological, nuclear and terrorism). We did not pay attention to
specific types of technological disasters that could potentially lead
to catastrophic losses. One could think of a major failure of
energy systems, related to or independent from cyber attacks or,
more generally, the huge economic losses and societal disruptions
that could follow from cyber attacks. As we already made clear in
the introduction, cyber attacks show particular idiosyncrasies
which make them different from any of the catastrophes we have
discussed so far. Moreover, as we also made clear, not every cyber
attack is necessarily a disaster although it may be regarded as
such in a financial sense. Some of the mechanisms that were put
in place to deal with the disasters that we have discussed in this
report (like insurance) are also available to deal with cyber
attacks. 303 Moreover, some alternatives (like the risk-sharing
agreements used in the nuclear sector in Germany) have recently
also been proposed as a potential remedy for cyber security
related risks. 304 A major difference, however, between the
disasters that were studied in this report and cyber attacks is that
(so far) the losses resulting from cyber attacks have not yet been
catastrophic (which does not mean that it could potentially not be
the case). Differently than with the disasters studied in this
report, the question also arises whether a cyber attack necessarily
leads to a demand for financial compensation. An element which
makes the cyber risk different is that there is especially a demand
for information sharing, for risk reduction and for damage
mitigation. Those often require also a collaboration, but not
necessarily the type of financial compensation for the types of
disasters we have studied in this report. Cyber security risks
should therefore undoubtedly be subject to further research in
another study.
Even though we limited this article to study the four
specific types of disasters, the principles and solutions worked out
in this article could be of relevance to other catastrophic lessons
as well. The major lesson from this and many other studies
devoted to this topic is always clear: working out ex ante a
structural solution to deal with the financial compensation after a
disaster has occurred is always better (in view of both prevention
and compensation) than an ad hoc ex post solution. The old
saying remains true: prevention is always better than cure.
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